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FAILED EXPLANATIONS AND CRIMINAL
RESPONSIBILITY: EXPERTS AND THE UNCONSCIOUS*

Stephen J. Morse**
"There is no such thing as a bad boy."
Fr. Edward Joseph Flanagan
"Tout comprendre c'est tout pardonner."
French Proverb
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INTRODUCTION:

A

1083

PROJECT FOR SciENTIFic MENTAL HEALTH
EXPERTISE

HE causes of human conduct, including aberrant behavior,
have forever been a source of interest, wonder, and puzzlement. At various times, Fate, humors, incubi, succubi, the gods,
the devil, genetics, parents, unconscious conflicts and structures,
the will, social structure, brain anatomy and physiology, contingencies of reinforcement, and combinations of the above have been
advanced as explanatory factors. 1 In the past two centuries, under

T

For standard histories of psychiatry, see generally F. Alexander & T. Selesnick, The
History of Psychiatry: An Evaluation of Psychiatric Thought and Practice from Prehistoric
1
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the influence of a scientific and medical Weltanschauung and
sympathy for criminal defendants, Anglo-American criminal law
has increasingly relied on the modern disciplines of behavior for
explanations, especially psychiatry, psychology, and psychoanalysis. Behavioral sciences and scientists have promised to help rationalize ascriptions of criminal responsibility and the apportionment of punishment. But have they fulfilled their promises?
In Crazy Behavior, Morals and Science: An Analysis of Mental
Health Law, a recent article that addressed mental health law generally,2 I attempted to clarify the usefulness of behavioral science
and scientists in understanding and deciding legal cases involving
mental health issues. I argued that the degree of present acceptance or reliance on mental health experts is unwise, unjustified,
and unnecessary, because such reliance often confuses social questions with scientific issues. 3 Crazy Behavior also claimed that, at
least for legal purposes, there is much less mental health science
than is commonly supposed, and that lay persons are generally but
not exclusively capable of providing the type of information necessary for reasoned decisionmaking in mental health cases. •
I also argued in Crazy Behavior that the general supposition
that the mentally disordered as a class are substantially less capable than "normal" persons of behaving rationally and controlling
their behavior is an empirically unwarranted assumption. Consequently, it is difficult to support, on other than intuitive grounds,
laws that treat the mentally disordered differently from normal
persons, thereby depriving them of liberty and dignity.~ I therefore
suggested reforms of a set of typical mental health laws that would
treat the mentally disordered properly, or at least clarify the essentially moral, social, and political nature of laws that did treat the
disordered specially. 6 The legal system was enjoined to take re-

Times to the Present (1966); G. Zilboorg, A History of Medical Psychology (1941). An excellent traditional history of psychology is E. Boring, A History of Experimental Psychology
(1949). A complete review of various theories may be found in Comprehensive Textbook of
Psychiatry-III (H. Kaplan, A. Freedman & B. Sadock 3d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as
CTP-III].
2
Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals, and Science: An Analysis of Mental Health Law, 51 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 527 (1978).
3
Id. at 543-54 (what is mental disorder?).
• Id. at 554-60 (who is crazy?); 600-22 (the relevance of experts).
• Id. at 564-90.
6
Id. at 626-54.
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sponsibility for deciding as a legal matter the difficult issues
presented by crazy behavior. 7
IVlore recently, Richard Bonnie and Christopher Slobogin, both
of the University of Virginia School of Law, have argued in a
thought-provoking and important article 8 that it is morally and socially proper for the criminal law to place great weight on the defendant's subjective psychological state for purposes of ascribing
responsibility and imposing punishment. Bonnie and Slobogin
claim that the law must accept the necessary imprecision that accompanies the investigation of subjective mental states when criminal punishment and stigma are at issue. 9 They also suggest that
the law should not narrow the contributions of mental health experts, as I advised in Crazy Behavior, but should expand the influence of these experts as an integral part of criminal law adjudication. Bonnie and Slobogin especially advocate the use of
psychodynamic psychologicaP 0 explanations of criminal behavior. 11
Finally, they argue that the proper response to the admitted failures of mental health expertise in the criminal process is not to
limit the role of the experts; rather, it is to train the experts to do
the job right. 12 To state and support their claims on behalf of
mental health experts, Bonnie and Slobogin use my views as a
counterpoint to their own.
The debate involves both the means by which our society and
the criminal justice system explain criminal behavior and ascribe
responsibility, and the means by which we can make criminal justice decisionmaking most rational. Mental health experts at present provide information about incompetence to stand trial, diminished capacity, criminal insanity, sentencing, parole, and other
7
Id . at 600-04, 626. The word crazy is used for the sake of accuracy and to avoid question-begging labels. The author does not intend any disrespect toward disordered persons or
mental health professionals. See id. at 529 n.l.
8
Bonnie & Slobogin, The Role of Mental Health Professionals in the Criminal Process:
The Case for Informed Speculation, 66 Va. L. Rev. 427 (1980).
• Id . at 431-52.
10
Psychodynamic formulations and reconstructions refer to explanations of behavior
based on the principles of psychodynamic psychol ogy. This article uses the term psychodynamic psychology to refer to all modern psychological theories, beginning with Freudian
psychoanalytic theory, that posit unconscious variables as the primary determinants of
hum an behavior. See infra notes 40-190 and accompanying text for a full discussion of psychodynamic psychology.
11
Bonni e & Slobogin, supra note 8, at 492-95 (summary).
12
Id. at 496-522.
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issues. They are the foremost experts u.sed by defense counsel to
support claims for mercy or com passion. In the nar:cm;vest legal
terms, the debate is about the proper limits on ment al health expert testimony in criminal trials. But the deeper issue involves fundamental conceptions of human behavior, the responsibility for actions, and the proper purposes and scope of punishment.
This article will first explore the importance of assessing subjec.
. l st a·t es m
. cnmma
. . l .laW
,
d" t '
l
~
t 1ve ment8.
ark vne roe or exper·l s m HS S lS ~v13
ing such m:.sessments. I agree with Bonnie and Slobogin t hat subjective mens rea requirements and general culpability are
necessary preconditions of just criminal punishment. I shaH argue,
however, that the duty to be fair to criminal defendants does not
justify the admission of expert testimony without regard to the reliability and validity of the data and opinions, or the needs of the
factfinder for assistance.
The second section, the centerpiece of the article, considers the
role of psychodynamic explanations in the criminal process by advancing four arguments. First, psychodynamic theory does not provide scientifically validated causal accounts for behavior; rather, it
is better understood as a literary-interpretive account of the meaning of behavior. Second, in individual cases, no means exist at present to construct a reliable and valid dynamic formulation of the
behavior of the defendant. Third, even if dynamic theory were sufficiently valid, and if mental health experts could formulate reliable and valid explanations of individual cases using the t heory, unconscious motivation should not affect assessments of
responsibility. Finally, the section argues that a psychodynamic
approach to criminal cases yields no sensible, practical ap proach to
dispositional questions.
The third section of the article shows that the scientific foundation for broad reliance on expertise is no stronger now than it was
when I first proposed in Crazy Behavior to narrow t he role of experts, and that training programs are an inapposite (and utopian)
remedy for the defects in expert testimony. The fourth section
analyzes intensively a representative sample of the cases that Bonnie and Slobogin offer as proof that t heir proposals will lead to the
production of useful evidence in criminal law decisionmaking.
Their analysis of the cases is parsed and compared with the apI'

13

Id. at 446.

•

•

...
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proach set forth in Crazy Behavior and the previous sections of
this article. The section claims that my approach will produce
decisionmaking that is more efficient, scientific, and fair than the
Bonnie and Slobogin system.
T he article concludes by suggesting that the medicalization of
bdmvior, exemplified by psychodynamic explanations, has eroded
sensible, traditional notions of responsibility by compromising the
belief that most persons are capable of rational behavior and reasonable self-control. To repair the damage, I call once again for a
return to primary reliance on common sense in thinking about
criminal law and adjudicating criminal cases.

II.

SuBJECTIVITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND EviDENCE: FoRMULATIONS
ON THE Two THEORIES OF E xPERT TESTIMONY

A criminal conviction is a matter of great consequence, leading,
as it almost always does, to some loss of liberty and to stigmatization. Substantive and procedural rules for adjudicating criminal liability must strike a just balance between societal and individual
concerns. The law must determine the necessary preconditions for
ascribing responsibility to and punishing a criminal defendant, and
it must decide how much latitude the defendant rnust be permitted in his or her efforts to defeat allegations of guilt or to argue for
mitigation of punishment after conviction.
In addition to an offensive act, the criminal law traditionally has
had two basic criteria for responsibility and punishment: first, the
actor must have been capable of reasonably rational, self-directed
control over his or her behavior at the time of the offensive act;
and second, the actor must have had the subjective state of mind,
the mens rea, that was required for liability by the definition of
the offense charged. 14 Although we agree on the wisdom of these

14
The policy behind the first criterion is straightforward. In a criminal justice system
concerned with just punishment rather than with simply the efficient maintenance of order,
it is unfair to punish persons for acts that are beyond their rational control. Small children
and beasts are not considered responsible and are not punished for this reason (although
they may be incapacitated in some fashion to protect themselves or others from the consequences of their ill-controlled behavior). The policies underlying the mens rea criterion are
cl osely allied to those supporting the necessity of rationality and reasonable control. Just
assessments of blame must consider the actor's state of mind when he or she performed the
offens ive act. Generally, for example, a person who acts intentionally is considered more
blmneworthy than a person who produces the same consequence negligently. For purposes
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requirements, what divides observers of criminal justice such as
Bonnie and Slobogin and myself is, first, the extent to which we
believe that psychological factors or theories bear on, vitiate, or negate self-control, and, second, the best method for gathering evidence about control capacity and mens rea. I argue that the law
should require a high degree of self-control from all persons and
that psychological factors rarely so undermine the capacity for reasonable self-control and the ability to form mental states that the
law should diminish the legal responsibility of the actor. 1 11 This argument is based on the belief that the data do not demonstrate
that most people, including most disordered persons, are incapable
of forming mens rea or acting with . reasonable rationality or selfcontrol. Bonnie and Slobogin believe, by contrast, that large numbers of offenders are either not fully responsible for their behavior
or are not responsible at all. Let us call such persons "responsibility skeptics." They appear to believe that a very substantial percentage of defendants lack reasonable degrees of autonomy and
dignity. As this article will demonstrate, the responsibility skeptics
usually reach this view on the basis of an uncritical assessment of
the scientific evidence or on the basis of a naive determinism.
My second point of departure from Bonnie and Slobogin is the
usefulness of much mental health testimony. Bonnie and Slobogin
claim that exclusion of such evidence is unfair to defendants because the experts have much to contribute to subjective assessments, and they label the critics of this testimony "method skeptics."16 I shall try to demonstrate, however, that, unlike the
"method skeptics," Bonnie and Slobogin make no systematic attempt either to analyze the questions allegedly calling for mental
health expertise or to consider the reliability and validity of the
scientific methods and data supporting the expertise they endorse.

of blaming and punishing, the criminal law recognizes the moral distinctions between states
of mind. There is virtual unanimity on the proposition that justice requires determinations
of mens rea and the capability for reasonable control.
Notwithstanding the suggestions by some that questions about mental states should be
resolved exclusively at the disposition phase, see, e.g., B. Wootton, Crime and the Criminal
Law (1963), the criminal law shows no indication of excluding decisions about mental state
and responsibility from the adjudicatory phase of criminal trials.
16
Those who take this position are termed "moral skeptics," a faintly pejorative appellation. Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 8, at 432. The label is also philosophically unsophisticated. See G. Warnock, The Object of Morality 125-38 (1971).
16
Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 8, at 433.
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They appear simply to assume that mental health expertise is reliable, valid, and relevant to legal decisionmaking; they therefore
may be termed "method votaries."
The method votaries admit that much of the "data" they would
allow into evidence is scientifically soft or unverifiable, but they
appear to justify its admission on three grounds. First, they uncritically assume the general scientific validity of theory and data. 17
Second, they correctly note that the modern trend in evidence law
is to expand greatly the scope of expert testimony and the competence of experts to offer conclusions on ultimate issues. 18 Third,
they argue that, in view of the first two assertions, the necessity for
the assessment of psychological functioning in criminal law decisionmaking requires the admission of quite imprecise mental
health testimony. 19 By contrast, I claim that although the criminal
law mti"St take subjectivity into account, this should not justify an
"anything goes" criterion for admission of expert testimony. The
law should exclude much mental health testimony from the criminal process because it is so unscientific that it cannot assist the
factfinder. Indiscriminate admission of mental health testimony is
inefficient, misleading, confusing, and sometimes prejudicial. 20
Under modern evidence law, the primary criterion for admission
of testimony is whether it will assist the trier of fact to resolve the
relevant issues. 21 In order to deem scientific evidence admissible,
courts require that the validity of the science be established. 22 Expert evidence is generally admissible, however, if it is based on
matters beyond the ken of laypersons. The increasingly permissive
standards for the admissibility of expert testimony are justified on
the grounds that the factfinder should have before it all the information that might reasonably aid its determination. 23 Weaknesses
or deficiencies in the scientific basis for expert testimony or in the
testimony itself are considered matters of weight rather than adId. at 461-66.
Id. at 452-53, 456.
19
Id. at 461, 492-93.
20
Morse, supra note 2, at 604-22, 625-26.
21
E.g., Fed. R. Evid. 702; Cal. Evid. Code § 801(a) (West 1966).
22
See, e.g., Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923); Gianelii, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-Century Later, 80
Colum. L. Rev. 1197 (1980).
23
McCormick's Handbook of the Law of Evidence § 203, at 490-91 (E. Cleary 2d ed.
1972).
17

18
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missibility. It is alleged that effective cross-examination can expose
the weaknesses of an expert's testimony. 24
I generally agree with permissive standards for the admissibility
of expert testimony, but the use of mental healt h testimony in the
criminal justice system should be an exception to the general rule.
The integrity of the criminal law, the protection of society, and
fundamental principles of justice should require more for admissibility than the facial relevance of theories and methods or t h eir use
by some percentage of practitioners in a field .2 :s It is not enough to
claim, as Bonnie and Slobogin do, that "the professional literature
reflects years of experimentation and close observation." 2 6 Expert
testimony should be admitted only if it can truly assist the
factfinder. Scientists in the past have accepted numerous doctrines
and theories that later have proven preposterous. Before the modern era, the law might have forgiven "scientists" for t heir mistakes
because the methods and instrumentation necessary to test empirical hypotheses were unknown. At present, however, it simply does
not suffice to recognize evidence purportedly based on a scientific
theory merely because that theory is accepted in the field, or because a proponent of that theory has had "years of experience." If
a scientific discipline lacks validity, its "data" simply cannot assist
the factfinder. For a science to be the basis of expert testimony, it
does not have to be as precise or validated as the laws of motion,
but specialized knowledge can assist the trier of fact only if it
exists.
Before courts accept evidence from a scientific field, they should
examine the evidence to determine its general reliability and validity. Otherwise, there will be no rational means for a court to decide
if the seeming relevance of scientific testimony is outweighed by its
tendency to be inefficient, misleading or prejudicial. If a particular
theory is no more than a set of unverified hypotheses, courts
should not accept "expert speculation" based on the theory, even if
many practitioners subscribe to it. If there have been scientifically
acceptable tests of the hypotheses, courts should still ask what the

24
Cf. Morse, supra note 2, at 626 (arguing that expert testimony is often inefficient,
wasteful, and prejudicial because "too few attorneys are skilled at cross-examining psychiatrists, laypersons overweigh the testimony of experts, and . . . unrestricted use of experts
promotes the incorrect view that the questions are primarily scientific").
20
See id.
26
Bonnie 8.'-- Slobogin, supra note 8, at 464 n.120.

980

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 68:971

data show. Have propositions relevant to the legal questions in issue been confirmed? If not, courts should not accept testimony
based on those propositions simply because a group of persons
claim without scientific support that they are a valid account. A
criminal defendant is not unfairly prevented from presenting the
fullest defense possible if unproven, invalid speculations are
excluded.
In a passage of admirable honesty, Bonnie and Slobogin admit
that they would exclude in civil commitment cases much of the
expertise they would allow so willingly in criminal proceedings. 27
By this admission they badly compromise their position. The inconsistency indicates that their guiding principle is not the validity
of the expertise itself; were that the guiding principle, the testimony would be of equal worth in all contexts. Rather, the guiding
principle for Bonnie and Slobogin appears to be that the law
should restrain the state as much as possible from exerting control
over a person in any context. Under this principle, their inconsistency in including or excluding mental health expertise evaporates,
because its use in a criminal prosecution and exclusion in civil
commitment proceedings both defeat the state's attempt to deprive a person of liberty. 28 Their guiding principle is clearly coherent, and I subscribe fully to their preference for liberty, 29 but there

27

ld. at 494-95.
Bonnie and Slobogin chide me for overlooking the normative distinction between using
expert testimony in civil commitment and criminal law cases. Id. at 468 n.l33. They argue
that in the former, it is the state that typically benefits and the individual who is involuntarily confined, while in the criminal law the defendant seeks to benefit by avoiding the
clutches of the state. Id. But I have not overlooked this supposed normative distinction-!
simply apply different guiding principles. The Bonnie & Slobogin principle is that the state
should be prevented from exerting control over the liberty of an individual, whether that
person allegedly committed a crime, acted crazily, or whatever. Consequently, they are extremely permissive in allowing the defendant to use mental health expertise to defeat a
criminal prosecution, but are equally willing to exclude the same expertise in the civil commitment context.
29
Although I, too, have a strong preference for liberty, see, Morse, A Preference for Liberty: The Case Against Involuntary Civil Commitment of the Mentally Disordered, 70 Cal.
L. Rev. 54 (1982), I am not uncomfortable with convicting and punishing guilty persons.
Almost all persons are capable of controlling their behavior and are responsible for it. Moreover, in all legal contexts, courts should only accept expert testimony that i2 reasonable and
scientifically valid and that deals with scientific and not legal issues. Thus, evidence that is
irrelevant because it is unhelpful on a particular issue in the civil commitment context is
similarly irrelevant to the same issue in criminal proceedings. I see no reason why a criminal
defendant, simply because he or she is a criminal defendant, should be allowed unjustified
~8
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is reason to doubt their commitment to the use of truly relevant
evidence in legal proceedings. If the evidence is too weak and too
prejudicial for use in commitment proceedings, the law should exclude it in all contexts. But if it is valid in criminal cases and if
involuntary commitment is - at least in some cases - a justified
exercise of state power, then mental health expert testimony ought
to be freely admissible in involuntary commitment cases as well.
Questions of scientific validity aside, the law should also exclude
much mental health expert testimony because mental health expertise is generally not necessary to answer the questions posed by
criminal law. To clarify this contention, let me reiterate the position I took in Crazy Behavior concerning the nature of mental
health questions in the law. Criminal courts confronted with
mental health cases wish to know whether the defendant was mentally disordered or mentally abnormal at the time of the crime
charged 30 and, if so, whether the disorder or abnormality interfered
so substantially with the defendant's mens rea or capacity for ra·tionality or self-control that the defendant should be acquitted or
considered less than fully responsible. 31
Crazy Behavior was largely devoted to an analysis and legal interpretation of these questions. The analysis and interpretation
were the bases for my proposals about the use of expertise. 32 I argued that the law ought not be concerned with whether a person is
mentally disordered; instead the crucial question is whether the
person was so abnormally crazy that one might reasonably assume

latitude to use questionable evidence to buttress claims of nonresponsibility. All defendants
want to use evidence that may beat the rap, but unless the defendant has a reasonably
creditable claim of lessened responsibility, the integrity of the system is compromised by
taking invalid claims seriously; no sound normative principle is violated by preventing a
defendant from using irrelevant evidence.
so Morse, supra note 2, at 541, 542-60.
"' Id. at 541, 560-90. I also noted, see id. at 590-600, that in some instances factfinders
wish to know what the person will do in the future . I demonstrated there that expert predictions, especially of the clinical variety, are likely to be highly inaccurate and therefore
should be treated with great skepticism and caution when used as a basis for legal decisionmaking. Bonnie and Slobogin agree with my evaluation of the predictive ability of experts
and the issue will not be addressed further . See Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 8, at 457-61.
The most recent authoritative treatment of this issue is J. Monahan, Predicting Violent
Behavior: An Assessment of Clinical Techniques 41-89 (1981).
82
Bonnie and Slobogin do not address directly my foundational analysis of mental health
Iaw questions, but I assume they are not in complete agreement with it because they reject
proposals based dire ctly on it. They do not present an analysis of these questions.
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that the actor lacked the usual degree of rational control over his
or her behavior. 33 Laws that treat crazy persons differently are bottomed on the assumption that such persons lack rational control or
free choice. A diagnosis of mental disorder is simply an inaccurate
and conclusory proxy for both abnormality and lack of self-control.
Disorder or disease explanations stereotypically assume a iack of
control, but supporting evidence is lacking. Therefore, I concluded,
it is better to confront the question of craziness and lack of control
directly. Finally, I contended that whether a person was sufficiently crazy to be subject to the application of special mental
health laws is a social and moral judgment that can be made on
the basis of lay assessment of thoughts, feelings, and actions.
Neither knowledge of the causes of craziness nor speculations
about disease processes answer the question of whether a particular person is too crazy to be subject to the usual rules. 34
On the question of the causal relationship between mental disorder and legally relevant behavior, I suggested in Crazy Behavior
that the question of whether the relationship existed at all required simply a commonsense assessment of whether crazy
thoughts, feelings, or actions were the impetus for the legally relevant behavior. 3 ~ Furthermore, I argued that there is no scientific
test for whether a person can control himself or herself, and that
whether the causal relationship is so strong that the law should
excuse the person is a question science cannot answer. 36 Science
m ight provide data about the strength of the relative pressures
craziness exerts on the person's choice to engage in legally relevant
behavior, and clinicians might provide relevant evidence about the
person's psychological experiences, but whether the pressure is too
great to hold the actor responsible is a matter of social and moral
judgment.
The implications of this analysis for the proper use of mental
health experts are clear . Because these questions can be answered
primarily on the basis of lay observations and judgments, expert
testimony should be limited to domains where it adds :relevant information. I agree that the criminal defendant must be allowed to

ss
~·
85

•~

Morse, supra note 2, at 542- 54.
Id. at 562--90.
Icl. at 554-60, 581.
Id. at 585-90.
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present a full defense, including the use of relevant expert testimony, but false, confusing, or misleading expertise must be excluded. If the integrity of t he criminal process is to be preserved,
the expertise of experts must be assessed and n ot assumed. On the
basis of an extensive analysis of the knowledge and skills of mental
health professionals, assessed in light of my interpretation of
mental health law questions; I proposed t he ft.:;llm;ving conclusions
concerning the proper contributions of mental health professionals.
First, mental health professionals are acute obs8rvere. of behavior
and can therefore efficiently provide the rich behavioral data -observations about thoughts, feelings, and actions - - that are necessary to decide mental health law questions.:l7 Second, these professionals can present quantitative data based on empirical studies
using reasonably sound methodologies to help triers of fact understand the effect craziness exerts on other behavior. 38 Third, the law
should prohibit professionals from offering theoretical speculations, including psychodynamic speculations, that are unsupported
by hard data. Unproven or invalid theoretical speculations do not
help a factfinder properly to organize data, to ascertain states of
mind, or to understand the "true" causes of behavior. Fourth, experts should not be allowed to offer opinions on nonscientific, ultimate legal issues. Imprecise but helpful data will be admitted
under my proposal, but diagnoses, speculations, and ultimate conclusions provide nothing of value to the factfinder, lead to a conflation of legal and scientific issues, and are generally inefficient and
misleading. 39

III.

PSYCHODYNAMICS AND CRIMINAL

LAw:

THEORY AND ITS

DISCONTENTS

This section will examine in detail the nature of psychodynamic
psychology and its relationship to ascriptions of criminal responsibility and the imposition of punishment. Psychodynamic psychology is chosen for examination because it is the psychological theory
that has most influenced legal theorists, 40 and because it is the pri-

37

Id. at 611-15.
Id. at 615-22.
39
Id. at 625-26.
4
° For examples of this influence, see A. Ehrenzweig, Psychoanalytic Jurisprudence
(1971); J_ Goldstein, A. Freud & A. Solnit, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child (1973); J.
ss
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mary theory Bonnie and Slobogin employ to aid criminal justice
decisionmaking. The section will argue that, scientifically, psychodynamic psychology is not sufficiently valid or reliable to provide
the basis for expert testimony. Moreover, it is not relevant to criminal responsibility and punishment, nor can it aid practical judgments about disposition.
Psychodynamic psychology offers a powerful and appealing theoretical and practical tool for conceptualizing and evaluating all
behavior, criminal and noncriminal. Bonnie and Slobogin accept,
with becoming caution, psychodynamic explanations as causal accounts of abnormal behavior. They suggest that these explanations
should lead in many cases to the mitigation of the punishment due
convicted criminals and, in some instances, should lead to complete absolution of criminal defendants. Bonnie and Slobogin implicitly accept the view that if one adduces an unconscious psychodynamic cause of behavior, one must also conclude that the actor's
capability for rationality or self-control was compromised to some
degree and that the actor's responsibility should be diminished to
some degree. 41 If Bonnie and Slobogin are correct, however, our
society's moral and practical approaches to criminal behavior are
far more misguided than they seem to recognize. The same types
of explanations that Bonnie and Slobogin advance to diminish responsibility for what they conceive to be aberrant criminal behavior can also be applied properly to all behavior, inexorably creating
a need for a vast reconceptualization of all notions of personal accountability. This task Bonnie and Slobogin do not appear disposed to perform, largely, I believe, because they have not fully
explored the psychodynamic tools with which they build their edifice of excusing and mitigating conditions.

Katz, J. Goldstein & A. Dershowitz, Psychoanalysis, Psychiatry and Law (1967); Bienenfeld,
Prolegomena to a Psychoanalysis of Law and Justice, Part I, 53 Cal. L. Rev. 957 (1965);
Bienenfeld, Prolegomena to Psychoanalysis of Law and Justice, Part II, Analysis, 53 Cal. L.
Rev. 1254 (1965); Goldstein, Psychoanalysis and Jurisprudence, 77 Yale L.J. 1053 (1968).
Although most criminal law theorizing and decisionmaking makes no systematic, extensive
use of any psychological theory, psychodynamic theory appears to be the only theory that
has attracted systematic legal attention. For a discussion of the reasons for this attention,
see infra notes 73-7 4, 134 and accompanying text.
•

1

Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 8, at 446-52.
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The Appeal of Theoretical Romances

P sychodynamic psychology is the theory of human behavior that
posits unconscious variables and processes, especially psychological
instincts, conflicts, anxieties and defenses, as the primary causes of
behavior. 42 P oets, philosophers, scientists and oth ers have always

Hereinafter, the terms psychodynamic psychology, dynamic psychology, and psychoanalytic psychology will be used interchangeably, although technically the latter term should
be reserved for Freudian psychology. The term "unconscious" as applied to mental contents
has two distinct meanings in psychodynamic psychology. A mental content is "descriptively" unconscious if a person is not aware of the content at any given moment, but can
bring it to mind by trying to do so. For example, one's telephone number is at most times
descriptively uncon scious. Freudians also refer to such material as being in the preconscious.
In contrast, mental contents are "dynamically" unconscious if they have been forced out of
consciousness by uncontrolled and unperceived processes because the contents, if brought to
consciousness, would produce too much emotional pain. For instance, Freudian psychology
posits that human beings have bisexual instincts and desires, but the homosexual component of the sexual drive is usually dynamically unconscious because it creates anxiety for
many persons to be aware of such impulses. Mental contents and processes that are dynamically unconscious constitute the prime determinants of behavior in psychodynamic
psychology.
For a brief description of the history, theory, and practice of psychodynamic psychology,
see Morse, An Introduction to Dynamic Psychotherapy, in Psychotherapies: A Comparative
Casebook 16-42 (S. Morse & R. Watson eds. 1977). The best primer on Freudian psychology
is P. Holzman, Psychoanalysis and Psychopathology (1970). A more technical "primer" is C.
Brenner, An Elementary Textbook of Psychoanalysis (1974). A more historical treatment is
R. Fancher, Psychoanalytic Psychology: The Development of Freud's Thought (1973). A
complete, if somewhat outdated, treatment of the most important psychodynamic psychologies is R. Munroe, Schools of Psychoanalytic Thought (1955). Useful summaries are also
found in 1 CTP-III, supra note 1, at 631-847. The best primary source introductions to
psychodynamic psychology are still S. Freud, Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, in
15-16 The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud (191517) [hereinafter cited as Standard Edition]; and S. Freud, New Introductory Lectures on
Psycho-Analysis, in 22 Standard Edition (1933).
The copious writings of Sigmund Freud originally appeared in various journals, as books,
and in other forms. Through the prodigious effort of James Strachey, translator and general
editor, all the psychological writings have been published in English by The Hogarth Press
and The Institute of Psycho-Analysis in the Standard Edition. This 24 volume series was
published seriatim beginning in 1953 and ending in 1974 with the publication of volume 24.
This collection is the standard English reference for Freud. Each of Freud's writings therefore has two dates: the date of its original publication in German and the date of its English
translation and publication in the Standard Edition. For purposes of simplicity and brevity,
only the date of the original publication will be given fo.!' each reference.
Although the Strachey translations are by far the best available, allegedly they systematically mistranslate Freud's theory by using pseudoscientific or pseudomedical terms for
words and phrases that Freud did not wish to have understood in those ways. For example,
Freud used the German word for "soul" throughout his \Vritings, but this was consistently
mistranslated as "mental." Bettelheim, Reflections: Freud and the Soul, The New Yorker,
March 1, 1982, at 52, 63-87. The upshot, in part, is that the nature of Freudian theory has
'
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recognized the existence of unconscious determinants of human
behavior, 43 but Sigmund Freud is credited with first describing
systematically and comprehensively the alleged causal role played
by unconscious factors. Over the course of about fifty remarkably
productive years, Freud elaborated his views into a theory and
mode of treatment that he called psychoanalysis . Freud's extraordinarily complex (and often vague 44 or contradictory"~) theoretical
and clinical writings include observations of behavior, 46 hypothetical inferences about the unconscious determinants of observable
behavior ,47 and theoretical statements explaining the operation of
unconscious processes and the structure of the mind (the metapsychology).48 Freud's theory purports to explain almost all human

been consisten tly misunderstood by readers of the English translation. See id. See also Gill,
Metapsychology Is Not Psychology, in Psychology versus Metapsychology- Essays in Memory of George S. Klein 71, 75-83 (M. Gill & P. Holzman eds. 1976) (explaining Freud's increasing denial of the biological foundation of the theory); infra notes 103-106 and accompanying text. But see generally Freud, "The Question of a Weltanschaunng," in New
Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, supra, at 158-82 (arguing that psychoanalysis is a
science).
3
'
See H. Ellenberger, The Discovery of the Unconscious 3 (1970) (history and evolution
of dynamic psychiatry); L. Whyte, The Unconscious Before Freud (1960) (study of the development of human self-awareness in Europe, 1680-1880).
44
See, e.g., S. Freud, Instincts and their Vicissitudes, in 14 Standard Edition 117 (1915).
" This is accepted by all commentators on Freud. See, e.g., L. Breger, Freud's Unfinished
Journey (1981); M. Jahoda, Freud and the Dilemmas of Psychology 3 (1977). Two examples
of theoretical contradictions are discussed in Steele & Jacobsen, From Present to Past: The
Development of Freudian Theory, 5 Int'l Rev. Psycho-Analysis 393, 408-09 (1978) (whether
the ego or the id is the storehouse of libido); id. at 403-10 (theories on narcissism). An
example of methodological contradiction is Freud's view of whether the reports of family
members are trustworthy evidence for constructing psychological formulations . Compare S.
Freud, From the History of an Infantile Neurosis, in 17 Standard Edition 14 n.2, with id. at
21 (1918). Compare also id. with S. Freud, The Question of Lay Analysis, in 20 Standard
Edition 216 (1926).
•• An example is the intense attachment that psych0analytic patients develop toward
their therapist. Freud termed this ubiquitous occurrence "transference." See S. Freud, The
Dynamics of Transference, in 12 Standard Edition 97 (1912). See also J. LaPlanche & J.
Pontalis, The Language of Psycho-Analysis 455-62 (1973).
7
'
For example, Freud hypothesized that the motive behind almost all dreams was a wish,
the so-called "latent content" of the dream, that was expressed in disguised form by the
actual dream, the so-called "manifest content." See generally The Interpretation of Dreams,
in 4-5 Standard Edition (1900).
'" Based on his early training in the hard sciences, Freud constantly created and modified
pseudomechanical and physiological models of the mind to explain behavior. Freud's earliest attempt to translate psychological concepts into a purely neurological model was his
Project for a Scientific Psychology, in 1 Standard Edition 295 (1896). Although Freud abandoned this model quite early because it was unworkable, see 1 Standard Edition 285-86
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behavior, including neuroses, 49 dreams, 60 parapraxes, 51 hurnor, 52
sexual aberration, 63 psychopathology in general/' and culture and
religion. 66 Freud constantly modified the theory, and although he
did provide masterful summaries from time to time~:w he never
provided a systematic, final exposition in a form that may be
tested according to the standards of modern behavioral science.
The source of the data for Freud's observations and theoretical
hypotheses was the human relationship that he termed psychoanalysis. Freud treated patients by having them lie down on the
fabled couch and talk to him in a form known as "free association," a process where the patient tells the therapist without censorship whatever thoughts, feelings, or memories enter his or her
mind. 67 As an avowed determinist, Freud believed that unconscious mechanisms governed by psychological laws produced the
flow of free associations. Free associations are thus not truly free.
It is necessary to understand the patient's unconscious wishes) impulses, conflicts, and defenses because they are the source of the
patient's difficulties. 68

(1896), prime examples of his later attempts include S. Freud, The Interpretation of
Dreams, in 4-5 Standard Edition 1, 509 (1900) (Chapter VII, The Psychology of the DreamProcesses); S. Freud, Papers on Metapsychology, in 14 Standard Edition 105 (1915); S.
Freud, The Ego and the Id, in 19 Standard Edition 12 (1923).
•• The most famous early example is J. Breuer & S. Freud, Studies on Hysteria, in 2
Standard Edition 3 (1893-95). Extraordinarily complex later case studies are S. Freud,
Notes Upon A Case of Obsessional Neurosis, in 10 Standard Edition 155 (1909); S. Freud,
From the History of an Infantile Neurosis, in 17 Standard Edition 7 (1918).
60
See, e.g., S. Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, in 4-5 Standard Edition 1 (1900).
61
S. Freud, The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, in 6 Standard Edition 1 (1901).
62
S. Freud, Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious, in 8 Standard Edition 9 (1905).
•• S. Freud, Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, in 7 Standard Edition 130, 135-72
(1905).
"' See, e.g., S. Freud, Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, supra note 42, at 358-77.
66
See, e.g., S. Freud, Totem and Taboo, in 13 Standard Edition 1 (1912); S. Freud, The
Future of an Illusion, in 21 Standard Edition 5 (1927); S. Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, in 21 Standard Edition 64 (1930).
66
See, e.g., S. Freud, Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, supra note 42; S. Freud,
New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, supra note 42.
67
Although Freud practiced psychoanalysis for almost five decades and produced an
enormous corpus of writing during that time, he wrote surprisingly little about psychoanalytic technique. The primary sources are S. Freud, Analysis Terminable and Interminable,
in 23 Standard Edition 216 (1937); S. Freud, Constructions in Analysis, in 23 Standard
Edition 257 (1937); S. Freud, The Question of Lay Analysis, supra note 45; S. Freud, Papers
on Technique, 12 Standard Edition 89-170 (1911-15) .
•• Morse, supra note 42, at 18-20.
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During the five decades of his psychoanalytic work, the interchanges between Freud and his patients often produced data
that did not fit Freud's current theoretical schema, forcing him
constantly to revise the theory. 59 Despite the changes, some t enets
of the theory remained constant: all behavior is meaningful and
causally related to unconscious dynamic forces; childhood experiences are the source of all behavior; the unconscious is t he repository of primitive instincts and of conflicting impulses, wishes and
memories, all of which are concerned largely with sexuality and aggression. It is worth emphasizing that F reud's evidence was neither
the observation of unconscious forces-they cannot be observed or
measured directly-nor the observat ion or treatment of children.
Almost the entire data base for his theory was the free associations
of his adult, psychoanalytic patients, a group of predominantly
middle-class Viennese citizens who consulted Freud from about
1890 until the 1930's. 6 ° Freud did not test his hypotheses outside
the therapeutic encounter, nor did he encourage his followers to do
so. Indeed, he was at best indifferent to external, independent validation of his speculations. 61
From time to time in therapy, Freud would intervene, interpreting for the patient the unconscious meaning and causes of the patient's behavior. The purpose of such intervention was to provide
insight-intellectual and emotional awareness and understanding
by the patient of the unconscious determinants of his or her behavior. Freud and his followers believed that insight was the source
of therapeutic change and, correlatively, that therapeutic change
following insight confirmed the validity of an interpretation as a
true account of the causal determinants of the patient's behavior. 62
The most celebrated instance of this is when Freud abandoned the view that neuroses
were caused by actual seductions by parents or caretakers and adopted the position that
fantasized seductions were the causal culprits. This shift is chronicled in Ernest J ones' magisterial biography of Freud. See 1 E. Jones, The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud 321-26
(1953) .
6
° Freud also used literature and history as evidence for his theories. See, e.g., S. Freud,
Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood, in 11 Standard Edition 63 (1910); S.
Freud , Delusions and Dreams in Jensen's Gradiva, in 9 Standard Edition 7 (1907 ).
61
See, e.g., Letter from Sigmund Freud to F. Rosenzweig, quot ed in MacKinnon &
Dukes, Represssion, in Psychology in the Making-Histories of Selected Research Problems
662, 702-03 (L. Postman ed. 1962).
62
See infra notes 93-101 and accompanying text. This was a crucial assertion on Freud's
part because only if it were true could psychoanalysis defeat its critics ' claims that both the
data that patients produced and their behavioral changes were actually the products of the
"
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The other major source of confirmation of Freud's theory was the
patient's reaction during the therapeutic hour. For instance, interpretations that led to breakthroughs of feelings or memories or to
strong resistance were believed to be accurate, and flows of associations that fit expected patterns were also considered confirm atory.
Freud's psychoanalysis has many descendants, direct :::m d i.n direct, legitimate and illegitimate. Most psychoanalysts consider
themselves direct, legitimate heirs of Freud, building on the origi-nal Freudian theoretical corpus while constantly revising it. 63
Many, however, have revised Freud's theory so extensively that it
is questionable whether the revisionists are true Freudians. 6 ·' Some
theorists, such as Jung 6 ~ and Adler, 66 were clearly schismatics•Yz
who denied fundamental aspects of Freud's theory (e.g., the centrality of sexual instincts) and formed their own schools of t heory
and therapy. Others gave sexuality its due, but placed more emphasis on the importance of social and cultural factors in explaining behavior. 68 All the psychodynamic psychologies adhere to the

therapist's suggestion.
63
Examples are A. Freud, Normality and Pathology in Childhood: Assessments of Development (1958); A. Freud, The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense (1936); H. Hartmann,
Essays on Ego Psychology (1965); H. Hartmann, Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation (1958). Because the literature of psychoanalysis is so extensive, this article uses representative examples from the major theories.
6
• E.g., W. Fairbairn, An Object-Relations Theory of the Personality (1954); H. Guntrip,
Schizoid Phenomena, Object Relations and the Self (1968); H. Guntrip, Personality Structure and Human Interaction (1961); M. Klein, Contributions to Psycho-Analysis 1921-45
(4th impression 1968); M. Klein, The Psycho-Analysis of Children (1948); H. Kohut, The
Analysis of the Self (1971); H. Kohut, The Restoration of the Self (1977); R. Schafer, A New
Language for Psychoanalysis (1976); H. Segal, Introduction to the Work of Melanie Klein
(1964); D. Winnicott, The Maturational Process and the Facilitating Environment (1 965 ); D.
Winnicott, Collected Papers: Through Paediatrics to Psycho-Analysis (1958).
66
Jung's theory is known as "analytical psychology." The collected works of Jung are
published by Princeton University Press. See The Collected Works of C.G. Jung (W. McGuire ed. 1973). A good secondary primer is J. Jacobie, The Psychology of C.G. Jung (1942).
66
Adler's theory is known as "individual psychology." The best primary source on Alfred
Adler is The Individual Psychology of Alfred Adler (H. Ansbacher & R. Ansbacher ads.
1956).
67
Freud relates his view of the splits with Jung and Adler in S. Freud, On the History of
the Psycho-Analytic Movement, in 14 Standard Edition 7, 42-66 (1914). Jones chronicles
the splits in 2 E. Jones, The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud 84-88, 128-34, 137-51 (1955).
A portrait more sympathetic to Jung is drawn in R. Steele, Freud & Jung: Conflicts of
Interpretation (1982).
68
Termed the neo-Freudians, this latter group included figures such as Harry Stack Sullivan, Erich Fromm, Erik Erikson, and Karen Horney. See, e.g., E. Erikson, Identity: Youth
and Crisis (1968); E. Erikson, Childhood and Society (2d ed. 1963); E . Fromm, Escape from
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central hypothesis that unconscious forces are the primary determinants of behavior. They differ enormously, .however, on the hypothesized development and content of the unconscious forces and
on how they influence human behavior. 69 If a mental health clinician says simply that he or she is a psychoanalyst or is psychodynami cally-oriented, one cannot be certain what theoretical views
the clinician holds-except that dynamically unconscious processes
affect behavior.
I belie ,;e Freud's theory was successful arnong clinicians of his
time and for sometime thereafter because, in addition to being
brilliantly written and interesting, the theory entered an explanatory vacuum. At the turn of the century, there was virtually no
scientific knowledge about human behavior in general and about
crazy behavior specifically. Freud's theory see:m.ed generally to
make sense of crazy behavior for the first time by revealing its apparently understandable hidden determinants. IV1oreover, t he theory was broad and flexible enough to explain all behavior. 7 ° Freud
wrote exquisitely and often narratively about inherently compelling factors-sex, aggression, death, and the deep, dark unconscious-and the theory therefore captured the popular imagination
of educated lay persons. 71 Most heartening to clinicians, psychoanalysis appeared to produce a reasonable degree of success in ameliorating crazy behaviors at a time of therapeutic impotence. 72
In modern behavioral science there are literally thousands of
theories competing for recognition. In the face of this competition,
I believe there are three basic reasons for the continued success of
dynamic theory: dynamic theory is interesting, comprehensive, and

Freedom (1941); K. Horney, The Neurotic Personality of Our Time (1937); H. Sullivan, The
Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry (1953).
"" Morse, supra note 42, at 41-42.
70
This does not mean, as some critics claim, that the theory is nonscientific because it is
unfalsifiable. Grunbaum, Is Freudian Psychoanalytic Theory Pseudo-Scientific by Karl Popper's Criterion of Demarcation?, 16 Am. Phil. Q. 131 (1979). It simply means that hypotheses are available to explain almost all behavior. The scientific validity of dynamic theory
will be discussed in detail at infra notes 75-135 and accompanyiag text. It might be noted,
however, that some friendly observers believe that psychoanalysis can never become a natural science. See, e.g., Mcintosh, The Empirical Bearing of Psychoanalytic Theory, 60 Int'l J.
Psycho-Analysis 405, 408 (1979).
7
' See generally, Burnham, The Inf1uence of Psychoanalysis upon American Culture, in
American Psychoanalysis: Origins and Development 52 (J. Quen & F. Carlson eds. 1978).
72
The therapeutic success of psychoanalytic therapy will be discussed at infra notes 91101 and accompanying text.
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literary-interpretative. 73 Most other theories address only restricted aspects of behavior and, unlike dynamic theory, do not
deal with the nitty-gritty of human life. Sex, aggression, and the
unconscious are simply more catchy than, for example, unconditioned and conditioned reflexes as explanations fo r behavior. ~11 ost
important for lawyers, historians, literary critics and others who
seek un derstanding of behavior and whose primary task is the interpretation of language and events, dynamic theory can be understood as offering an interpretative rather than a mechanistic account of behavior. Freud treated behavior as a language that
needed to be interpre~ed, and he attempted to provide both the
grammar and the dictionary. Dynamic theory attempts to make
sense of all of human life by explicating its meaning, much as literary criticism makes sense of a poem or historical scholarship makes
sense of past events. 74 Lawyers therefore appreciate psychodynamic theory because it speaks comprehensibly to their concerns.
Psychodynamic theory has now been in existence for nearly a
century. Despite its continued popularity, however, the law must
ask fundamental questions of it. Is it in principle a scientific theory? How much of it has been scientifically validated? And what is
its relevance to the criminal law? These are the questions to which
this section now turns.

B. Does Psychodynamic Psychology Provide a Valid Causal
Account of Human Behavior? Science and Its Vicissitudes
This subsection considers systematically the general scientific
validity of psychodynamic psychology. The goal is not to prove
conclusively that it is generally invalid; rather, I hope to demonstrate that its validity as a causal, mechanistic account of behavior
is so questionable that criminal courts should disallow testimony

73

Another major reason for its general success is that psychodynamic theory and practice
have been taught and propagated by a formal set of institutions known as psychoanalytic
institutes.
" In large measure, this is why dynamic theory can be so attractive to lawyers, historians,
and literary critics. They are constantly interpreting language and behavior in order to
make sense of them. If a psychodynamic theorist is asked to explain a human action, he or
she will tell a story about a human life, explaining the behavior by reference to motives-sex, aggression-that we can all understand. It will be a human story about human
beings, rather than an account that treats behavior as nothing more than the mechanistic
effects of biological, psychological, or sociological variables.
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based upon it. At the very least, I hope to demonstrate that large
portions of the theory are invalid or unvalidated and should not be
accepted as the basis for expert testimony. In sum, I wish to shift
the burden of persuasion, to force proponents of psychodynamic
psychology to demonstrate-not simply to assert-that the theory
in general--or at least some specific propositions of the theory-are sufficiently valid to serve as the basis for expert opinion.
In assessing the scientific validity of psychodynamic psychology,
it is important to remember that there is no systematic, coherent,
accepted series of principles grouped under the rubric "psychodynamic psychology." ~ There is only one common principle-that
unconscious determinants affect behavior. T here are an enormous
number of hypotheses, many of which are contradictory, all competing in the intellectual and clinical marketplace. 76 New hypotheses rarely replace the old ones; instead, they co-exist in varying
states of complementarity. 77 How, then, is the puzzled observer to
7

Mcintosh, supra note 70, at 408 (theory has no significant formal structure); Morse,
supra note 42, at 41-42.
76
A recent example is the divergent and widely influential views of Heinz Kohut and
Otto Kernberg on borderline or narcissistic personalities. See Robbins, Current Controversy
in Object Relations Theory as Outgrowth of a Schism between Klein and Fairbairn, 61 Int'l
J . Psycho-Analysis 477 (1980) (views of Kohut and Kernberg seem "fundamentally antagonistic "; the roots of the antagonism are found in a theoretical split between earlier thinkers).
77
See S. Fisher & R. Greenberg, The Scientific Credibility of Freud's Theories and Therapy 6-7 (1977). An example is the treatment accorded a phenomenon called the "transitional object." See Brody, "Transitional Objects": Idealization of a Phenomenon, 49 Psychoanalytic Q. 561 (1980).
To understand why this is so, it is necessary to examine how psychodynamic psychology
developed and has been tested. Almost all the data gathered by the first generation of psychodynamic psychologists, including Freud, Jung, and Adler, came from therapeutic consultations. The theories were constantly revised in light of the communications emanating from
the consulting room, but there never was an attempt to set down in systematic, testable
form the theoretical propositions derived from the data. Psychodynamic psychology was
veiwed from the first as a constantly evolving theory that was always open to revision, but
most of its schools, especially the still pre-eminent Freudians, developed a cult around the
works of the founder. Treated as holy writ, the founder's writings are the subject of constant
exegesis and heated dispute about their meaning. No theoretical advance within a school is
possible without ritual obeisance to what the Master had to say about a particular topic.
Moreover, the schools tend to be quite hostile to one another. Freud himself was especially
dogmatic and pitiless to those who strayed too far from the received wisdom. Heretics-a
word that is none too strong-such as Jung and Adler were banished, besmirched, and even
vilified for daring to question hypotheses, such as the centrality of sexual instincts, which
Freud considered crucial to the theory. See supra note 67.
In the psychoanalytic movement, disputes are solved by assertions of authority rather
than according to acceptable methods of scientific investigation. S. Fisher & R. Greenberg,
70

I
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determine if dynamic psychology has been scientifically validated
to some reasonable extent? 78 Which theorist or which hypotheses

supra; Holzman, The Future of Psychoanalysis and Its Institutes, 45 Pyschoanal:,-'tic Q. 250,
269 (1976). At most, a theorist will use anecdotal and unchecked case reports to buttress
assertions of theoretical superiority. G. Klein, Psychoanalytic Theory: An Exploration of
Essentials 64 ( 1976). For instance, orthodox Freudians are challenged today by the theoretical deployments of a psychoanalyst named Heinz Kohut. This new teacher, lately deceased,
preached that the Oedipus complex, so central to the orthodox theory, is perhaps less important for explaining the problems of many patients than psychological disturbances arising from an earlier developmental period when the self is being organized. H. Kohut, The
Analysis of Self, supra note 64. A comparison of Kohut's views with those of more orthodox
Freudians is contained in Kohut, The Two Analyses of Mr. Z, 60 Int'l J. Psycho-Analysis 3
(1979). The Oedipus complex refers to the simultaneous sexual, rivalrous, and aggressive
feelings that all children between the ages of three and six are alleged to experience toward
their parents. These feelings are repressed because they are too threatening to be confronted
consciously. The repression of the Oedipus complex is responsible for the child's sexual
identity, for the formation of conscience, for patterns of loving and hating, and for other
crucial aspects of personality and psychopathology. In orthodox Freudian theory, the resolution of the Oedipus complex is considered the crucial psychological event of childhood. See,
e.g., 0. Fenichel, The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis 91-98 (1945). In modern psychodynamic psychology, the Oedipus complex seems to be declining in importance as a crucial
construct. See Loewald, The Waning of the Oedipus Complex, 27 J. Am. Psychoanalytic A.
751 (1979).
Although Kohut's decade old theory is enormously influential, my search disclosed no
empirical test of the theory. But cf. Silverman & Wolitzky, Toward the Resolution of Controversial Issues, in Psychoanalytic Treatment Factors in Dynamic Psychotherapy 321, 32939 (S. Slipp ed. 1982) (some ongoing research not based on Kohutian theory may bear on it).
Indeed, the evidence considered crucial by Kohutians to prove the theoretical and clinical
validity of Kohut's theory is purely uncontrolled case study material. See, e.g., The Psychology of the Self: A Casebook (A. Goldberg ed. 1978); Kohut, The Two Analyses of Mr. Z,
supra (clinical validity of Kohut's theory demonstrated by successful re-analysis using
Kohutian methods on a patient formerly analyzed by more traditional methods). The cases
collected in the Goldberg volume, supra, are criticized intensively and extensively in Gedo,
Reflections on Some Current Controversies in Psychoanalysis, 28 J. Am. Psychoanalytic A.
363 (1980). Gedo is especially harsh on the "scientific" quality of the Kohutian case studies.
He claims that Kohutian analyses are incomplete and that "theoretical inferences derived
from observations made in the course of such incomplete analyses fail to carry scientific
conviction." Id. at 382. He also complains that "there is no inductive reasoning on this
work," citing one case study author who was "unable to hear the significance of what the
patient was saying until I [the author] had the conceptual assistance of a new analytic discovery." Id. at 367. Although I am sympathetic to Gedo's viewpoint, it is clear that his
critique is based on exactly the same sort of soft case study material and vague, suspect
theoretical inferences for which he takes the Kohutians to task. One wonders what Gedo
means by "scientific." Within the psychoanalytic movement, this kind of debate and evidence are prototypical of disputes about psychodynamic theory and practice.
78
A theory is scientifically validated if it is confirmed by reasonable deductive or inductive procedures. In the behavioral sciences, such as psychodynamic psychology, reasonable
validation includes subjecting clear hypotheses to possible disconfirmation, and using reliable and valid procedures that make the observational data available to outside observers
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are particularly important? It is a mark of the scientific confusion
surrounding psychodynamic psychology that there are no truly acceptable answers to these questions. 79 Given these difficulties, how
do psychodynamic psychologists and behavioral scientists assess
the relative merits of the wealth of propositions that flow from innumerable therapeutic consultations?
It is necessary first to discuss briefly whether psychodynamic
theory is sufficiently scientific in form to be worthy of serious scientific consideration. 80 Many eminent philosophers of science such
as Popper 81 have claimed that psychoanalytic theory is so vague
and internally contradictory that it is impossible to confirm it and,
more importantly, to disconfirm it. It is true that the various psychodynamic theories are often vague and contradictory; however, if
one carefully considers the writings of Freud and other dynamic
psychologists, one can derive testable and disconfirmable hypotheses. In a series of exhaustive and penetrating analyses, the eminent
philosopher of science Adolf Grtinbaum has demonstrated beyond
reasonable doubt that in principle some of Freud's theory is scientific and that the criticisms made by Popper and others are the
result of an insufficiently close reading of the theory. 82 This is not
to say that all psychodynamic psychologists would agree on the
particular statement of a testable hypothesis derived from the the-

and control for the influence of extraneous and confounding variables and alternate hypotheses. See Silverman & Wolitzky, supra note 77, at 322 (delineating "minimal requirements
for any discipline that aspires to be a science").
79
It is utterly extraordinary that although psychoanalytic psychology has existed for
nearly a century, its scientific status is "equivocal." Bowlby, Psychoanalysis as a Natural
Science, 8 lnt'l Rev. of Psycho-Analysis 243 (1981). Indeed, psychoanalysis has probably
been more self-consciously "preoccupied ... with its status as a science" than any other
discipline that purports to be a science. Silverman & Wolitzky, supra note 77, at 321-22.
This is entirely unsurprising, however, if one remembers the utterly unscientific manner in
which psychoanalytic "research" has been carried on within the psychoanalytic movement.
See supra note 77; infra notes 84-135 and accompanying text.
80
The most useful general collection on this issue is Psychoanalysis, Scientific Method
and Philosophy (S. Hook ed. 1959).
81
Science: Conjectures and Refutations, in K. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The
Growth of Scientific Knowledge 33-39 (1962). Another example is Cioffi, Freud and the Idea
of a Pseudo-Science, in Explanations in the Behavioral Sciences 471 (R. Borger & F. Cioffi
eds. 1970). See also H. Eysenck & G. Wilson, The Experimental Study of Freudian Theories
1-13 (1973).
82
Grtinbaum, supra note 70; Grtinbaum, Can Psychoanalytic Theory Be Cogently Tested
on "the Couch"?, forthcoming in Explanation and Evaluation in Psychiatry and Medicine
(L. Laudan ed. 1982).
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ory, nor is it to say that they would agree that a particular test of a
hypothesis is valid. The claim is more limited: simply that one can
reasonably derive from the various theories some testable hypotheses. That the theory can be tested scientifically does not, of course,
O"uarantee or even suggest that it is valid. 83
b
Psychodynamic psychology has been tested using three basic
methods-by observing the patient's response during therapeutic
consultations, by assessing the efficacy of dynamic therapy, and by
external, independent, controlled quantitative studies of hypotheses derived from the clinical and theoretical writings. An examination of the validity of these methods or their results reveals that
psychodynamic theory in general-or, at the least, great portions
of it-cannot withstand the rigors of scientific scrutiny.
Psychodynamic psychologists historically have relied almost entirely on the couch as the primary means for testing as well as deriving their theoretical propositions. If a patient does not produce
expected data (associations, memories, affects), especially in reaction to a theory-based therapeutic intervention, a piece of theory is
tentatively disconfirmed; conversely, if a patient does produce expected data, the piece of theory is tentatively confirmed. 84 This

83 Nagel, Methodological Issues in Psychoanalytic Theory, in Psychoanalysis, Scientific
Method and Philosophy, supra note 80, at 38, 55; Salmon, Psychoanalytic Theory and Evidence, in Psychoanalysis, Scientific Method and Philosophy, supra note 80, at 252, 265.
Indeed, Griinbaum's reading of the evidence is that Freud's theory is partially scientific in
form, but that it is not validated. Griinbaum, supra note 82, at 54, 197, 206; Nagel, supra
(agreeing with Grunbaum) .
•• See S. Freud, Constructions in Analysis, supra note 57, for an early explanation of this
view. For example, therapist A may claim: "My patients behave such and such a way, predicted and explained by Y's theory; therefore, Y's theory is correct." Therapist B says in
response: "Nonsense. My patients do not behave in that way; furthermore, if there is any
merit to Y's observations, they can be explained by the theory of Q." And so on.
An examination of the training that psychodynamic psychologists receive reveals how the
unusual testing system developed. Full training is reserved mainly for physicians with psychiatric training. If the candidate is accepted by a psychoanalytic institute, his or her training consists of three experiences. First, the candidate undergoes psychoanalysis, a process
referred to as a "training analysis." The training analysis, the sine qua non of the process,
will not be considered successful unless the candidate accepts the account of his or her
behavior interpreted by the analyst. Glover, Research Methods In Psycho-Analysis, 33 Int'l
J. Psycho-Analysis 403, 403-04 (1952). Second, the candidate engages in academic training,
but only in the school or schools of dynamic psychology adhered to by his or her training
institute. The candidate is taught that the proper data base for deriving and testing theory
is primarily the therapeutic dialogue. Finally, the candidate conducts some analyses under
the supervision of senior members of the training institute, who naturally supervise the candidate according to the theoretical and therapeutic biases of the supervisor and the
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process sometimes results in the discarding of hypotheses, but it
rarely challenges the major tenets of the system. Moreover, external evidence seldom causes m odifications of the theory. 8 1> The psychoanalytic environment is a sealed cosmos that communicates far
too little with the outside world. 86
For dynamicists, the couch produces many types of data that dynamic clinicians believe confirm their theory: the relationship with
the therapist develops in familiar ways predicted by the theory; a
patient's series of free associations can be understood only according to the theory; a patient responds to an interpretation based on
the theory with a flood of affects or a group of associations that
appear to confirm the validity of the interpretation. Yet the behavior of almost all patients "confirms" the diverse and often contradictory theories of their various therapists, and thus validates no
single theory. 87 The patients of Freudians dream dreams, respond
to interpretations, and understand themselves as Freud's theory
suggests. But so do the patients of Jungians, Adlerians, existential-

institute.
·~ Some notable counter-examples do exist, however. Freud believed, for instance, that
females experienced two distinct orgasms depending on whether the source of the excitation
was primarily clitoral or vaginal. He had no physiological evidence for this assertion, however, and recent research on sexual physiology has thoroughly disproved it. M. Sherfey, The
Nature and Evolution of Female Sexuality (1966) . The psychodynamicists must therefore
revise at least some aspects of their theories of female psychology. See Stoller, Overview:
The Impact of New Advances in Research on Psychoanalytic Theory, 130 Am. J. Psychiatry
241, 244 (1973) (Freud's theory of development of female character is incorrect). Stoller also
notes that the impact on psychoanalytic theory of the new advances in sex research has
been "mild," but that the impact on analysts "may be considerable." Id. at 249. No support
is cited for either proposition.
An example of the sweeping use of external evidence to modify dynamic theory is found
in the noted work of John Bowiby, who has used ethology and information-processing models extensively to reconceptualize dynamic theories of attachment, separation, and loss. See
1 J. Bowlby, Attachment and Loss, Attachment (1969); 2 id., Separation (1973); 3 id., Loss
(1980).
86
See, Bowlby, supra note 79, at 250. I recently examined the references to all the articles
that appeared in the 1979 volume year of the two leading psychoanalytic journals - 60 lnt'l
J. Psycho-Analysis (1979) and 27 J. Am. Psychoanalytic A. (1979). The examination revealed that in 38 articles of 60 Int'l J. Psycho-Analysis (1979), 96 % of the references cited
were to psychoanalytic sources. Of the remaining 4 % , 34% were to nonscientific sources and
66 % were to social or behavioral science sources. In 27 J. Am. Psychoanalytic A. (1979),
84 % of the references were to psychoanalytic sources. Only four of the 29 articles in the
volume accounted for 62 % of the nonpsychoanalytic sources. In a supplement on psychotherapy published in 27 J . Am. Psychoanalytic A. (1979), 98.5 % of the references were to
psychoanalytic sources.
87
Marmor, Limitations of Free Association, 22 Archives Gen. Psychiatry 160, 161 (1970).
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ists, and all the others.
One might sensibly ask whether the couch is an epistemologically valid means of validating dynamic theory. Can unchecked (or
checked) observations by therapists of the behavior of patients
during therapeutic encounters properly test dynamic theory? This
is a matter of great dispute. 88 The most persuasive analysis suggests, however, that the patient's behavior in the consulting room
is badly contaminated as a data source. 89 The intense relationship
that develops between therapist and patient creates and continuously enhances the patient's disposition to accept the authoritative
therapist's (mostly) unwitting suggestions. Patients learn and produce the appropriate responses to please the therapist. The patient's behavior then naturally conforms to and confirms the therapist's theoretical expectations-expectations that are themselves
the source of the therapist's suggestive behavior.
This process is readily explicable: confirmation of the therapist's
theory is, after all, terribly important to both patient and therapist. The patient is in difficulty and has consulted an expert upon
whom he or she is quite dependent; the patient naturally wants to
please the therapist and to have a successful therapeutic experience. The therapist strongly needs to have the worth and validity
of therapy substantiated. It is unremarkable, then, that patients
behave in accord with the theoretical expectations of their ther-

88
Analysts have always assumed that the couch is a proper laboratory. See, e.g., S. Fisher
& R. Greenberg, supra note 77, at 7. Indeed, Freud himself felt that this type of evidence,
and the success of psychoanalytic therapy, were the only necessary methods of confirmation,
but we need not accept assumptions and assertions that are unsupported by data or convincing analysis.
89
Gri.inbaum, Can Psychoanalytic Theory be Cogently Tested on "the Couch"?, supra
note 82; Gri.inbaum, Epistemological Liabilities of the Clinical Appraisal of Psychoanalytic
Theory, 14 Nous 307 (1980) (expanded version of Gri.inbaum's 1979 article with the same
title); Gri.inbaum, Epistemological Liabilities of the Clinical Appraisal of Psychoanalytic
Theory, 2 Psychoanalysis & Contemp. Thought 451 (1979). See Eagle, Psychoanalytic Interpretations: Veridicality and Therapeutic Effectiveness, 14 Nous 405 (1980) ("So decisively
has Gri.inbaum shown that therapeutic outcome and other clinical data cannot validate psychoanalytic propositions, that there is little more one can say directly on the question.").
See also Kubie, Problems and Techniques of Psychoanalytic Validation and Progress, in
Psychoanalysis as Science 46, 118 (E. Pumpian-Mindlin ed. 1952) (data from therapeutic
interactions "are hardly the stuff out of which fundamental scientific advances can be fashioned"). As George Klein put it: "Among the sorriest cliches I have heard in psychoanalytic
circles are the view that doing therapy is research and . .. that treatment is experimentation ." G. Klein, supra note 77, at 64 (emphasis in original).

998

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 68:971

apists. "0 The associations of Freudian patients confirm Freudian
theory, and the associations of Jungian patients confirm Jungian
theory. Such results from the couch cannot sustain the validity of
dynarnic theory.
A second method of testing dynamic psychology is to assess its
efficacy as a therapy. If psychodynamic theory cannot be confirmed by evidence from the consulting room, can it be proven
valid because the therapy based on it is successful? After all, psychoanalysis was born as, and remains, primarily a method of treating behavioral disorders, and Freud thought that the success (or
failure) of psychoanalytic therapy was critical evidence of its validity (or invalidity). 91 For decades this process was carried out entirely unscientifically and uncritically, 112 leading to claims and
counterclaims that were equally invalid. After almost four decades
of scientific study of psychotherapeutic outcomes, however, it is
now possible, despite many pitfalls, to reach reasonably valid conclusions about therapeutic efficacy.
Freud and all the dynamicists who followed him believe that repressed unconscious factors are the mechanisms that distort our
lives and produce psychopathology. People experience difficulties
because they react not only to the stimuli appropriate to a situation, but also to the irrational and unconscious forces, mechanisms,

&o A further reason rests upon the reciprocal nature of free association and the therapist's
expectations. Suppose a patient begins associating to an element of a dream. At what link in
a theoretically endless chain of associations will a therapist intervene to help the patient
di scover the meaning of the element? If a person begins to free associate to any stimulus, at
some point associ ations connected to almost all important aspects of human existence will
arise. D. Taylor, Explanation and Meaning 28-31 (1970). Clearly the therapist will intervene
at the link that the theory holds is critical and will consider the theory confirmed. By intervening at that point, the therapist conveys the information to the patient that this association is the crucial one, thus encouraging the patient to produce similar associations and to
believe that they are in fact crucial. But unless there is some external confirmation of the
th erapist's theory, there is no reason to believe that the association confirms the theory,
because the patient was certain to produce associations that would confirm other theories as
well.
"' S. Freud , Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, supra note 42, at 452.
92
By this I mean that at the end of therapy, therapists would make global assessments
concerning how much the patient had improved, but there were no checks on the accuracy
of the therapist's observations during therapy nor were there controls to insure that the
simple passage of time (spontaneous remission, maturation) or other variables were not the
causes of the alleged therapeutic effect. These issues will be discussed in greater detail at
in fra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
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and processes within. 93 Because the actor does not have access to
the distorting unconscious stimuli, he or she acts without all the
data necessary to behave maturely and reasonably. According to
dynamic therapists, the corrective is insight: the patient must become aware at an intellectual and emotional level of the unconscious impulses, wishes, memories, affects, conflicts, and defenses
that are so troublesome. Armed with self-knowledge, the person
will supp osedly perceive himself or herself and others in an undistorted, adult fashion and will no longer be buffeted by unknown,
irrational forces. 94 The method of dynamic therapy, then, is for the
therapist to help the patient discover his or her own unconscious
motives and mechanisms.
Freud believed that accurate insight was the only agent of enduring and deep therapeutic success, and that such success was
therefore the guarantee of the validity of psychoanalytic theory
against the charge that therapeutic results were the products of
suggestion. Freud wrote:
The doctor has no difficulty, of course, in making him [the patient]
a supporter of some particular theory and in thus making him
share in some possible error of his own. In this respect the patient
is behaving like anyone else - like a pupil - but this only affects
his intelligence, not his illness. After all, his conflicts will only be
successfully solved and his resistance overcome if the anticipatory
ideas he is given tally with what is real in him. Vvhatever in the
doctor's conjectures is inaccurate drops out in the course of the
analysis; it has to be withdrawn and replaced by something more
correct. 95

Freud viewed correct insight, the necessary condition for therapeu-

For instance, a student may misinterpret and feel unnecessarily badly about a communication from a teacher because the student may unwittingly react to the teacher in light of
continuing unconscious conflicts that developed in the early relationships with his or her
parents.
9
' This is still an article of faith among many psychodynamic practitioners. See, e.g.,
Miller, The Drama of the Gifted Child and the Psycho-Analyst's Narcissistic Disturbance,
60 Int'l J. Psycho-Analysis 47 (1979) ("[T]here is only one weapon available against mental
sickness: emotional discovery and acceptance of the truth in our individual and unique
childhood history.").
9
° Freud, Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, supra note 42, at 452. In later life,
when Freud was wiser, he recognized that psychoanalysis was often ineffective and that
other experiences such as religious conversion could be quite effective. S. Freud, New In troductory Lectures of Psycho-Analysis, supra note 42, at 152.
93
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tic success, as possible only through the uncovering work of analysis.96 Consequently, when a patient improved, Freud concluded
that the insights provided by the analyst tallied with what was
causally real, and that only psychoanalysis could have produced
therapeutic success in this manner. 97 Freud's bold conclusion was
th at therapeutic success vouched for the accuracy of the insights in
an individual case and confirmed the validity of his theory in
general.
Confirming the validity of psychodynamic psychology by reference to its therapeutic success raises three distinct questions: (1) is
psychodynamic therapy more successful than spontaneous remission? (2) is it more successful than therapies based on quite different theories of behavior? and (3) if dynamic therapy is successful,
is its success produced by accurate insight into the causes of behavior, as dynamicists claim? 98 If the therapy is not successful or if
dynamic insight is not the agent of change, dynamic theory is disconfirmed according to Freud's own standards.
There have been hundreds of "outcome" studies, of differing
methodological rigor, which have examined various therapies. The

Gri.inbaum, Can Psychoanalytic Theory be Cogently Tested on "the Couch"?, supra
note 82 , at 72, and Gri.inbaum, Epistemological Liabilities of the Clinical Appraisal of Psychoanalytic Theory, supra note 89, at 321, refer to the crucial point as the "Necessary Condition Thesis."
7
"
Gri.inbaum, Can Psychoanalytic Theory be Cogently Tested on "the Couch"?, supra
note 82, at 73, and Gri.inbaum, Epistemological Liabilities of the Clinical Appraisal of Psychoanalytic Theory, supra note 89, at 323, refer to this whole line of argument as the "Tally
Argument."
98
In more credulous times, a therapist would note that some patients improved and the
therapist would then claim that the therapy was successful. Behavioral scientists recognize
that patient improvement simpliciter is invalid evidence of efficacy; more careful, controlled
studies must be performed before one can make clair.J.s for the efficacy of a therapy. For a
thorough cataloguing of the objections to scientific study of psychotherapy outcome and a
persuasive response to the objections, see M. Smith, G. Glass & T. Miller, The Benefits of
Psychotherapy 24-35 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Benefits]. Good outcome studies should
include the following methodological parameters: the group of patients receiving the therapy
(th e "experimental" group) should be compared to control groups that receive either no
therapy or a placebo, and therapeutic change ought to be judged by independent, external
observers who have no stake in the outcome. Useful treatments of research design in psychotherapy outcome studies are J. Gottman & H. Markman, Experimental Designs in Psychotherapy Research, in Handbook of Psychotherapy and Behavior Change: An Empirical
An alysis 23 (S. Garfield & A. Bergin 2d ed. 1978); J. Meltzoff & M. Kornreich, Research in
Psychotherapy 3-60 (1970); Epstein & Vlok, Research on the Results of Psychotherapy: A
Summary of Evidence, 138 Am. J. Psychiatry 1027, 1027-28 (1981) (briefly listing the criteria for good outcome research).
96
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overall conclusion of these studies is remarkable: all therapies conducted under all types of conditions seem to offer a greater chance
of improvement in short-term emotional feeling than spontaneous
remission, but, with a few minor exceptions, no type or condit ion
of therapy seems more successful than any other. t~ It does not
seem to matter which therapy a patient chooses; simply being in
therapy works. T he dynamic therapies are no more efficacious
than other therapies that are not based on dynamic theory and
insight. Making the unconscious conscious does not, as Frev.d and
his theory predict, offer a unique route to true and durable emotional improvement. 100 Although the finding of no special efficacy
9

•• Benefits, supra note 98, at 183-89. The meta-analysis provided in this work is a comprehensive, useful and persuasive integration of ihe vast psychotherapy outcome literature.
These findings have recently been replicated by a re-analysis of its data. See Andrews &
Harvey, Does Psychotherapy Benefit Neurotic Patients? A Reanalysis of the Smith, Glass
and Miller Data, 38 Archives Gen. Psychiatry 1203 (1981). The methodology of Benefits has
been harshly criticized. SeeS. Rachman & G. Wilson, The Effects of Psychological Therapy
248-56 (2d ed. 1980); Eysenck, An Exercise in Mega-Silliness, 33 Am. Psychologist 517
(1978). For the answer to their critics by the authors of Benefits, see Glass & Smith, Reply
to Eysenck, 33 Am. Psychologist 517 (1978). For a highly favorable review of Benefits that
discusses the issues, see Abeles, Psychotherapy Works, 26 Contemp. Psychology 821 (1981).
I have chosen to rely on the Benefits conclusions because they are the most favorable to
psychodynamic psychology and therefore least favorable to my thesis. See generally Epstein
& Vlok, supra note 98.
The only exception to the statement in the text applies to treatment of specific phobias or
habit disturbances such as smoking. For such problems, behaviorally oriented therapies are
almost certainly more effective. See S. Rachman & G. Wilson, supra, at 257.
100
Indeed, a well-respected, although behaviorally biased, pair of scholars have recently
concluded from an intensive review of the literature that "there still is no acceptable evidence to support the view that psychoanalysis is an effective treatment." S. Rachman & G.
Wilson , supra note 99, at 76 (emphasis added). These authors also dispute the conclusion
that all therapies work equally well. They believe that behavior therapy has clearly shown
itself to be more effective in general than other forms of psychological treatment. Id. at 25577. See generally id. at 117-94.
No review of the research literature has concluded that dynamic therapy is more successful than other therapies in general or for specific problems. See Lubarsky, Singer & Lubarsky, Comparative Studies of Psychotherapies: Is it True That "Everyone Has Won and All
Must Have Prizes"?, 32 Archives Gen. Psychiatry 995 (1975). At best, reviewers conclude
that it is no less effective than other therapies. One might argue, however, that because
psychoanalysis and long-term dynamic psychotherapy are more expensive and time consuming than other therapies, an overall cost-benefit analysis leads to the conclusion that they
are the least desirable. Proponents of dynamic therapy have attempted to meet such objections by developing quite brief and relatively inexpensive methods of psychotherapy based
on psychodynamic principles. See, e.g., D. Malan, The Frontier of Brief Psychotherapy
(1976); J. Mann, Time-Limited Psychotherapy (1973). There is no evidence that these brief
methods are more or less effective than other types of psychotherapeutic treatment, including their more extensive ancestors.
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does not mean that Freud's theory is invalid, it does mean that, on
the basis of current evidence of therapeutic results, neither psychodynamic theory in general nor any particular school can claim
greater validity than any other psychological theory.
Moreover, dynamic theory cannot claim that it is at least one
valid theory among others or that it is partially valid because it
achieves some therapeutic success. The issue is whether improvemen t under dynamic therapy is the result of insight, the asserted
agent of change, or whether it is the result of a placebo or an as yet
unidentified therapeutic agent. If Jungian patients improve with
Jungian insights, Freudian patients improve with Freudian insights, and so on, and all improve equally, it is difficult to claim
credibly that all the theories are equally correct. If the widely diverse and often contradictory insights of the various dynamic theories and the wide range of psychological interventions employed by
the other therapies are all equally efficacious, it appears very unlikely that the specific insights or interventions are the true change
agents. There is simply no evidence that it is the specific content
of these different insights that cure. We need not accept the conclusion of the Dodo at the end of the Caucus Race in Alice's Adventures in Wonderland: "Everybody has won and all must have
prizes." 101 Unless one is willing to make the incredible assumption

Finally, one investigator has concluded that in ratings of the success of dynamic therapy,
symptomatic improvement is a highly significant component of the rating. See Mintz, Measuring Outcome in Psychodynamic Psychotherapy: Psychodynamic vs. Symptomatic Improveme nt, 38 Archives Gen. Psychiatry 503, 506 (1981) (also questioning the need for an
expert clinician's "dynamic assessment" in order to rate improvement).
101
L. Carroll, Alice's Adventures in Wonderland 33 (Signet Classics ed. 1960). The full
text is:
"Why," said the Dodo, "the best way to explain it is to do it." (And, as you might
like to try the thing yourself some winter-day, I will tell you how the Dodo managed
it.)
First it marked out a race-course, in a sort of circle ("the exact shape doesn't matter," it said), and then all the party were placed along the course, here and there.
There was no "One, two, three, and away!", but they began running when they liked,
and left off when they liked, so that it was not easy to know when the race was over.
However, when they had been running half an hour or so, and were quite dry again,
the Dodo suddenly called out "The race is over!" and they all crowded round it, panting, and asking "But who has won?"
This question the Dodo could not answer without a great deal of thought, and it
stood for a long time with one finger pressed upon its forehead (the position in which
you usually see Shakespeare, in the pictures of him), while the rest waited in silence.
At last the Dodo said "Everybody has won, and all must have prizes."
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that all the psychological theories upon which the different therapies are based, including the diverse dynamic theories, are all
valid, and equally so, then one must acknowledge that studies of
therapeutic outcome do not confirm the validity of dynamic
therapy.
The third method of testing psychodynamic theory is by exter-·
nal, empirical studies of theoretical propositions. In contrast to
validation from the couch or consulting room, many behavioral
scientists, str uck by the rich comprehensiveness of psychodynamic
psychology and by its impact on psychiatry and culture, have attempted to test dynamic propositions externally by controlled,
quantitative, correlational and experimental studies. Almost always they have used the works of Freud himself: they have attempted to restate Freud's hypothesis in forms suitable for testing
according to the methods of modern behavioral science. Freud is
the most sensible theoretician to test, for he is the fount of psychodynamic psychology and there is little reason to test a disciple's
theoretical offspring rather than the works of the teacher. 102 The
Id. (emphasis in original)
The more likely explanation for equal therapeutic success is that all the various psychotherapies share certain, nontheoretically related characteristics that are the source of behavioral melioration. Many commentators have suggested that this is the case, and it certainly
is the most parsimonious account of the empirical evidence. J. Frank, Persuasion and Healing 1, 2 (rev. ed. 1973); Hobbs, Sources of Gain in Psychotherapy, 17 Am. Psychologist 741
(1962); Strupp, On the Basic Ingredients of Psychotherapy, 41 J. Consulting & Clinical Psychology 1 (1973); Strupp, The Interpersonal Relationship as a Vehicle for Therapeutic
Learning, 41 J. Consulting & Clinical Psychology 13 (1973); Strupp & Hadley, Specific vs.
Nonspecific Factors in Psychotherapy: A Controlled Study of Outcome, 36 Archives Gen.
Psychiatry 1125, 1135 (1979). See also Cross, Sheehan & Khan, Short- and Long-Term Follow-Up of Clients Receiving Insight-Oriented Therapy and Behavior Therapy, 50 J. Consulting & Clinical Psychology 103, 111-12 (1982). But see Garfield, Basic Ingredients or
Common Factors in Psychotherapy?, 41 J. Consulting & Clinical Psychology 9 (197 3).
Two eminent theoreticians have offered unifying, theory-based explanations for the success of the diverse psychotherapies. Bandura, Self-Efficacy: Toward a Unifying Theory of
Behavioral Change, 84 Psychological Rev. 191 (1977) (cognitive/behavioral theory); Eysenck,
A Unified Theory of Psychotherapy, Behavior Therapy and Spontaneous Remission, 188
Zeitschrift fi.ir Psychologie 43 (1980) (classical conditioning theory). See also Bandura, SelfEfficacy Mechanism in Human Agency, 37 Am. Psychologist 122 (1982) (broad ramifications
of theory of self-efficacy). One might claim that particular therapies would be more successful if they were matched with the appropriate cases. See S. Garfield, Psychotherapy An
Eclectic Approach 225-37 (1980). But empirical evidence fails to support this view and, in
any event, it would show only that a particular theory accounted for a restricted portion of
reality.
102
This is especially so because the validity of the Freudian corpus is hardly settled. Disciples and schismatics all derive their data from therapeutic consultations, which , I nrgu<2d
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question is whether the validity of the theory, as a scientific, causal
theory, can be established by external, controlled, quantitative
studies which, after all, would provide stronger direct verification
than uncontrolled clinical evidence from the consulting room or
studies of therapeutic outcomes.
Freud's writings (and those of most other psychodynamic clinicians) contain at least two major types of statements: observations
of behavior and theoretical explanations of varying orders of inference.103 Empirical observations include data such as slips of memory, 104 and the apparently regular concurrence of certain clusters of
personality traits such as orderliness, obstinacy, and parsimony. 1011
Empirical observations can be confirmed directly, but confirmation
proves little, if anything, about the validity of an allegedly explanatory theory. Freud's theoretical explanations for his observations
are the interesting and relatively unique aspects of his work. The
most important types of causal, theoretical explanations for observed behavior include genetic (developmental) and dynamic
processes. 106 For an instance of a genetic explanation, Freud
at supra notes 84-90 and accompanying text, are a contaminated data source, much as were
Freud's consultations. Therefore, in light of Freud's incomparable brilliance, there is little
reason to test systematically the hypotheses of the offspring until the Freudian underbrush
is cleared and pacified. The eminent British psychiatrist, Sir Aubrey Lewis, wrote that "the
access ions to psychoanalytic theory since Freud's death have been of little weight in comparison with the colossal edifice of ideas and hypotheses that he reared." The Later Papers
of Sir Aubrey Lewis 66 (1978) (also noting significant revisions).
The empirical literature testing analytic theory and studying psychotherapy is by now
enorm ous, but it is almost totally ignored by most psychodynamic clinicians who are evidently content to remain sealed in their analytic cocoon. See supra note 86. Moreover, those
in the analytic movement have failed to pay attention to advances in social science methodology that may have aided their endeavor. G. Klein, supra note 77, at 64 (" [l]s it not astonishing that, except for a few recent faint stirrings .. ., there has not been, since Freud's
time , a single advance in the investigative or research methodology used by psychoanalysts?" (emphasis in original)).
103
This, of course, is a vast oversimplification, but for the purposes of this paper it is a
us efu l categorization. Psychodynamicists often confuse data and theory, and evidence and
inference, much to the conceptual detriment of their enterprise. Esman, On Evidence and
Inference, On the Babel of Tongues, 48 Psychoanalytic Q. 628 (1979) (examples given). Neverth eless, one can distinguish the two.
104
S. Freud, The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, supra note 51.
10
' S . Freud, Character and Anal Eroticism, in 9 Standard Edition 169 (1908).
106
In the most famous attempt to systematize the structure of psychoanalytic theory,
David Rapaport described the genetic point of view as follows :
All behavior is part of a geneti c series, and through its antecedents, part of the temporal sequences which brought about the present form of the personality .. ..
[M]uch of what "exists" here and now in the subject can only be known through a
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termed the personality triad of orderliness, obstinacy and parsimoniousness "anal" traits because, he hypothesized, they were acquired as a result of the conflict engendered by toilet training-the
anal phase of psychosexual development-when the child wished
to enjoy his or her feces and play with them, but was forced to
renounce such wishes by parental pressure. As an example of a dynamic explanation, Freud attributed lapses of memory to the process of repression, whereby a particular recollection would be unconsciously prevented from reaching consciousness because, for
any number of reasons, it would produce conflict and anxiety if the
person were to remember it.
Genetic and dynamic hypotheses can be tested. Although it is
difficult for even longitudinal, prospective research to confirm ge-

genetic exploration of its antecedents. This implies that descriptively identical behaviors may differ in their psychological significance, depending on their genetic roots.
D. Rapaport, The Structure of Psychoanalytic Theory 44-45 (Psychological Issues Monograph 6, 1960). Freud described the dynamic point of view as follows: "We seek not merely
to describe and to classify phenomena, but to understand them as signs of an interplay of
forces in the mind, as a manifestation of purposeful intentions working concurrently or in
mutual opposition. We are concerned with a dynamic view of mental phenomena." S. Freud,
Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, supra note 42, at 67 (emphasis in original).
In addition to the genetic and dynamic points of view, psychoanalytic theory contains
four other points of view. The topographic view hypothesizes that mental life occurs at
different levels of consciousness. The economic point of view is concerned with the distribution and discharge of hypothesized psychic energy, e.g., libido. The structural point of view
posits that the mind can be divided into three units - e.g., the id, ego, and superego each of which has different functions. The adaptive point of view holds that behavior is
determined in part by the person's external reality. See D. Rapaport, supra, at 57-61.
Freud posited many highly inferential explanatory constructs, such as psychic instincts
(life and death), energies (e.g., libido), and psychic structures (id, ego, superego), to explain
the processes that caused behavior. He termed such theorizing "metapsychology." The genesis of many of these constructs was Freud's background in the physical sciences and his
desire to appear to have his psychology approach the precision of a physical science. Indeed,
Freud believed chemistry and physiology ultimately would explain all his discoveries. See
generally F. Sulloway, Freud: Biologist of the Mind: Beyond The Psychoanalytic Legend
(1979) (interpreting Freud's work as an attempt to be a natural science); Bettelheim, supra
note 42 (interpreting Freud's work not primarily as an attempt to be a natural science and
demonstrating how mistranslation has led readers in English astray). Creative as these constructs are, however, many of them are not theoretically or scientifically sound - they are
better understood as metaphors than as explanatory variables. See, e.g., Rubenstein, The
Problem of Confirmation in Clinical Psychoanalysis, 28 J. Am. Psychoanalytic A. 397, 409
(1980) ("Freud's energic hypotheses have been thoroughly discredited physiologically.").
The main dispute among current mainstream Freudians is concerned with whether the metapsychology is a useful part of psychoanal:y'tic theory . G. Klein , supra note 77, at 41-71; R.
Schafer, supra note 64; Gill, supra note 42; Holt, The Death and Transfiguration of Metapsychology, 8 Int'l Rev. Psycho-Analysis 129 (1981).
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netic personality explanations, well-performed studies nevertheless
can furnish strong correlational evidence of an association between
a developmental experience and a personality variable. For instance, if Freud was right about the roots of the anal personality,
there should be major differences of the expected type between the
toilet training experiences of " anals" and "non-anals." Indeed, if
all other possible explanatory variables are distributed randomly
am ong the anals and non-anals, one might cautiously conclude that
t oilet training experiences are a causal variable in t he development
of the anal personality. 107 Even so, such a study would not demonstrate that toilet training produced the personality trait constellation as an effect of the unconscious psychological dynamic
processes that Freud suggested.
Dynamic explanations are equally interesting because they purport to explain how the person's mental processes that have been
produced by his or her experiences in turn produce observable behavior. Such processes can be tested experimentally to determine
if predicted behavioral consequences ensue. For instance, one can
try to induce conflict and anxiety in one group of subjects by exposing them to those stimuli that the theory predicts will produce
anxiety. Then one can determine if the anxious group, compared to
a non-anxious control group, evidences significantly greater theroretically predicted defects in memory, attention, perception or the
like. If the study is properly done, positive results will substantiate
the theory in the absence of a better explanation for the results.
Although Freud never attempted to validate his theories by systematic, controlled tests, others have. Thousands of experimental
and correlational studies of various aspects of psychodynamic theory have been performed outside the consultation room. 108 The
novv standard text for assessing the empirjcal evidence for dynamic
theory is a critical compendium by two psychologists, Fisher and
Greenberg, entitled The Scientific Credibility of Freud's Theories

107
Investigators cannot perform closely controlled experimental tests of genetic hypotheses because ethical principles and families will not allow experimenters to manipulate critical child-rearing practices to such an intrusive degree.
108
A use ful collection of these studies is Freud and Psychology (S. Lee & M . Herbert eds.
1970) . A collection of some of the "strongest" such studies, each followed by highly critical
commentaries, is H. Eysenck & G. Wilson, supra note 81. A useful primer on the scientific
testing of psychodynamic theory is I. Sarnoff, Testing Freudian Concepts (1971).
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and Th.erapy. 1 0 tl .Although this work is highly valuable, it suffeis
from serious substantive and methodological constraint s. F'irst, despite the vas t nu:mber of dynamic theorists and theories , Fisher
and Greenberg reviewed only some aspects of one t heoryFreud 's.no Second , as is too often the case in behavioral science,
the studies relied upon have rarely been replicat ed , and. th.e studies
of single topics a r e often not comparable to one another. T hird,
empirical tests of the va.lidity of dynamic theories ar e prone to cir .
1' l ~,
'
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. d t11at
1
' ,
culanty.
· J.1 or exano.ple,
a +-~,es t. wll
1s 'baseu on. t 1rte
very dynamic theory that is to be tested. If the result s fai l to disprove the theory-the null hypothesis is rejected-both t he theory
and the test are considered validated. But building validation into
a test is a bootstrapping operation of the first order. Convincing
validation requires tests -vvhose foundation and prior validation are
external to the theory. 112 Fourth, many of the tests used in the
studies reported by Fisher and Greenberg do not have sufficient
reliability and validity to meet modern, behavioral science standards for tests. 113 Fifth, many of the studies, especially t he earlier
ones, do not conform to present criteria for methodological soundness. Sixth and last, even when a reasonable study produces results
_J

S. Fisher & R. Greenberg, supra note 77. Fisher and Greenberg a ttempted to review all
the pre- 1974 published and much of the unpublished (dissertation) empirical literature
bearing on Freud's therapy and on five aspects of his therapy. T hese are (1) the dream
theory; (2) personality types and oral and anal characters; (3) oed ipal dynamics and consequences; (4) the origins of hom osexuality; and (5) paranoid d efensive projection of homosexual impul ses. The book also reviews the empirical evidence concerning psychoanalytic t herapy, but t his topic has already b een examined at supra notes 91-101 and accompanying text.
(Fisher an d Greenberg agree wit h the conclusions reached supra.) Another work that attempts a similar review is P. Kline, Fact and Fantasy in Freudian Theory (1972).
110
As indi cated at supra note 102 and accompanying text, the choice of F reud makes
emin en t se nse-indeed, any other choice would be foolish: only Freud's t heory, and only
some aspects of it, have received reasonable amounts of empirical attention . It is remarkable
that much of the rest of Freud's theory and all the other dynamic theories have not rece ived
substanti al empirical testing. See supra note 77. N everth eless, the Fisher and Greenberg
review, extensive as it is, assesses only a limited portion of the enormous numbers of hy potheses that may be derived from the wide range of dynamic theories.
111
Studies use such dispar ate subjects and methods that it is difficult t o aggregate them
to reach general conclusions. See Eysenck, The Experimental Stud y of Freudian Concepts,
25 BulL Brit. Psychological Soc'y 261, 265 -66 (1972) (outlining valuable methodological criticisms of empiri cal studies confirming psychodynamic theory and concluding that "there is
no evidence at all for psychoanalytic theory").
112
Eysenck, supra note 111 , at 266.
11 3
E.g., t he Dynamic Personality Inventory. See Sells, Dynamic Personality Inventory, in
The Sixth Mental :tvieasurements Yearbook §§ 86-87 (0. Buros ed . 1965).
1 09
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consonant with theory, behavioral scientists, like lawyers, need to
apply Ockham's razor liberally or, as psychologists put it, the principle of parsimony. Behavioral scientists should try to determine if
there are alternative explanations of the results that are simpler
and less inferential. 114
Fisher and Greenberg take note of some of these points, but they
rarely give them their due. They do not consider the problem of
aggregating studies in sophisticated detail, nor do they employ any
of the reasonable methods of aggregation that methodologists have
devised. 1111 The problem of circular validation is ignored and alternative explanations are either not considered or are rejected a priori . The problem of methodological rigor is addressed but, in my
opinion, is not sufficiently considered. The criterion for the inclusion of a study in the review is extremely loose and permissive. 116

j
·J
I

i
'" Eysenck, supra note 111, at 261-63.
10
'
Li ght & Smith, Accumulating Evidence: Procedures for Resolving Contradictions
Among Different Research Studies, 41 Harv. Educ. Rev. 429 (1971); Rosenthal, Combining
Res ults of Independent Studies, 85 Psychological Bull. 185 (1978). See also Cooper & Rosenthal, Statistical Versus Traditional Procedures for Summarizing Research Findings, 87
Psychological Bull. 442 (1980).
In addition, Fisher and Greenberg use very vague terms to describe the strength of findings, e.g., "results demonstrate fairly convincingly," S. Fisher & R. Greenberg, supra note
77, at 148, or, "Freud's theory concerning this matter is moderately well affirmed," id. at
195.
116
Fisher and Greenberg describe their methodology for reviewing and evaluating the
literature on a topic as follows:
When we decided to collect and evaluate all of the existing scientific information
bearing on Freud's models, we were confronted with having to set standards concerning the meaning of the term "scientific." We decided to apply the term to any study
in which observations had been gathered according to rules more exacting than "This
is what I personally witnessed or experienced." We will . . . cite information only
when it has been secured through procedures that are repeatable and involve techniques that make it possible to check on the objectivity of the reporting observer. We
did not decide in advance to rule out studies that had defects in their experimental
designs or that were based on oversimplistic notions concerning Freud's models. It
seemed more sensible to make a sweep of the total empirical data, flawed or otherwise, and to draw conclusions from overall trends.
S. F isher & R. Greenberg, supra note 77, at 15.
Thus, Fisher and Greenberg do not give differential weight to studies of varying rigor, nor
do they discuss the rigor of particular studies very often. They conclude that it is "sensible
to make a sweep of the total empirical data, flawed or otherwise," but they do not provide
reasons for why this is sensible. Their criteria for inclusion are very permissive, to say the
leasi.
Develop ing and employing methods for aggregating data and reporting aggregated results
precisely is ad mittedly difficult and time-consuming. Compare, for example, the methods
used in Benefits, supra note 98, at 55-84, with the methodology of Fisher and Greenberg.
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Finally, a unique point in behavioral science research should be
noted. For various reasons, negative research results are published
far less frequently than positive results, producing a bias in support of validity if one considers only published literature. Recognizing this, Fisher and Greenberg have commendably sought to
remedy this bias by consulting unpublished dissertation literature,
but for unavoidable reasons their search of this literature must be
incomplete. 117 Although Fisher and Greenberg have produced an
enormously useful work, it is nonetheless a review of limited aspects of one theorist that uses a permissive inclusion crit erion. Its
conclusions must therefore be viewed with caution.
With these methodological constraints and cautions in mind, one
can draw t hree broad conclusions from the Fisher and Greenberg
volume. 118 First, Freud was a fine, acute observer of behavior.
Many of his observations of behavior and his associations between
behaviors are reasonably valid. The anal personality constellation,
for example, does seem to exist, 119 and anals appear generally to
behave consistently as one predicts anals would (e.g., they are
more likely to be stamp collectors than non-anals are). 120 Second,
although studies appear to have validated a number of observational theorems, these studies have not confirmed a majority of the
causal genetic and dynamic hypotheses, especially those pertaining
to women. 121 And most of what has been confirmed has not been

Although Fisher and Greenberg are more readable than Benefits, it is patent that one prefers the difficulty and rigor of Benefits when one is trying to reach convincing conclusions.
117
For example, Fisher and Greenberg failed to discover my doctoral thesis, which systematically tested a number of crucial Freudian and post-Freudian hypotheses derived directly from the primary literature. See S. Morse, Anxiety, Ego and Death (1973) (unpublished doctoral thesis on file in Widener Library, Harvard University) (disconfirming almost
all hypotheses tested). Fisher and Greenberg cannot be faulted for this failure - it would
be impossible to identify every relevant thesis. Nevertheless, the omission indicates that
there might be a great deal of negative evidence that Fisher and Greenberg did not canvass.
118
Tests of Freudian hypotheses have mainly addressed observations and genetic and dynamic explanations. To review the extensive array of topics covered by Fisher and Greenberg would be beyond the purpose of this paper; therefore, only representative conclusions
will be discussed.
119
S. Fisher & R. Greenberg, supra note 77, at 142-45.
120
Id. at 163.
121
Id. at 394-95, 408-09. For example, the anal personality is probably not related to toilet training, id. at 147-49; it is unclear whether female paranoia is the result of a projective
defense against unacceptable homosexual wishes, id. at 269, 409 (see also S. Freud, A Case
of Paranoia Running Counter to the Psycho-Analytic Theory of the Disease, in 14 Standard
Edition 263 (1915)); the manifest content of a dream is not a "disguise" produced by de-
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the uniquely Freudian developmental and genetic hypotheses.

fenses aga inst th e unacceptabl e wishes of the latent dream, S. Fisher & R. Greenberg, supra
note 77, at 394; love, not fear, is probably t he major cause of t he boy's oe dipal id entifi ca tion
with his fat her, id. at 395, 404-06. The very core process of rep ress ion itself, as F reud conce pt ualized it, has not been sc ientifically validate d. H olmes, In vesti ga tion of Repression:
Di ffe rent ial Recall of Material Experimentally or Na turally Assoc iated with Ego Th rea t, 81
Psycholog ical Bull. 632 (1974). Indeed, th e logical and evidenti ary basis for th e con ce pt in
F reud 's own work is problematic. Grunbaum, Logical Foundations of Psych oanalytic Theory, for t h co ming in Festschrift for Wolfgang Stegmuller (W. Ess ler & H. Putn am eds. 198 2) .
Project ion is another core concept not di scussed by Fisher and Gr ee nberg that has not
been em pirica lly confirmed as Freud identified it. H olm es, Dimensions of P rojection, 69
Psych·.Jlogical B ull. 248 (1968); Holmes, Projection as a Defense Mecha nism, 85 Psychologi ca l Bull. 677 (1978). H olmes' conclusions, however , have been criticized . See Sherwood, SelfSe rvin g Bias in Person Perception: A Re-examination of Projection as a Mechanism of Defense , 90 Psychological Bull. 445 (1981). As Holmes' answer demonstrates, however, classical
projection is still unconfirmed. Holmes, Exist ence of Classical Projection and the StressReduci ng Function of Attributive Projection: A Reply to Sherwood, 90 Psychological Bull.
460 (1 981). But see Sherwood, Consciousness and Stress Reduction in Defensive Projection:
A Reply to H olmes, 91 Psychological Bull. 372, 373 (1982) (disagreeing with Holmes but
admittin g that the Freudian conceptualization is idiosyncratic, unsystematic, incomplete,
and "in consistent with contemporary thinking and unlikely to advance our understanding of
the ph enomenon, if it indeed exists").
More recent evidence on some of the genetic hypotheses-the family histories of male
homosex uals, for example-has failed to confirm hypotheses that Fisher and Greenberg consider confirmed. See A. Bell, M . Weinberg & S. Hammersmith, Sexual Preference: Its Development in Men and Women 50, 61-62, 189-90 (1981); Zuger, H omosexuality and Parental
Gu ilt, 137 Brit. J . Psychiatry 55 (1980).
T he genetic (developmental) hypotheses of the theory, which are at the very core of psychoanalyt ic explanat ion, are now considered by many eminent observers t o be incorrect.
See, e.g., J. Kagan, R. Kearsley & P. Zelazo, Infancy: Its Place in Hum an Development 60
(1978) ("The original psychoanalytic variables of interest .. . are no longer of interest today. By the late 1940's . .. the research record was not in accord with prediction.");
Bowlby, supra note 79, at 249 ("[A]ll of his [Freud's] developmental psychology came to be
found ed in principles long since abandoned by biologists. If . . . psychoanalysis is to become
t he natur al science ... that Freud intended, there are compelling reasons for drastic
changes in some at least of its basic assumptions .. .. Although psychoanalysis is assuredly
a develop mental discipline, it is nowhere weaker . .. than in its concepts of development.") .
Even if psychoanalysts today would focus on different developmental explanations from
those posited by Freud, the original Freudian hypotheses are still vastly influential, Bowlby,
supra note 79, and to the best of my knowledge, newer developmental hypotheses, such as
th ose of Kohut, have not been systematically tested. See supra note 102 and accompanying
text. T hese conclusions do not contradict the assumption that parent-child relations are
important in the child's develoment; they simply mean that psychodynamic theory does not
offe r a validated account of the influence of parent-child relations on development and
ad ult behavior.
Many phenomena explained by Freud in his distinctive fashion have been explained acco rd ing to other theories that seem more parsimonious and require fewer inferential, imaginative leaps. See, e.g., R. Nisbett & L. Ross, Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings
of Social Judgment 228-48 (1980); S. Timpanaro, The Freudian Slip: Psychoanalysis and
Textual Criticism (1976); Chapman & Foot, The Psychology of Humour, 4 Trends in
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Third, where Freud's observations and explanations have been
confirmed, they are only partial accounts of reality. Confirmation
refers only to the weight of the evidence. Some studies of all propositions are negative, and even positive studies do not yield perfectly consistent results. For example, anal personality traits do
not always cluster together; there are non-anals who behave in anal
ways (e.g., collect stamps) and vice versa. Not all paranoids respond to homosexual stimuli. Persons with particular experiences
and dynamics do not always behave in the predicted ways, while
some persons who lack those experiences or dynamics do behave in
those predicted ways. In sum, it must be acknowledged that Freudian observations are incomplete, and that Freudian causes are
predisposing, not necessary or sufficient, causes of behavior. Moreover, the evidence from the pro-dynamic Fisher and Greenberg
treatise does not strongly support Freudian theory. 122
Unlike Freud, other dynamic psychologists have recognized the
necessity to perform methodologically adequate studies of dynamic
theory in an attempt both to rehabilitate and to validate it. The
work of Lloyd Silverman, a leading spokesman for academic dynamic psychology, provides the best example. The work of
Silverman and his students appears to provide two distinct types
of confirming evidence. First, it purports to demonstrate that dynamic theory explains the success of one standard form of behavior
therapy, systematic desensitization, better than the behavioral the-

Neurosciences IV, V (1981); Erdelyi, A New Look at the New Look: Perceptual Defense and
Vigilance, 81 Psychological Rev. 1 (1974); Norman, Categorization of Action Slips, 88 Psychological Rev. 1 (1981).
122
Fisher and Greenberg are optimistic about the success of tests of Freudian hypotheses,
but their optimism is difficult to fathom. Although a large number of studies are positive,
many of the most important Freudian hypotheses are disconfirmed and few genetic and
dynamic hypotheses - the core of the theory - receive substantial support. Others take an
even dimmer view of the outcome of empirical tests of Freudian hypotheses. See, e.g., H.
Eysenck & G. Wilson, supra note 81, at 392 (the studies most strongly "confirming" Freudian hypotheses "give little if any support to Freudian concepts and theories"); Crews,
Analysis Terminable, Commentary, July, 1980, at 25, 28 ("[M]uch of psychoanalytic thought
is by now a palimpsest of hazy, mutually jostling notions, not one of which has been shown
by an adequately designed empirical study to be the most likely explanation of a given
phenomenon."). Crews also believes that even if one accepts in total the claims of Fisher
and Greenberg, only "marginal credence" would be lent to the theory. Id. at 28 n.11. See
generally Slater, The Psychiatrist in Search of a Science: III-The Depth Psychologies, 126
Brit. J. Psychiatry 205 (1975) (denying the scientific validity of psychoanalysis). But see
Kelk, Is Psychoanalysis A Science? A Reply to Slater, 130 Brit. J. Psychiatry 105 (1977)
(asserting the continued validity of Freudian hypotheses).
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ory upon which the treatment is based, and that an unusual form
of t herapy derived from particular psychodynamic hypotheses is
successful in treating a wide range of problems. 123 Second,
Silverman and others have conducted numerous experimental
studies of dynamic processes that attempt to enhance psychopathology, many of which appear to confirm psychodynamic theory.124 More recent work, however, has severely undermined the
optimistic conclusions that dynamicists would wish to draw from
Silverman's work. One investigator has shown that Silverman's
proffered psychodynamic explanation for the success of systematic
desensitization is vitiated by multiple methodological flaws. 12 ~ Another behavioral scientist has tried rigorously in three recent separate experiments to replicate Silverman's experimental findings on
dynamics. 126 When the first test failed, the experimenter twice

E.g., Silverman, Psychoanalytic Theory: "The Reports of My Death are Greatly Exaggerated," 31 Am. Psychologist 621, 629-31 (1976); Silverman, Frank & Dachinger, A Psychoanalytic Reinterpretation of Systematic Desensitization: Experimental Data Bearing on the
Role of Merging Fantasies, 83 J. Abnormal Psychology 313 (1974). Systematic desensitization is a treatment wherein a patient is first taught to relax and is then exposed to a series
of graded stimuli, which increasingly provoke anxiety. As each stimulus is presented and the
patient feels anxious, he or she is instructed to relax. This procedure is repeated until that
stimulus is presented and the patient feels no anxiety. Then, the next, more anxiety-producing stimulus is presented and the procedure is repeated. The process continues until the last
stimulus, typically the real cause of the patient's concern, such as a fear of flying, is mastered. The classic text on this method is J . Wolpe, Psychotherapy by Reciprocal Inhibition
(1958).
The unusual therapeutic intervention used by Silverman is to present the subject with the
subliminal written message, "Mommy and I are one." This message appears to be successful
in ameliorating a range of problems, including schizophrenia.
1
. . E.g., Silverman, supra note 123, at 626-29; Silverman, Ross, Adler & Lustig, Simple
Research Paradigm for Demonstrating Subliminal Psychodynamic Activation: Effects of Oedipal Stimuli on Dart-Throwing Accuracy in College Males, 87 J. Abnormal Psychology 341
(1978).
m Condon & Allen, Role of Psychoanalytic Merging Fantasies in Systematic Desensitization: A Rigorous Methodological Examination, 89 J. Abnormal Psychology 437 (1980). But
see Palmatier & Bornstein, Effects of Subliminal Stimulation of Symbiotic Merging Fantasies on Behavioral Treatment of Smokers, 168 J. Nervous & Mental Disease 715 (1980)
(Silverman's theory apparently confirmed, but test is of a trivial behavior). Two other recent studies appear to demonstrate the efficacy of subliminal messages in reducing psychopathology, but some results were surprising or not predicted by Silverman's earlier work.
See Fribourg, The Effect of Fantasies of Merging with a Good Mother on Schizophrenic
Pathology, 169 J. Nervous & Mental Disease 337 (1981); Mendelsohn, The Effects of Stimulating Symbiotic Fantasies on Manifest Pathology in Schizophrenics: A Revised Formulation, 169 J. Nervous & Mental Disease 580 (1981).
106
Heilbrun, Silverman's Subliminal Psychodynamic Activation: A Failure to Replicate,
89 J. Abnormal Psychology 560 (1980) (also citing other failures to replicate).
123
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modified the experimental design, each time making it easrer to
replicate Silverman. Both further attempts failed. 127
Generally, then, empirical, external investigation has failed to
confirm substantially, and in many cases to confirm at all, the validity of Freudian theory. 128 Nevertheless, there are myriad other
psychodynamic theories, both Freudian and non-Freudian, in use
today by mental health clinicians. Is there reason to believe that
some or all of them might be more valid than their Freudian an-

Id. Silverman has recently com mented on the studies by Condon and Allen, supra note
125, and H eilbrun, supra note 126. See Silverman, A Comment on Two Subliminal Psychodynamic Activation Studies, 91 J. Abnormal Psychology 126 (1982). The responses to
Silverman's comment are Allen & Condon, Whither Psychodynamic Activation? A Reply to
Silverman, 91 J. Abnormal P sychology 131 (1982), and Heilbrun, Reply to Silverman, 91 J.
Abnormal Psychology 134 (1982). See also Silverman, Rejoinder to Allen & Condon's and
Heilbrun's Replies, 91 J. Abnormal Psychology 136 (1982). For a recent, popular review of
Silverman's work, see Adam s, Mommy and I Are One, Psychology Today, May 1982, at 24.
Silverman's work has been positively replicated in about three-quarters of the studies using
his methods, many of which were conducted by him and his students. There is no reason to
doubt this work, but in light of the failure consistently to replicate the work, it is not clear
what conclusions can be drawn from it. I believe Silverman's work is the most interesting
and encouraging attempt to validate core psychoanalytic hypotheses, but the results are not
obviously predicted by psychoanalytic theory, and indeed they may even be psychodynamically counterintuitive. Something is happening in these studies, but it is not clear what.
Silverman's work is not generally accepted yet, but even if it should be, it does not validate
the extraordinarily broad range of psychodynamic hypotheses that are used to explain behavior. For other recent empirical investigations by dynamically oriented researchers, see
Spence & Gordon, Activation and Assessment of an Early Oral Fantasy: An Exploratory
Study, in 8 Psychological Issues 11-28 (M. Mayman ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Psychological Issues]; Lubarsky, Forgetting and Remembering (Momentary Forgetting) During
Psychotherapy: A New Sample, in 8 Psychological Issues, supra, at 29-55; Shevrin, Brain
Wave Correlates of Subliminal Stimulation, Unconscious Attention, Primary and Secondary-Process Thinking, and Repressiveness, in 8 Psychological Issues, supra, at 56-87. Cogent and compelling criticisms of these studies are made by Holzman, Some Difficulties in
the Way of Psychoanalytic Research: A Survey and a Critique, in 8 Psychological Issues,
supra, at 88-103. See generally Meehl, Some Methodological Reflections on the Difficulties
of Psychoanalytic Research, in 8 Psychological Issues, supra, at 104-17. For more recent
evidence confirming observations, see Greenberg & Fisher, Freud's Penis-Baby Equation:
Explanatory Tests of a Controversial Theory, 53 Brit. J. Med. Psychology 333 (1980); Masling, O'Neill & Katkin, Autonomic Arousal, Interpersonal Climate, and Orality, 42 J. Personality & Soc. Psychology 529 (1982).
128
That hypotheses derived from Freud 's theory should fail to receive substantial confirmation is not surprising given the method of his investigation. Freud consistently constructed post hoc explanations of the antecedents of behavior based on the material that his
adult patients provided in the consulting room. Freud never really tested these constructions, however. A brilliant exposition of the difficulties and contradictions that Freud's
method produced is Jacobsen & Steele, From Present to Past: Freudian Archaeology, 6 Int'l
Rev. Psycho-Analysis 349 (1979).
127
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cestor? It is possible that the first dynamicist, Freud, although admittedly a genius, made only a hesitant and often wrong beginning.
This is unlikely, hO\vever. Freud's powers as an intellectual and
theoretician far surpassed those of his contemporaries and successors; and, unlike the situation in most sciences, there have not
been validated advances in the instrumentation and methodology
of psychodynamic psychology. The therapist-observer and the consulting room couch are still the tools of discovery and theoretical
advance. Simply put, it seems fair to conclude that, in general, the
theories of other dynamic psychologists are no more valid than
those of Freud. 129 In any case, the burden of persuasion should be
on the dynamic psychologists to demonstrate by acceptable scientific methods that their alternatives to and emendations of Freud
are valid.
The conclusions drawn from the evidence concerning the scientific validity of dynamic psychological theory are these: (1) the theory cannot be tested properly by the patient's responses to therapeutic interventions in the consulting room; (2) the outcome of
psychodynamic therapy suggests that it is not uniquely successful
and that the theoretically posited variables are not the agents of
the therapeutic change that does occur; (3) external, empirical investigations have produced, at best, only equivocal and pallid confirmations of Freud's theory; (4) alternative theories often can explain the results of studies supportive of Freudian theory, and, in
any case, psychodynamic theory is only a partial account of reality
even in those areas where it may be valid; and (5) a great propor..,
tion of Freud's theories, and almost all of the theories of those who
followed him, have never been tested by reasonably scientific
means. 130

This is not to deny that some theorists have usefully amended the Freudian corpus.
For instance, Hartmann's attention to the real world, although put too abstractly, was a
useful corrective. See H. Hartmann, Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation (1958).
130
A caveat to these conclusions is necessary. Even though a great part of dynamic psychology as a scientific, causal account of behavior is not valid, descriptively unconscious
determinants do affect behavior. To reiterate a distinction explained in supra note 42, descriptively unconscious determinants have not been forced into unconsciousness because
they are too painful to recognize-they are simply not in awareness. Much behavior can be
explained only if one posits such variables. See R. Nisbett & L. Ross, supra note 121;
Shevrin 8L Dickman, The Psychological Unconscious: A Necessary Assumption for All Psychological Theory?, 35 Am. Psychologist 421 (19BO). The issue then is the validity of psychodynami c accounts of why mental contents are unconscious and how they affect behavior.
1 29
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As a purportedly scientific causal account of hu:raan behavior,
dynamic theory has had nearly a century to prove itself, and in
large part it has failed to do so. Given its broad claims fmd. comprehensive nature, t he empirical support psychodynamic theory
has rece ived simply is not sufficient to sup port the conclusion that
it is generally valid: other theories explain the most supportive
. , an d n1.any core concep t s nave
l
1
.J •
,..
stud1es
oeen uwcm1nrmen
. ...'0 sycnoanalysis has always had its critics, especially in academic psychology, but today, as a scientific psychology, it is not only losing support in its traditional home in psychiatry but is also beset by
critics from within. 131 Moreover, attempts to employ dynamic psychology to explain behavior in other fields such as history and
literature are rece1vmg increasing criticism or are being
abandoned. 132
?

~

Other theories and models, concerned with information-processing in general, explain the
data more parsimoniously and satisfyingly. E.g., R. Nisbett & L. Ross, supra note 121; S.
Timpanaro, supra note 121; Norman, supra note 121. With such models, there is no need for
recourse to the many layers of inference required by dynamic theory and one is not forced
to confrom and then rationalize the large body of negative evidence about dynamic propositions that has accumulated.
131
Frank, Two Theories or One? or None?, 27 J. Am. Psychoanalytic A. 169 (1979).
An important indication is that psychodynamic concepts were not influential in the development of the American Psychiatric Association's new Diagnostic and Statistical Ma.'1ual of
Mental Disorders (3d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as DSM-III]. See Spitzer & Williams,
Classifications of Mental Disorders and DSM-III, in 1 CTP-III, supra note 1, at 1035, 1053,
1055 (system is atheoretical, and neither text nor diagnostic critera contain psychodynamic
material, despite disapproval by psychoanalysts).
Dynamic psychology has rarely found a comfortable niche in American academic psychology because Freudian theory is seen as unscientific, as so often vague and reliant on unobservable variables, and because the evidence for it is weak. See MacKinnon & Duke, supra
note 61 , at 670-73 (also noting some attention paid to psychoanalysis but little scientific
impact). See generally D. Shakow & D. Rapaport, The Influence of Freud on American
Psychology, in 4 Psychological Issues, supra note 127 (1967). Some percentage of academic
and practicing clinical psychologists are dynamically oriented, but dynamic psychology is
increasingly removed from the mainstream of scientific psychology. Among clinical psychologists, only 19 % now consider themselves dynamically oriented, compared to 41% according
to a 1961 survey. Garfield & Kurtz, Clinical Psychologists in the 1970's, 31 Am. Psychologist
1 (1976). See generally Garfield, Psychotherapy: A 40-Year Appraisal, 36 Am. Psychologist
174 (1981).
132
J. Barzun, Clio and the Doctors (1974); F. Crews, Out of My System: Psychoanalysis,
Ideology, and Critical Method (1975); D. Stannard, Shrinking History: Freud and the Failure of Psychohistory (1980). On the other hand, psychoanalysis seems to have taken on new
life in France. S. Turkle, Psychoanalytic Politics: Freud's French Revolution (1978); French
Freud: Structural Studies in Psychoanalysis, in 48 Yale French Studies (1972). I leave it to
the intrepid reader to consult some of the primary French sources in psychoanalysis to determine whether this result is a benefit to intellectual life.
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The law, too, should reject all, or at least most, of psychodynamic theory as a scientific, causal account of behavior. Michael
Moore has shown convincingly that dynamic theory is not motivational in character, in that it does not provide reasons for behavior
that rationalize that behavior and causally explain it. 133 Nor, as we
have seen, is it likely that dynamic wishes and other processes and
mental events are causes of behavior in the mechanical or functional sense.
All of us want explanations for behavior that seems to make no
sense. Psychodynamic psychology will continue to be seductive to
legal factfinders (who are not dismayed by its fanciful excesses)
because it offers a story about an actor's behavior, a story that is
wrapped in the mantles of medicine, psychology, and science, and
that seems to explain the actor's behavior. One wants to believe
the story because no other theory offers such an apparently full,
causal account. Indeed, one might argue that psychoanalysis is a
good "social hermeneutic" because it tells compelling stories of social dis-eases: 134 psychodynamic tales allow us to accept that some
persons act in unacceptably antisocial ways for reasons beyond
their control and not because of moral weakness, moral failure, or
the like. Psychodynamic psychology portrays aberrant conduct as
the product of inexorable, dark, primitive, unconscious forces.
Thus, the wrongdoer is not like the rest of us, whose conflicts are
of a lesser order and a milder nature. Finally, psychodynamic stories help us rationalize our desire to be merciful.
But the law should resist the sirens of dynamic psychology.
Therapeutic meaningfulness is not the law's concern, and we must
confront directly the hard social choices involved in excusing a
criminal defendant or mitigating punishment. If we wish to hear
tales about why people behave cruelly, evilly, or monstrously, let
us do so honestly and have them told by novelists and poets. The
difficulty with having dynamic clinicians tell these tales is that the
tales are then enshrouded in the white coats of science and

Moore, The Nature of Psychoanalytic Explanation, 3 Psychoanalysis & Contemp.
Thought 459, 537 (1980). Accord Eagle, A Critical Examination of Motivational Explanation
in Psychoanalysis, 3 Psychoanalysis & Contemp. Thought 329, 362-64 (1980). For a different
account of the nature of psychoanalytic explanation also rooted in the philosophy of science,
see M. Sherwood, The Logic of Explanation in Psychoanalysis (1969).
13
'
Christopher Stone and other readers of this article have suggested that this is the
primary function of dynamically-oriented expert testimony.
133
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medicine. Rather than understanding them as attempts to interpret the awful aberrance of which humans are sometimes capable,
the law mistakenly accepts the tales as scientifically-based causal
accounts of behavior. As a consequence, the law then misunderstands and misapplies the tales. But the tales should not be told in
courts at all-not by doctors or by novelists. The integrity of the
criminal trial process is too important to permit it to be compromised by the admission of dynamic speculations.
The significance of the evidence is clear: psychodynamic psychology in general is not sufficiently scientifically verified for the
law to accept it as relevant in the criminal process. 135 Speculations
Dynamic psychology is best understood, I believe, as a method of interpreting and
giving meaning to behavior, rather than as a mechanistic, causal explanation of it. See P.
Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation (1970); Steele, Psychoanalysis
and Hermeneutics, 6 Int'l Rev. Psycho-Analysis 389 (1979). Cf. M. Sherwood, supra note
133, at 244-57 (noting the narrative nature of psychoanalytic explanations and suggesting
criteria for evaluating the adequacy of such explanations). Freud rejected this account of
dynamic psychology: although the process of interpretation was crucial for Freud, the purpose of interpretation was not simply to provide meaning; rather, the provision of meaning
was hypothesized to cause specific modifications in the hypothesized unconscious causal
mechanisms that primarily determine behavior. See S. Freud, The Question of Lay Analysis,
supra note 57; S. Freud, An Outline of Psycho-Analysis, in 23 Standard Edition 144, 179
(1940). Nevertheless, the author of a theory is not the exclusive arbiter of its validity or
usefulness. Professor Moore, too, has argued that treating psychodynamic psychology as
simply an interpretive system, much like literary criticism, trivializes the theory. Moore,
Psychoanalytic Explanation, supra note 133, at 529. But this is true only if one insists on
maintaining that psychodynamic psychology is a causal, scientific account of behavior. Even
if it is not a causal account, however, the provision of meaning can be crucial in peoples'
lives.
It is often said, unfairly, that psychoanalysis is the modern secular religion and that analysts are the latter day priests. Dynamic therapists are probably able to impart meaning
authoritatively to skeptical modern patients because the therapists are trained in psychiatry
or psychology, which are, in a sense, modern religions. For millenia, religions have had the
vitally important effects of comforting people and of giving an account of and imparting
meaning to their lives. This has been true even though the spiritual doctrines of the world's
religions are not scientifically verifiable. Dynamic therapists give meaning to the lives of
patients, and meaning counts.
This is a reasonable point at which to confess that when I don my clinical hat, I am a
psychodynamically-oriented clinician. I no longer believe, however, that dynamic theory is a
causal account of behavior. Rather, I view it, as I have suggested in this article, as an interpretive story that provides meaning and may therefore be comforting to persons. I also believe that traditional psychoanalysis is never indicated as a psychotherapeutic measure, but
that it may be useful for aspiring dynamic clinicians as a means of "scrubbing" their unconsciouses. Finally, I also confess to having written years ago theoretical and clinical psychoanalytic articles: Morse, Perfecting the Parents: A Family Romance Resistance, 27 Am. J.
Psychotherapy 410 (1973); Morse, The After-Pleasure of Suicide, 46 Brit. J. Medical Psychology 227 (1973); Morse, Structure and Reconstruction: A Critical Comparison of Michael
1"
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based on psychodynamic psychology, judged as scientific causal accounts of behavior, are not "informed" but idle. At most, only
speculations based on the few verified propositions should be admitted into evidence. That a significant number of mental health
clinicians accept psychodynamic psychology does not in any way
prove its validity. The burden of persuasion should be on proponents of dynamic psychology to demonstrate that it is more verified than I claim. The criminal law should demand more than mere
acceptance; it should require a reasonably solid scientific foundation before admitting the testimony of dynamicists. It is currently
impossible to lay this foundation, for instead of concrete there is
only faith.
C.

Are Psychodynamic Formulations Reliable? A Difficulty in
the Path of Expert Testimony

Even if one concludes that some or all of psychodynamic theory
is sufficiently valid as a causal account of behavior to support expert testimony, the question remains whether clinicians can give
accurate and reliable explanations in individual cases. If they cannot, such clinical testimony does not aid rational decisionmaking
by the factfinder.
A good dynamicist collects data about a person primarily by extensive interviewing. The dynamicist typically takes a comprehensive history of the person and gives the person enormous freedom
to talk about whatever he or she wishes. From the person's own
historical account and from the person's behavior during the
clinical interviews, the dynamicist draws inferences about the person's developmental processes, personality structure, and dynamics. The dynamicist constructs speculations about the person's unconscious infantile impulses, wishes, conflicts, and feelings, and
about the person's characteristic unconscious means of denying
and expressing those impulses, wishes, conflicts, and feelings. The
dynamicist does not deny the influence on behavior of biological
and sociological variables or conscious thoughts and feelings, but
the primary explanatory tool is unconscious motivation. 136 Thus, it
is dynamically unconscious motivation that the psychodynamic eliBalint and D.W. Winnicott, 53 Int'l J. Psycho-Analysis 487 (1972); Morse, The Psychological Theory of Michael Balint, 3 Psychiatry in Medicine 407 (1972).
136
See S. Freud, Analysis Terminable and Interminable, supra note 57, at 219-30, 234-40.
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mcwn seeks to understand and, in therapy, to elucidate. The
dynamicist applies the same process of explanation and understanding in terms of unconscious variables to both life patterns
and individual events. Indeed, understanding an individual event
is impossible without understanding the person's general personality structure and dynamics.
Let us take a simple example: an employee is late for an ap pointment with a superior. The employee explains truthfully that
he or she was so engrossed in prior activities that the time was
forgotten. This is an ordinary enough occurrence that most persons
would understand and attribute it to inadvertence. By contrast,
the dynamicist would assume that the person unconsciously wished
to be late and that the tardiness was not a matter of inadvertence.
It would be assumed further that becoming engrossed in prior activities was a means the employee unconsciously employed to provide a conscious excuse. But why did the employee wish to be latet
and why was the wish so unacceptable that the employee was unconsciously unwilling to become aware of it? Based on an understanding of the employee's usual dynamics and the associations to
the particular incident, the dynamicist might conclude that the
cause of the tardiness was hostility toward the superior, or the
masochistic desire to be chastised by the superior, or some other
irrational, unconscious reason or combination of reasons. Furthermore, recognition of these irrational wishes is psychologically
threatening; consequently they cannot be allowed into consciousness. At a deeper level yet, the dynamicist would seek the root of
the wish in the employee's childhood relations with other significant authority figures, such as parents. The dynamicist might explain the employee's seemingly nonsensical and unjustified unconscious hostility towards the superior by hypothesizing that the
employee unconsciously reacted to the superior as if the superior
were the employee's parent. The employee unconsciously behaved
towards the superior in the passive-aggressive, hostile manner that,
as a child, the employee unconsciously used to express hostility toward his parents. Such hostility would have been a source of great
unconscious anxiety for the child for many reasons-"what if my
parents retaliate or stop loving me," and "children who feel hostility towards parents are bad." The hostility would therefore be defended against and kept from consciousness in many ways. Moreover, the resulting punishment would unconsciously be desired to
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expiate the guilt engendered by having bad feelings. 137
Note the extraordinary level of complexity that even this oversimplified dynamic story gives to an ordinary incident. At the first
level, the dynamicist interprets the incident in terms of an unacceptable wish. Then the clinician hypothesizes about the substance
of that irrational wish. And finally, a genetic explanB.tion is given
for the activation of the wish and the conflict-based reaction to it
in that particular context. This is what is known as a psychodynamic formulation of the incident. It does not purport to be solely
an interpretation of the meaning of the incident; rather, it is offered as a causal account, with the causal chain beginning in childhood, mediated by an adult (wish-conflict-anxiety-defense) dynamic, and ending in an expressive behavioral effect-tardiness.
Note, too, how much more interesting the dynamic story makes
this otherwise pedestrian incident.
When a psychodynamic clinician proffers testimony either to
help the factfinder understand why a criminal defendant lacked
self-control or to try to convince the factfinder that the defendant
did not have the requisite mens rea at the time of the charged offense, the clinician will offer a formulation of the defendant's psychodynamics at the time of the offense and relate it to a conclusion
about control capacity or mens rea. This testimony will be of no
aid, however, if the formulation provided is not an accurate, causal
account of the defendant's behavior.
As should be clear from the example given above, it is impossible
to verify an individual formulation objectively: there are not, for
example, substantiated and accepted physiological or psychological
criteria to judge the accuracy of the clinician's hypothetical formulation. Dynamicists claim, however, that the person's reaction to
the formulation, when the person receives it as an interpretation, is
the standard means of verifying the accuracy of a formulation/interpretation. If the person reacts to the interpretation with a loosening of affect, a stream of confirming associations, or even by an

Dynamic theory also predicts that the patient will act out his or her personality dynami cs with the therapist, toward whom the patient unconsciously transfers the feelings he
or she has toward significant figures from childhood, especially parents and siblings. Indeed,
much of clinical psychoanalysis is devoted to analysis of the "transference," the recreation
with the therapist of the patient's characteristic and unconsciously mediated behavior patterns. See generally R. Greenson, The Technique and Practice of Psychoanalysis 151-356
( 1967).
137
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"Aha, so that's it" response, then the interpretation is deemed accurate.138 This method is unavailing for several reasons, however.
First, criminal defendants being evaluated are not the patients of
their evaluator. There is no therapeutic contract-defendants are
simply the subjects of a psychological investigation. Consequently,
they are not being offered interpretations on a regular basis, if at
all, and the usual set of reactions are unavailable as a source of
validation. 1v1ore important, even if dynamic psychology is generally valid, it cannot be tested on the couch. The defendant's reactions cannot serve to validate formulations. Even a criminal being
evaluated will often desire to please the expert; or the expert, who
does not have the temporal luxury of doing psychoanalysis, will intervene actively to hasten the evaluation and, by so doing, will
shape the communications produced. Finally, there is simply no
persuasive objective evidence that the subject's reactions validate
an interpretation, and there is much reason to believe that they do
not. 139 At present, therefore, there is no external source to test the
validity of an individual formulation.
The only remaining means to assess the probable validity of a
formulation is to examine its reliability. Reliability here means the
degree to which independent observers agree about the categorization of a phenomenon. 140 One may ask whether a dynamic formulation is reliable in the following specific ways: What is the likelihood that two or more dynamicists interviewing the person
separately will independently construct the same formulation? Or,
what is the likelihood that they will independently construct the
same formulation based on the same interview (conducted either
by one of them, both of them, or a third interviewer)? If dynamic
science is generally valid, and experienced practitioners can inde-

See S. Freud, Constructions in Analysis, supra note 57, at 261-65.
See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
uo Reliability generally refers to the degree to which a test or measurement system produces the same response under similar conditions. W. Mischel, Personality and Assessment
13 (1968). There are many types of reliability. See L. Cronbach, Essentials of Psychological
Testing 156-73 (3d ed. 1970); C. Selltiz, L. Wrightsman & S. Cook, Research Methods in
Social Relations 181-94 (3d ed. 1976). In the current "testing" of psychodynamic hypotheses, however, virtually the only "measuring instrument" is the clinician-observer applying
dynamic theory. Thus, the primary type of reliability measurement is to determine if independent clinician-observers agree on the formulation of the case. This is also the primary
method for measuring the reliability of psychiatric diagnoses. R. Kendell, The Role of Diagnosis in Psychiatry 29-30 (1975). See also sources listed in infra note 141.
138
139
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pendently agree on a formulation, then one has some indirect evidence fo r the accuracy of the formulation. 141
Because there are no acceptable criteria for determining the validity of a formulation, at the very least one would expect-indeed,
one should require-that proponents of psychodynamic theory
would perform reliability studies of psychodynamic formulations
carefuUy and constantly. But they have not done so. 'The very few
st ud ies of the reliability of dynamic formulations that exist are
nwstly impressionistic and suggest that these formulations are unreliable. Independent dynamicists do not agree on the explanations
of individual cases. 142 Thus, if a dynamicist offers a formulation at
'" The degree of agreement can be expressed numerically as a reliability coefficient. See
L. Cronbach, sup~a note 140; House, House & Campbell, Measures of Interobserver Agreement: Calculation Formulas and Distribution Effects, 3 ,J. Behav'l Assessment 37 (1981);
Janes, Agreement Measurement and the Judgment Process, 167 J. Nervous & Mental Disease 343 (1979). Modern studies of the reliability of psychiatric diagnosis typically use a
reliability statistic called Kappa (K) , which corrects for the amount of chance agreement
that may be expected between judges. R. Kendall, supra note 140, at 36; Spitzer & Williams,
supra note 131, at 1042. Although there are no universally agreed-upon levels of acceptable
reliability, see Grove, Andreasen, McDonald-Scott, Keller & Shapiro, Reliability Studies of
Psychiatric Diagnosis: Theory and Practice, 38 Archives Gen. Psychiatry 408, 412 (1981), in
clinical psychiatry, diagnostic reliability of .80 is considered "quite good" and .50-.60 is considered "at least fair." See Spitzer & Williams, supra note 131, at 1061. An eminent
psychometrician has suggested, however, that in applied settings, the reliability of a measure may make a great deal of difference and therefore higher reliability - .90 as a minimum - should be required. J. Nunnally, Psychometric Theory 245-46 (2d ed. 1978). See
generally Grove, Andreasen, McDonald-Scott, Keller & Shapiro, supra.
42
'
Marmor, Validation of Psychoanalytic Techniques, 3 .J. Am. Psychoanalytic A. 496,
500, 502-04 (1955); Seitz, The Consensus Problem in Psychoanalytic Research, in Methods
of Research in Psychotherapy 209, 215 (L. Gottschalk & A. Auerbach eds. 1966). Recent
reviewers once again concluded that "in the few formal studies ... [citing Seitz] of this
'consensus issue,' the results have been most discouraging." Silverman & Wolitzky, supra
note 77, at 325. See also Mischel, On the Empirical Dilemmas of Psychodynamic Approaches: Issues and Alternatives, 82 J. Abnormal Psychology 335, 337 (1973) (dynamicallybased clinical judgments do not predict behavior well, nor do they enable clinicians to tailor
treatments to the individual client's needs and circumstances, because clinicians cannot
identify inferred generalized cross-situational predispositions).
Seitz's review revealed only two unpublished studies, including his own. Seitz's study,
carried out by senior analysts at the Chicago Psychoanalytic Institute, is a fascinating report
of disagreements about interpretations and interpretive processes, and of the squabbles and
narcissistic investments in the interpretations offered by the individual analysts. There were
heated disagreements, and finally the group disbanded because of an "inability to make
progress in developing a reliable interpretive method, i.e., a method that would yield greater
consensus among a group of analysts in making independent formulations of the same case
material." Seitz, supra, at 210. If such eminently qualified analysts from the same training
institute cannot achieve reliable formulations, there is no reason to believe the average forensic mental health professional will do so. See also S. Fisher & R. Greenberg, supra note
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a professional meeting, in a courtroom, or in a consulting room, it
is virtually certain that another colleague would have explained the
case differently on the basis of the same data. 143 As an intuitive
matter, it would be extraordinary to claim that all are correct
causal accounts. The measuring instrument of psychodynamic psychology-the clinician-observer applying his or her theory-is simply unreliable.
There are several explanations for the unreliability of dynamic
formulations. First, there are many theoretically divergent schools
of dynamic psychology. There is no reason to expect the formulation of a Jungian to sound anything like the formulation of a Freudian, or the formulation of a Sullivanian to sound like that of an
Adlerian. Even within a particular school, there can be major theoretical differences. A Kohutian-Freudian, for example, will not
sound like a Brenner-Freudian. 144 Second, the process of investi-

77, at 294-97 (describing other relevant studies).
In the last decade, some researchers have attempted to measure the reliability of judgments of various aspects of the transference during psychoanalysis, using selected portions
of transcripts and rating scales of one to five to rate the degree to which the aspects of
transference were present. These investigations report that statistically significant, but poor,
reliability was achieved. Luborsky, Graff, Pulver & Curtis, A Clinical-Quantitative Examination of Consensus on the Concept of Transference, 29 Archives Gen. Psychiatry 69 (1973).
See also Graff & Luborsky, Long-Term Trends in Transference and Resistance: A Report on
a Quantitative-Analytic Method Applied to Four Psychoanalyses, 25 J. Am. Psychoanalytic
A. 471 (1977) (no reliability determination, but investigators assumed that the same reliability obtained as in the earlier study because the same judges were used). These studies are a
far cry, however, from studies of the reliability of formulations or interpretations, which are
the core process of psychodynamic clinical work. In another study, judges were able to make
reliable estimations from psychotherapy process notes, of which themes, previously identified, had been warded off in therapy. Horowitz, Sampson, Siegelman, Wolfson & Weiss, On
the Identification of Warded-Off Mental Contents: An Empirical and Methodological Contribution, 84 J. Abnormal Psychology, 545, 549-50 (1975) . Again, however, this finding is
quite different from discovering high reliability about formulations.
143
Of course, if the patient had been interviewed by a different clinician, different data
would have been elicited. Marmor, supra note 142, at 504. Even if the same data are used,
however, differences would be great.
1
. . See, e.g., Unger, A Program for Late Twentieth-Century Psychiatry, 139 Am. J. Psychiatry 155, 158 (1982):
The great scandal in the use of psychological models-Freudian or not-in contemporary psychiatry is what I have called their indeterminacy. By indeterminacy I mean
the overabundance of plausible but only ambiguously successful responses to the
same explanatory or therapeutic problems. There are just too many alternative explanations and treatments based on too many incompatible pictures of what is in fact
the case. The variety of meaningful interpretations in turn puts pressure against the
diagnostic categories. It makes them seem more or less arbitrary.
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gating an individual's psychodynamics and constructing a formulation is entirely subjective and based on exceedingly complex inference chains for which no decision rules exist and no external
checks are available. ~ Two interviewers examining the same patient will elicit very different types of reactions and information. 146
Even if the clinicians constructing the formulation use a single
data base, obviating subjectively caused differences in the production of the data base, the inferential process of constructing the
formulation will still eliminate reliability. 147 \Vhen a clinician uses
loose, vague criteria, unchecked by external validity constraints,
and when the clinician's individual training, experience, and personality affect the application of those criteria, it is hardly remarkable that the highly inferential process of dynamic reasoning will
lead to markedly different formulations. 148
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Cf. Mcintosh, supra note 70, at 408 (psychoanalytic theory has no predictive force because
there are no nomic universals and hence no scientific laws in the theory).
A brilliant evocation of the internecine disputes of the psychoanalytic schools may be
found in J. Malcolm, Psychoanalysis: The Impossible Profession (1981), which describes the
present workings of the psychoanalytic profession by focusing on one analyst in New York
City. One of the most bizarre aspects of the book is that its protagonist, Dr. Aaron Green (a
pseudonym), retained a debilitating symptom that interfered with his career after two
psychoanalyses that had lasted a total of 14 years!
''" D. Rapaport, supra note 106, at 113 ("The extensive clinical evidence . . . fails to be
conclusive in terms of the usual criteria of science, because there is no established canon for
the interpretation of clinical observations (emphasis in original)). See Glover, supra note
84, at 405-07; Ramzy, How the Mind of the Psychoanalyst Works: An Essay on Psychoanalytic Inference, 55 lnt'l J. Psycho-Analysis 543, 543 (1974) ("Unbelievable as it may sound,
in the whole vast library of psychoanalysis - clinical, theoretical, technical or applied there are hardly any references which outline the logical guidelines or the methodological
rules which the analyst follows in order to understand his patient.") . See generally Ramzy &
Shevrin, The Nature of the Inference Process in Psychoanalytic Interpretation: A Critical
Review of the Literature, 57 Int'l J. Psycho-Analysis 151 (1976).
146
Marmor, supra note 142, at 504. See Bowlby, supra note 79, at 252 ("[W]hat an analyst subsequently reports his patient to have said [is] probably influenced as much or more
by the analyst's preconceptions as by anything the patient may in fact have said or done.").
147
Moreover, from the time of Freud to the present, therapists describing cases wittingly
or unwittingly elaborate the material to fit their own preconceptions. M. Sherwood, supra
note 133, at 71; S. Fisher & R. Greenberg, supra note 77, at 276; Glover, supra note 84, at
407.
148
Assume now, however, that, contrary to the claims of its proponents (and those who
argue that it is relevant to the ascription of responsibility), dynamic psychology does not
offer causal accounts of behavior and assume instead that it offers an account of the meaning of behavior. See supra notes 70-7 4 and accompanying text. If the interpretation of psychodynamic psychology as a hermeneutic is correct, then the lack of reliability of formulations is neither surprising nor troubling. One does not expect the interpretations of a
literary work by different critics to be the same, even if the critics were trained in the same
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It might be objected that the argument about verifying the accuracy of a formulation proves too much. Establishing states of mind
is central to assessments of culpability, and if this cannot be accomplished reliably then the bedrock . of guilt determination is
blasted away. There is a major distinction, however, between assessing a defendant's conscious states of mind (such as purpose, or
knowledge or awareness of risk), and assessing a d efend ant's unconscious dynamics. All persons can verify by ordinary experience
that conscious mental states such as purpose exist, and we can
often infer easily and correctly whether in particular circumstances
these mental states were present in others by examining those circumstances, including the actor's utterances and actions. There is,
however, no correspondingly easy access to dynamically unconscious processes, and there are no generally available and acceptable means for inferring their presence or absence in others. Evaluating ordinary mental states is not simple, but it is within the
realm of ordinary experience; evaluating unconscious dynamic
processes is entirely within the realm of speculation. 149

academic department and according to the canons of a particular theory of criticism. Moreover, the validity or accuracy of an interpretation is not assessed in the same fashion as the
solution to a mathematical problem or other empirical question.
In large measure, interpretations are judged by how satisfying and internally coherent
they are, by whether they "work" by helping us to understand the artistic creation under
consideration. This, I suggest, is directly analogous to the process of psychodynamic formulation and interpretation. Formulations and interpretations are neither ultimately right nor
wrong: either they work to help the patient and the therapist create a coherent story about
the patient's life, or they do not work. Whether that story is an accurate causal account is
irrelevant, and, as has been recognized for a long time, an inexact interpretation may be
therapeutic. Glover, The Therapeutic Effect of Inexact Interpretation: A Contribution to
the Theory of Suggestion, 12 Int'l J. Psycho-Analysis 397 (1933). Thus, Freudian stories
work for Freudian patients, Jungian stories work for Jungian patients, and the new criticism
works in many departments of English. Stories that work are satisfying, and vice versa.
I am not suggesting that, among psychologies, dynamic psychology is the best interpretive
system, or that all interpretive systems are equally valuable. Indeed, Professor Frederick
Crews suggests that dynamic theory may be pernicious because it is particularly guilt-inducing and because its therapy is unjustifiably expensive and time-consuming. Nevertheless, all
the dynamic theories and therapies do appear to be able to impart meaning.
~<e A similar point can be raised about assessing the influence of drugs on behavior. Bonnie and Slobogin try valiantly to rehabilitate their unverifiable speculations based on dynamic psychology by comparing them to opinions about the effects on behavior of alcohol
and other drugs. They are surely correct when they propose that retrospective inquiries
about the effects of drugs on mental states in criminal cases are important because drugs
affect behavior, and they are right to suggest that such inquiries will usually lead to imprecise conclusions. Nevertheless, they are far wide of the mark in their claim that retrospective knowledge of the effects of drugs is no more imprecise than retrospective psychody-
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Dynamic formulations present a dilemma to the factfinder. At
present, no acceptable means exist to externally verify an individual formulation, and it is entirely likely that any particular formulation will be unreliable. An unseemly battle of the experts is all
but inevitable, for neither the proponent nor opponent of a psychoanalytic formulation can point to external validity criteria to
butt ress the accuracy of a causal account of the defendant's behavior. Psychodynamic formulations are post hoc interpretive rationalizations of behavior, not explanations of it. In sum, a psychodynamic formulation is an unverifiable and unreliable causal account
of an individual case; it provides the factfinder with little more
than a false sense of security based on the incorrect assumption
that a reasonably accurate scientific explanation has been provid ed. Psychodynamic formulations are so inherently unreliable
that they cannot aid decisionmaking in the criminal justice system.
They should not be admitted at trials, at sentencing hearings, or at
any other stage of the criminal process. 111 ° Cross-examination will
not be an effective tool for exposing the inaccuracy of psychodynamic formulations because factfinders will have no means to resolve disputes. Moreover, the unseemly battle of the experts which
will result will be costly, confusing, and inefficient.

namic formulations. The existence of chemicals as variables that cause changes in behavior
is at leas t verifiable, in complete contradistinction to the existence of psychodynamic variables. Moreover, countless rigorous studies have examined the effects of recreational and
therapeuti c drugs on behavior, and even more extensive clinical experience has added to the
st ore of knowledge about drug effects. See generally E. Abel, Drugs & Behavior: A Primer in
Neuropsychopharmacology (1974); E. Brecher, Licit and Illicit Drugs (1972); R. Julien, A
Primer of Drug Action (2d ed. 1978). Finally, most adults in our culture have had some
exper ien ce with one drug or another. Indeed, experience with alcohol is so common in our
culture that intoxication is one subject on which lay witnesses are usually allowed to offer
an opinion. Lilly, An Introduction to the Law of Evidence § 29, at 85, 87 (1978). Even if
fac tfinders are faced with an imprecise inquiry about drug effects, there is simply infinitely
more hard data and common wisdom with which to assess such claims compared to the
causal claims of psychodynamic psychology. At least we know beyond a reasonable doubt
that drugs exist and do affect behavior.
'"" It is interesting to consider why psychodynamic psychology retains its appeal in the
face of disconfirming evidence. Let me offer a few speculations. First, if one treats the theory as an interpretive rather than causal account, disconfirming evidence is not problematic.
Second, psychodynamic theory is fascinating and comprehensive and no other equally fasci nating, com prehensive theory has appeared to replace it. Third, causal explanations developed to explain data seem to persevere in the face of discrediting information. See Anderson, Lepper & Ross, Perseverance of Social Theories: The Role of Explanation in the
Persiste nce of Discredited Information, 39 J . Personality & Social Psychology 1037, 1043-48
(1980).
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D. Are Psychodynamic Formulations Relevant to the
Establishment of Responsibility in Criminal Proceedings?
If dynamic formulations aid criminal justice decisionmaking,
they are most relevant to assessing a defendant's capacity for behavioral control or criminal responsibility in general; 161 psychodynamic explanations are rarely used to buttress a claim that a defendant lacked a requisite conscious mens rea. Instead, the usual
thrust of arguments by proponents of dynamic explanations is to
establish that a defendant's unconscious conflicts and motives
eroded to a legally significant degree the accused's ability to control the offending behavior. 162 Proponents conclude or imply that,
compared to the average criminal defendant, a defendant who is
the innocent victim of uncontrollable unconscious forces is less responsible, less blameworthy, and less deserving of punishment. 163
There is no dispute in principle about the relevance of lack of control or capacity for rationality - if a defendant is truly unable to
exercise control or to behave rationally, the law should mitigate or
excuse his or her responsibility. The question is whether unconscwus motivation m fact vitiates control, rationality, and
responsibility. 1114
Legal proponents of the mitigating effects of unconscious motivation suppose that a defendant whose behavior meets all the prescribed elements of a crime, including the requisite mens rea, is
less guilty because unconscious motives were one cause of that behavior. They rarely analyze the issue, however. 166 They simply as161
Kadish and Paulsen refer to this as general mens rea. S. Kadish & M. Paulsen, Criminal Law and Its Processes 87-88 (3d ed. 1975). The notion is that, because it is unfair to
punish someone for behavior that was beyond his or her control, the law requires general
mens rea as a precondition for punishment. Cf. H. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility 28,
152-56, 227-30 (1968).
162
See Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 8, at 435-52. A criterion such as "aberrant" may be
used to distinguish persons who may pose such claims. See infra notes 163-65 and accompanying text.
163
See Fingarette, Victimization as Excuse 16-17 (1981) (unpublished manuscript on file
with the Virginia Law Review Association).
164
Assume, for the purpose of discussing this issue, that the first two steps of my argument are rejected-that psychodynamic psychology is sufficiently valid to be an acceptable
basis for expert testimony and that psychodynamic formulations are sufficiently reliable in
individual cases to permit their admission into evidence.
166
As we shall see, Bonnie and Slobogin fall into this category. Philosophers, however,
have addressed the issue. See Alexander, Rational Behavior and Psychoanalytic Explanation, 71 Mind 326 (1962); Audi, Psychoanalytic Explanation and the Concept of Rational
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sume that the unconscious motives produced by childhood conflicts and t rauma are causes, and that because the actor is the
innocent victim of those causes and is unaware of them, they compromise self-control or rationality to a legally cognizable degree. 1M
It is implied that unconscious causes can be analogized to cases of
compulsion or force majeure, where the actor literally is forced to
perform the offending action or where the action is the on ly reasonable thing to do under the circumstances. Or it is implied that
unconscious motives can be analogized to some type of brain injury
t hat renders the actor incapable of behaving rationally. These
analogies in turn imply that the law should not consider an actor
who is under the sway of unconscious causes to be responsible for
his or her actions. But unconscious causes (or any other types of
causes) are relevant to responsibility only if they produce a legal
excuse such as irrationality, lack of mens rea, or compulsion. If a
defendant meets at a conscious level the criteria for rationality and
mens rea, the actor is not less responsible for his behavior simply
because it is possible to identify an unconscious determinant or
any other cause for that behavior. To conclude otherwise is to confuse nonresponsibility with causation.
In a recent series of illuminating and complex articles that employ the tools of the modern analytic philosophy of action, Michael
tvfoore has argued persuasively that unconscious motivation almost
never vitiates responsibility for actors who otherwise meet the criteria for criminal guilt. 1 ~ 7 A demonstration that behavior has
causes does not per se undermine responsibility, because causation

Action , 56 The Monist 444 (1972); Blumenfeld, Free Action and Unconscious Motivation, 56
The Moni st 426 (1972); Mullane, Psychoanalytic Explanation and Rationality, 68 J. Phil.
413 (1 971 ).
••• In dynamic therapy, the goal is to make the actor aware of the unconscious, adult
residues of childhood experience. Conflicts that unconsciously terrified the child and were
repressed, leading to deformations of behavior, do not terrify the adult who can counteract
th e effects of these conflicts once they are made conscious. Freud put it as follows:
In the end, if the situation of the repression can be successfully reproduced in his
memory, his compliance (with the rule of free association] will be brilliantly rewarded. The whole difference between his age then and now works in his favour; and
the thing from which his childish ego fled in terror will often seem to his adult and
streng t hened ego no more than child's play.
S. Freud , The Question of Lay Analysis, supra note 45, at 205.
107
Moore, Res ponsibility and the Unconscious, 53 S. CaL L. Rev. 1563 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as Responsibility and the Unconscious]; Moore, Responsibility for Unconsciously Motivated Actions, 2 Int'l J. L. & Psychiatry 323 (1979).
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is not equivalent to, or proof of, a legal excuse. Moore and other
philosophers argue that the language and concepts of responsibility
analysis and causation analysis are derived from entirely different
categories. Responsibility language and concepts refer to persons
acting for reasons; causation language and concepts refer to things
happening because of antecedent events. The criteria for legal responsibility are simply that the actor is rational in the sense that
he or she acts for reasons that fit a practical syllogism, and that
the actor meets the particular legal requirements of liability. Thus,
a reasonably rational defendant who performs the actus reus with
the requisite mens rea ~s responsible for the crime. The language of
the prima facie case in criminal law is one of actors acting for reasons - causation is usually irrelevant. It is possible to redefine all
behavior, including the formation of mens rea, as events or effects.
As such, all have sufficient antecedent causes - physiological, sociological, psychodynamic, and so on. With such a redefinition,
however, one is no longer talking the language of persons, reasons,
choices, and responsibility. Instead, one is talking about persons
and their behavior as objects and events. The two realms of discourse should not be confused, because if causation is equated with
excuse, it leads to the reductionist conclusion that no one is responsible-presumably, all behavior has causes.
Unless one is prepared to accept hard determinism and recognize its incompatibility with responsibility, those who wish to use
dynamic explanations as excuses must demonstrate more. Simply
because there is an unconscious cause of behavior does not mean
that it is compelled or that the actor is irrational. Proponents of
such excuses must prove that, because of unconscious motivation,
the actor's otherwise seemingly rational action was irrational or the
actor's choice whether to obey the law was too hard. ~ 8 The task for
responsibility skeptics is to show systematically how unconscious
motivation produces excusing conditions, and to formulate criteria
for determining which unconsciously motivated actors the law
should excuse. After all, as Moore has shown, unconscious causes
1

' "" Moore suggests, for example, that if an actor holds an unconscious belief that constrains his choi ces, and if it is possible to discover such beliefs, perhaps one would conclude
that the actor's choice was too hard. Moore, Responsibility and the Unconscious, supra note
157 , at 1665-66, 1669-70.
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do not negate conscious rationality 1 ~ 9 or mens rea, 150 nor does their
existence necessarily mean that the person's actions are compelled.
One need not, of course, accept the approach outlined above.
Philosophically impure common sense consistently rejects the
philosophically pure view by assuming that the behavior of all persons is subject to various causes and that these causes vary in their
salience and strength. "Selective determinism" 161 assesses responsibility differentially according to the types and strengths of the
pt'essures that operate on an actor, and it assumes that certain
causes vitiate responsibility, even if the causes are not linked coherently to legal excuses. The corollary of selective determinism is
selective responsibility skepticism. For example, although the beh avior of both the slum kid and the rich kid is caused by something, one assumes that the rich kid is better able to avoid criminal
behavior than the slum kid. Some persons then claim that the
slum kid is less culpable and perhaps even less legally responsible,
because the pressures on him to violate the law are greater than
th ose on his more fortunate counterpart. 162 Bonnie and Slobogin
are evidently selective responsibility skeptics and claim that the
law should excuse only some persons because their criminal behavi<Jl' was produced by unconscious determinants. Although this
equation of causation with compulsion is muddled, it is the commonsense view. Assuming arguendo that selective compulsion is
reasonably coherent, the burden is on responsibility skeptics to
suggest and justify criteria for the law to employ in excusing some
p ersons because of unconscious motivation.
Aberration is apparently one criterion that might be used to
identify those who should be excused, 163 but this criterion is unacceptable. If only aberrant defendants can raise creditable claims
for mitigation on the basis of unconscious determinants, a workable definition of aberrance is absolutely necessary. It is all but im-

t
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Id. at 1659-63.
Id. at 1649-54.
16 1
See Hollander, Sociology, Selective Determinism, and the Rise of Expectations, 8 Am.
Sociologist 147 (1973).
1 62
Bazelon, The Morality of the Criminal Law, 49 S. Cal. L. Rev. 385 (1976). See Haney,
Psyc hology and Legal Change: On the Limits of a Factual Jurisprudence, 4 L. & Human
Behav. 147, 172 (1980) (claiming that there are "mountains of data" to disprove the free will
hypothesis). By this, Professor Haney must mean that at present there is greater evidence of
environmental causation in some cases than in others. Presumably, all behavior is caused.
'"" See Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 8, at 452, 466.
1 09

180
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possible, however, to specify for measurement the criterion of aberrance.164 Does "aberrance" refer to the defendant's conscious
thoughts and feelings and observable actions, or does it refer to the
content and dynamics of the unconscious, or both? \Vhat is the
definition of ((aberrant" - statistical aberration? dysfunction?
suffering? craziness? 16 r> vVhat are aberrant unconscious contents or
dynamics?
Even if there are identifiable criteria for aberrance, it is not possible to make out a scientific or philosophically sensible clairn for
selective compulsion. If dynamically unconscious factors cause
overt behavior, criminal or otherwise, one must as k whether these
causes are "compelling" or overwhelming. Data from studies sup·portive of psychodynamic propositions and clinical wisdom demonstrate that unconscious dynamic variables are neither necessary
nor sufficient causes of any particular behavioral effects. 168 Even if
particular unconscious dynamic variables are significantly and
causally associated with particular behaviors, the behavior will occur in some cases without the antecedent operations of those variables, and in other cases those variables will operate without producing the effects. At most, particular unconscious dynamics are
predisposing causes of varying strength. 167
For instance, suppose a dynamicist explains a homicide in the
following manner. The dynamicist assesses the defendant, post hoc
of course, as a dependent person who fears for his manhood and
has fragile ego integration. The homicide occurs in response to a
stress-a physical beating by a man who is a rival for the woman
they both love-a stress that creates enormous anxiety and allegedly activates all the accused's unconscious dynamic difficulties. 168
It is claimed that in order (unconsciously) to assert his manhood,
to guarantee his unique access to the loved one, and to ward off
ego disintegration, the defendant kills the rival. The defendant reports that consciously he was simply furious at the rival and

164

Bonnie and Slobogin, for example, never do so. Moreover, they have not provided a
theoretical rationale for why aberrance, however understood and defin ed, raises a claim for
legal excuse based on psychodynamic grounds.
166
See Morse, supra note 2, at 546-54 (discmsing the various meanings of aberrance).
166
See supra text at notes 108-22.
167
For a general discussion of the types of causes identified in the behavioral and med i.cai
sciences, see Morse, supra note 2, at 564-66.
168
This hypothetical is based on State v. Sikora, 44 N.J. 453, 210 A.2d 193 (1965) .
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wanted to pay him back for the beating. We know that many people kill who are not under the influence of this defendant's dynamics, including some people who are exposed to similar types of external stress, and that most persons with this defendant's
dynamics do not kill, even if they are exposed to the same or similar stresses. Indeed, the vast majority of people with similar dynamics (or, for t hat matter, with any dynamic constellation) do not
kill at all (or offend the law in other nontrivial ways). This defendant's dynamics, even when coupled with the stresses in question,
are not a necessary or a sufficient cause of homicide. If the defendant's dynamics are a cause at all, they are only weakly predisposing in the statistical sense.
The implication of the assertion that unconscious dynamic variables are only weakly predisposing causes of behavior is that such
causes do not seem entitled to great weight as factors that "compel" criminal behavior. One might counter this implication by arguing that statistical associations are misleading because they are
based on the grouping together of cases that are significantly different. For instance, one might allege that the hypothetical defendant considered above should not be included in a class of persons
whose dynamic contents are similar, because to do so ignores the
comparative strength of our defendant's difficulties. 169 This defendant's conflicts presumably were unusually strong, and he was extraordinarily upset and unbalanced by the stress he underwent. In
sum, the defendant's case is unique if it is understood in sufficient
detail. This post hoc argument is simple but unacceptable. Explanations of individual differences that adduce the variances in the
strengths of unmeasurable and unverifiable underlying dynamic
variables are circular: A kills and B does not because A's (similar)
dynamics were greater; we know this because A killed and B did
not, even though their dynamics were similar. Moreover, it is impossible to refute such explanations, because the crucial explanatory variable - strength of conflict - is at present unmeasurable
and unverifiable except through the use of unacceptable tautological reasoning. 170
Uniqueness explanations are generally unverifiable and prove

-
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T hi s involves the economic point of view in dynami c theory. See supra note 106.
See Ku bie, Th e Fallacious Use of Quantitative Concepts in Dynamic Psychology, 16
P syc hoa nalytic Q. 507 (1947) .
17 0
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too much. It is possible to argue that cases differ not only in terms
of the strength of unconscious determinants, but also in terms of
other dynamics that dynamicists have not yet understood or identified. If such other factors are beyond present understanding or
measurement, however, it is unavailingly speculative to employ
them to explain behavior. In ad dition, if one digs deeply enough
into any case and identifies enough background factors, in princi ple every case will be unique and contain sufficiently powerfu l de-terminants to vitiate responsibility. Thus, arguments about
uniqueness lead inexorably to the reductionist conclusion that no
one is responsible - a conclusion that creates a more general
problem, as we shall see below. 171
Even if research demonstrates that in some cases unconscious
determinants are a strongly predisposing cause of criminal behavior, this does not compel the conclusion that the defendant's responsibility is lessened or that he or she should be punished less or
not at all. There are other very strongly predisposing causes of
criminal behavior - poverty, for example - that most observers
do not think should diminish or negate a defendant's responsibility. The dynamicists must therefore show that unconscious determinants deserve special status as causes that uniquely affect responsibility. Although the legal votaries of dynamicism do not
make such a showing, the argument would proceed in the following
fashion. Full responsibility requires the capacity for a reasonable
degree of rationality and self-control. These capacities in turn require that the actor be reasonably capable of perceiving and weighing the data relevant to the choice to behave, including unconscious cravings and affects. Although a background of poverty may
restrict choices enormously, making criminal behavior a more
prominent option, it supposedly does not affect the capability for
rational assessment and controU 72 By contrast, dynamically unconscious determinants allegedly affect precisely the capacity for

See infra notes 187-89 and accompanying text.
If a particular defendant could demonstrate that his or her subcultural background
affected the capacity for rational assessment, however, such a case would raise interesting
philosophical and legal problems. Irrationality produced by mental disorder excuses in extreme cases. Should a similar excuse exist where the actor seems incapable of making reasonable choices, according to dominant community standards of rationality, where subcultural socialization was the cause of the lack of rationality? See generally Bazelon, supra note
162.
171

172
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rational assessment and control of behavioral choices. Even if the
defendant is able to express a conscious and explicable motive for
his behavior, as did our hypothetical homicide defendant discussed
above, the defendant is not aware of crucial variables - strongly
predisposing, irrational, unconscious determinants - that in large
measure motivate the behavior. Moreover, the defendant cannot
become aware of this motivational data by paying more careful attention to his or her thoughts, feelings, goals and desires: these dynamically unconscious data are inaccessible because of developmental processes and events that have made them so emotionally
painful that they have been unconsciously forced out of awareness.
The defendant can only recover such data by entering psychotherapy or by extraordinary feats of self-insight that are beyond the
powers of the average person. The defendant who is motivated
largely by unconscious determinants therefore is incapable of behaving rationally and exercising self-control, even if he or she appears rational, and thus it would be unfair to hold the defendant
fully responsible for criminal conduct.
Assuming that these factual premises are valid, the argument
raises squarely the issue of deciding in which cases unconscious determinants are so predisposing to criminal behavior that the law
should diminish the defendant's responsibility. Those who argue
for a diminution in responsibility have the burden of providing criteria for assessing the strength of predisposition, and for developing normative justifications for the decision that the actor's unconscious determinants, rather than his or her character and conscious
choices, were "really responsible" for the actions in question. This
they have not done, except, perhaps, by reference to the unacceptable aberrance criterion discussed above. 173
To help elucidate the difficulties involved, consider the case of a
male mugger who always chooses older women to rob, and who
often seriously injures his victim during the attack for reasons not
apparently connected with his larcenous intent. When asked why
he chooses older women as victims, he replies that they are easy,

See supra notes 163-65 and accompanying text. Indeed, a leading psychoanalytic theoretician claims that it cannot be done because psychoanalysis has no clear and coherent
theory of action in general and of the role of unconscious determinants in causing action. D.
Shapiro, Autonomy and Rigid Character 8-11, 21 (1981) (rejecting the model of behavior
that sees persons as irresistibly driven by unconscious determinants).
173

1982]

Experts and the Unconscious

1035

defenseless targets, and, when asked why he senselessly harms
them, he replies that he "gets a kick out of it." Here is a perpetrator who obviously knows exactly what he is doing and does so intentionally for explicable if execrable motives. At an ethical level,
one could simply assess the defendant as a moral monster, punish
him as harshly as the law allows - he is both evil and dangerous
- and leave it at that. M any laypersons might say that this person
has a "thing" against older women , but t hey would also say, "So
what-he is a bad actor." A dynamicist who interviews the d efendant might offer the follo wing woeful tale and formulation. The
defendant was abandoned by his parents at an early age and raised
by an elderly aunt who was both seductive and emotionally distant
from him, and who beat him. This upbringing left the defendant
feeling furious and needy. Moreover, at an unconscious level, the
defendant wished to take revenge against his "mother," in part by
obtaining the "supplies" (money = love = milk) that he so desperately desires. Still, the defendant robbed and then needlessly
and brutally harmed innocent and defenseless older women. Moreover, he knew fully that in our society such behavior is not considered nice.
Despite the strong "push" exerted by the defendant's unconscious dynamics, it is impossible to determine if he could have altered his behavior. Even though his choices were constrained to
some degree because he was unconsciously attempting to achieve
irrational goals, perhaps he could have said to himself, "I want to
harm those women, but it is wrong and unnecessary, and I simply
will not do it." We can try to assess his general control structures
and functioning, but ultimately we will have to guess about the
strength of the predisposing, unconscious cause of the desire to
harm older women. 174 There is simply no scientifically reliable and

It is by no means clear that the mugger would not have committed the crime if by
chance he had previously been to a psychodynamic therapist and had understood his irrational unconscious motivation for harming older women. If he had committed the muggings
despite having apparently obtained insight, three interpretations would be possible: (1) the
behavior was freely chosen now and he is fully responsible for it; (2) he had never integrated
the insight emotionally so the behavior was still compelled (Intellectual insight is considered
a necessary but not sufficient precondition for behavioral change. The patient must emotionally feel and understand the insight in order for it to be efficacious: the person must
consciously experience at a noncognitive level the effect of the conflict. This is theory and
has not been confirmed, but it is an article of faith among dynamic practitioners.); or, (3)
other hypothetical unconscious determinants, not yet discovered, were the real cause. Be174
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valid way to make such a determination. The burden should be on
the proponents of dynamicism to demonstrate that dynamic explanations can be used to assess responsibility in more than an utterly
vague and discretionary fashion.
The strongest conceptual objection to the use of psychodynamic
explanations to reduce responsibility is that these explanations
lead to the conclusion that no one is responsible. Psychodynamic
psychology is deterministic; it posits that behavior, like all other
phenomena of nature, is determined by natural laws. 1711 A
dynamicist may therefore take one of three positions on the relationship between the causation of behavior and responsibility: that
determinism and responsibility are irreconcilable (the "incompatabilist" position), that they are reconcilable (the "compatabilist" position), or that the principle of psychic determinism
should be abandoned. If the incompatibilist position 176 is adopted,
the dynamicist must consider the concept of responsibility to be an
"as if' myth that is at present absolutely necessary for social cohesion.177 Consequently, while recognizing that no person has a "real"
choice about how he behaves, such a dynamicist will wish to excuse
only those who are obviously insane, subject to duress, or the like.
There is no coherent argument that an incompatibilist dynamicist
can make for selective diminution of responsibility so long as the
mens rea for a crime is present and all the extreme excusing conditions are absent. 178

cause there is no scientifically valid means of choosing among the three alternatives, any
choice must be either conclusory or tautological.
176
See Basch, Psychic Determinism and Freedom of Will, 5 Int'l Rev. Psycho-Analysis
257 (1978). Insight might make persons feel better, and, indeed, it might even give a patient
the illusion of freedom; nevertheless, all behavior is determined. Id.
176
A useful introductory review of the determinism and freedom or responsibility issue is
L. Davis, Theory of Action 107 -4 1 (1979) .
177
F. Alexander & H . Staub, The Criminal, The Judge, and The Public: A Psychological
Analysis 59-65 (rev. ed. 1956); K. Menninger, The Crime of Punishment 96-97 (1968); Haney, supra note 162, at 172. See also Wolf, The Importance of Free Will, 90 Mind 386, 393
(1981).
178
It would be possible in theory to develop a sliding scale model of responsibility based
on the hard choices experienced by the actor. As the choice to obey the law becomes harder,
the actor is less responsible. See generally Perkins, Impelled Perpetration Restated, 33 Hastings L.J . 403 (1981) (proposing a general doctrine of excuse for conduct deemed "impelled"
because the actor consciously faced a hard choice). Note, however, that such a scheme is not
based on causation; presumably all actions are caused. The basis of mitigation or excuse is
that the act or consciously experienced a hard choice as in cases of duress. The difficulty in
developing such a scheme is discussed infra notes 182c86 and accompanying text.

.
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Alternatively, the dynamicist may adopt the compatibilist position, as do many modern philosophers. 179 He or she will argue that
determinism and responsibility are reconcilable because each concept belongs in a different conceptual category, and that comparing them commits the familiar Rylean category mistake. 180 The
consequences of adopting the compatibilist position, however, are
the same as those described above in the discussion of Moore's
work: 181 so long as the actor is capable of being reasonably rational
at the conscious level, and no standard excusing condition is present, unconscious motivation does not vitiate responsibility.
The third possibility for the dynamicist is to abandon the general underlying postulate of psychic determinism in favor of selective compulsion. 182 Although this violates a fundamental canon of
dynamic psychology, it does avoid the pitfalls in responsibility assessment just outlined. 183 But there are worse pitfalls ahead. The
"selective compulsivist" chooses cases that he believes demonstrate
both the existence of strongly predisposing unconscious determinants of behavior and the relevance of such determinants to responsibility assessment. 184 The insuperable difficulty is that a good
dynamicist can create a story of unconscious compulsion to make
any case fit whatever criteria are created for diminishing responsibility. The dynamicist can always "show" that for any significant
action there was some deep and irrational unconscious motivation
that "explains" the action. Even if behavior seems totally rational
and explicable, a dynamicist can give an irrational, strongly disposing dynamic explanation for it.
Consider, for example, an unskilled, uneducated, unemployed

See, e.g., A. Kenny, Freewill and Responsibility 22-45 (1978) .
G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind 15-23 (1949). A category mistake is the allocation of a
familiar concept in abstract thinking to logical types to which they do not belong. See id. at
17.
181
See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
182
This appears to be the move made by Bonnie and Slobogin.
183
Without assuming psychic determinism, the dynamicist who conceives of dynamic psychology as a mechanistic, causal account of behavior cannot make causal sense of the flow of
free associations-the fundamental data source for dynamic theory and assessment.
184
This is true although psychodynamic theory does not offer a coherent account of action and will. See supra note 173. Although Bonnie and Slobogin have not offered workable
criteria for the selection of compelled cases, assume that, in principle, reasonable criteria
can be developed. Note, however, that an enormous number of assumptions about the Bonnie and Slobogin position have to be made in order to set forth a reasonable case, and most
of these assumptions are almost certainly not viable.
179
180
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man who embarks on a series of larcenous burglaries. Asked why
he engaged in a criminal career rather than accepting welfare, he
explains that he can make much more money from burglary. He
knows from street information that his chance of getting caught is
exceedingly slim and his chance of going to prison if cau ght is slimmer still. This is a classic case of rational crime, and there should
be no obstacle whatever to holding him fully responsible. Dynamic
vot ar ies presumably would be loathe in such a clear case to offer a
rnitigating explanation-there seems to be no indication of aberrance, however defined-but the reason for this hesitancy is elusive. A sophisticated and sympathetic dynamicist could easily
" show," for example, that the passive acceptance of aid from authority figures (i.e., welfare) was unacceptable at a deep unconscious level and that burglary satisfied some equally deep unconscious psychological needs (e.g., breaking and entering a house =
oedipal rape of the mother). 185 The selective compulsivist will
therefore claim that the defendant was not "really" rational, or
that the crimes were the products primarily of unconscious causes
over which the defendant had no control, leading to the conclusion
of nonresponsibility. 186
One can find "deep" reasons for almost all behavior if one digs.
Although one must admit that there are probably some trivial
criminal behaviors about which it would be difficult to fabricate a
convincing tale of unconscious causes that overwhelmed the defen-

If this story did not fit the background or the post hoc data gathered by the
dynamicist during the assessment, some other story that would be coherently fitting and
satisfying surely could be constructed.
6
'"
It might be objected that the hypothetical case is unrealistic. Consider therefore the
example from California of Lawrence S. Bittaker, who provides a more chilling, real world
example. See L.A. Times, Feb. 10, 1981, pt. II, at 4, cols . 1-3. Bittaker is a forty-year old
man accused of cold-bloodedly murdering and torturing five young women he and an accomplice had kidnapped . Four of the victims were raped and otherwise sexually abused. The
crimes were committed in a particularly pitiless way and Bittaker went so far as to taperecord the agonies of his victims and to torture them psychologically as well as physically.
Bittaker was entirely rational at the time of the torture-rape-killings, however, and, at his
murder trial, the defenses of diminished capacity and insanity were not raised. It is ha~d to
see why counsel should have been so reticent, however, especially in a state like California,
whi ch then had an expansive diminished capacity defense to murder. See, e.g., People v.
Conley, 64 Cal. 2d 310, 411 P.2d 911, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1966). In light of Bittaker's appalling actions, it is inconceivable that even the most neophyte dynamicist would be unable to
construct a tale of aberrant psychodynamics for Bittaker. Indeed, unless one believes in
pure evil - as surely the responsibility skeptics/method votaries do not - the only explanation for Bittaker's conduct must be his unconscious psyche.
'
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Assuming, as we need not, that psychodynamic psychology is
generally valid and that it is possible to create reliable for:r.nulations in individual cases, dynamic explanations either do not bear
on responsibility in most conceivable cases, as J\1oore has d.ernonstrated, or they prove far too much, as I have shown. Even if dynamic explanations are scientific, they are not relevant to evaluations of responsibility for criminal behavior, and the law should
exclude them at all decisional stages of the criminal justice process.
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The Ghost and the Machine

Assuming that psychodynamic explanations can help factfinders
assess criminal responsibility, reliance on such explanations to determine blameworthiness and to mitigate punishment raises a severe practical problem. The problem is this. A legally sane defendant wit h the requisite mens rea - the machine --- has committed
an antisocial act. T he actor thus evidences dangerousness and,
without a dynamic explanation, blameworthiness as well. But suppose a psychodynamicist convinces the court that the d efendant is
not fully responsible; rather, the actor's unconscious dynamics the ghosts - are to blame. This acceptance of psychodynamic theory raises two questions related to t he criminal justice system's
goals of retribution and incapacitation. First, considering only retribution, hovv should the law calibrate the diminution in responsibility and punishment resulting from an excuse based on a psychodynamic explanat ion? Second, a defendant who is less responsible
for psychodynamic reasons is nonetheless dangerous because of
factors beyond his or her control and should be incapacitated: how
should the law resolve the tension that will arise between t he retributive and incapacitative goals of the system ? Psychodynamic .
psychology, however 1 can offer little guidance in apportioning pun-
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isb_Inent justly or in deciding whether the benefits of incapacitation
are worth the costs of punishing less blameworthy defendants.
"W hat are the possible and proper responses of the criminal justice system to the tension between punishment based on the machine and punishment based on the ghost? If the law reduces the
punishment - typically imprisonment - meted out to the convicted defendant because he or she is less blameworthy, the dangerous defendant is freed earlier than the law otherwise dictates.
Arg uably this is an especially undesirable result because dyn amically compelled defendants are unaware of the power ful unconscious forces that compel them to commit crimes: the unseen ghost
renders the machine a particularly uncontrolled desperado. A reasonable answer to the danger of early release is to treat the prisoner psychodynamically - to exorcise the ghost. This tactic seems
of dubious value: although it may make the prisoner feel better
emotionally (if he feels bad at all), it is entirely unlikely that the
dynamic treatment will substantially change his overt behavior. 187
Moreover, it is risible to imagine significant numbers of dynamicists practicing their arts in the p risons. If the law accepts the
psychodynamic story but the convicted defendant is imprisoned
longer than his or her culpability warrants in order to preserve social safety, it will be clear that society is willing to punish persons
nwre harshly than they deserve and to employ preventive detention in the criminal justice system. Few other than pure utilitarians will accept this outcome, but it is the logical implication
of psychodynamic excuses and should be rec.ognized by those who
wish to take such excuses seriously. Consequently, psychodynamic
theory, if it is valid and relevant at all, will inevitably create tension between retribution and incapacitation, a tension which it can
do nothing to help society resolve, either by ameliorating defendants' dangerousness or by suggesting other resolutions to the
problems it identifies.
If reduced sentences that release dynamically compelled dangerous defendants "too early" are acceptable or obligatory because
bl.ar:neworthiness places an upper limit on punishment, the

·~ ; See supra notes 131-35 and accompanying text. If dynamically compelled defendants
can be held and treated until they are no longer dangerous, what will be the future criteria
for cure and consequent nondangerousness? At present, of course, such criteria, like dynrnnic treatment for prisoners, are nonexistent.

l
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dynarnicist still has the burden of formulating adequate criteria by
which legislatures, judges, and juries should calibrate the responsibility and punishment of these defendants. As mitigating variables,
dynamic explanations are not like harsh childhood experiences,
family tragedy, illness, and the like. The relationship of these latter types of variables to considerations of culpability and mercy is
within the domain of common sense and needs no expert elucidation for sensible decisionmaking. 188 By contrast, the relationship of
dynamic explanations to behavioral control is clearly beyond pure
lay assessment and requires authoritative clarification. As this article has argued, however, scientifically verified and accepted knowledge of the relationship between dynamic explanations and behavioral control does not exist. If there is no legal or normative theory
that links the expert's psychodynamic story to the degree of criminal responsibility and culpability, then the law will be unable without arbitrariness to determine how blameworthy the defendant is
and to decide how much he or she should be punished. Because no
such theory exists, it is beyond the powers of both experts and
laypersons to calibrate the degree of responsibility and severity of
punishment which are appropriate in view of a particular defendant's psychodynamic story. Moreover, when the factfinder is
faced with conflicting formulations, or conflicting inferences about
control based on those formulations, it is difficult to imagine what
criteria can be used to assess the comparative merits of the case.
There are no objective, external criteria one can use to assess validity: there is only the aesthetic and emotional intuition that the
tale being told is satisfying. 189

188

Playwrights and novelists have always known this.
Perhaps, however, dynamicism can be used sensibly in criminal justice decisionmaking. In a previous paper, Morse, Diminished Capacity: A Moral and Legal Conundrum, 2
Int'l J. L. & Psychiatry 271, 292-96 (1979), I suggested that the determination of whether a
defendant was only partially responsible for his or her crime should be accomplished at trial
rather than at sentencing. In addition to the usual criminal law verdicts, a verdict of "guilty
but partially responsible" would be appropriate in cases where the defendant's conduct fulfilled all the requisite elements of the crime, but the defendant was proven to be substantially less responsible than the average defendant for whatever reason, such as mental disorder or defect, the courts or legislatures chose to accept. If the arguments of the present
paper are rejected, psychodynamic factors might be such a reason. Defendants found "guilty
but partially responsible" would be sentenced to a punishment equivalent to a fixed percentage of the punishment allowed for the crime.
Bonnie and Slobogin have criticized this proposal as too discretionary, supra note 8, at
450, but their criticism misses the mark. My proposal limits potential arbitrariness in deter189
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If mitigation based on psychodynamic explanations is taken seriously, sentencing becomes more arbitrary than it is now. Defendants who are especially dangerous because they supposedly have
subnormal control over their behavior may be released earlier than
other defendants convicted of the same crime, with no assurance
t hat the lack of culpability that justifies the imposition of this cost
on society exists. This is an irrational and dangerous result of taking psychodynamicism seriously in the criminal law. A criminal
justice system that wishes to allow crucial responsibility decisions
to be made on t he basis of the vague data provided by psychodynamic analysis can hardly be committed, however imperfectly, to
the search for truth. The responsibility skeptics correctly contend
that justice requires imprecise data to be admissible in criminal
trials, but there is a limit to such imprecision, a limit that dynamic
explanations utterly transgress.

F.

Summary

Criminal courts should reject expert testimony based on psychodynamic psychology for four reasons. First, scientifically sound evidence about the validity of psychodynamic psychology discloses
that much of the psychology is invalid and much has never been

minations of criminal responsibility and sentencing. Partial responsibility is considered, but
there is only one degree of it for all crimes and its relationship to sentencing is fixed. Moreover, because the decision about partial responsibility concerns the fundamental question of
blameworthiness, it is a decision that should be made during the high visibility, morally
adjudica tive trial process. The factfinder, not a sentencing judge, should be allowed to decide in which cases psychodynamic factors affect responsibility. Furthermore, dynamic explanations are more likely to be considered fully if they are assessed at trial rather than at
sentencing proceedings (capital punishment aside). The position taken in this article is that
psychodynamic explanations do not belong in the criminal justice process at all, but, if they
must be admitted, it is more sensible to admit thelJl at trial under a partial responsibility
approach of the type delineated just above. It is ironic that Bonnie and Slobogin criticized
this proposal for creating too much arbitrariness in the system, when the upshot of their
proposals will be just the discretion they decry.
The problems with employing psychodynamic formulations in the criminal justice system
would not end, however, even if the law were abl e to devise a relatively nonarbitrary partial
responsibility approach for dealing with dynamically compelled defendants. Assessing craziness is a simple matter compared to the proper construction of a psychodynamic formulation of an individual case. The latter typically requires a substantial number of hours of
assessment; indeed, in dynamic therapy the process of assessment is continuous and formulations often change as the therapy produces more data. For both defense and prosecution
to obtain a worthy dynamic assessment and formulation, enormous resource expenditures
would be required .
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tested. 190 Because the testimony lacks scientific validity, its admission would therefore be inefficient, misleading, and prejudicial. At
most, courts should only accept expert testimony founded on psychodynamic psychology if the testimony is based on those aspects
of the "discipline" that have been confirmed. Second, even if the
general validity of psychodynamic psychology can be demonstrated, there is no evidence that clinicians can provide reliable
formulations in individual cases. Thus, courts should exclude psychodynamically based testimony because there is no reason to believe that such testimony will be accurate. Third, psychodynamic
explanations are not relevant to the ascription of criminal responsibility and the apportionment of punishment. Either they do not
bear on criminal responsibility, or they prove too much because
such explanations apply equally to all persons and will thereby excuse all persons. Fourth, even if the first three reasons are rejected,
psychodynamic psychology is problematic because it is impossible
to base either sensible dispositional policies or sound individual
decisions on it, and its admission will inevitably enlarge the battle
between experts. In sum, the introduction of expert testimony
based on psychodynamic psychology will be inefficient, confusing,
and prejudicial. As we shall see in the next section, it is also utterly
unnecessary.

IV.

CRIME, CRAZINEss, AND ExPERTISE

In this section, I shall consider briefly the theoretical and scientific merits of some representative examples of the recommendations Bonnie and Slobogin make for the broad use of mental health
expertise in criminal cases, 191 and I shall examine whether forensic
training will remedy the admitted weakness of current mental
health expert testimony. The section will argue that there is little
basis for recommending the broad use of expertise, and that training will not solve the present problems. Next, I shall suggest that
my Crazy Behavior recommendations will make far better, more

Although some hypotheses have received reasonable confirmation, they are rarely the
hypotheses that are most distinctively psychodynamic, and they often can be explained
more parsimoniously by other theories. See supra notes 101-13 and accompanying text.
191
Dealing with most of the claims would be fruitless nitpicking, so I shall not do so. Part
III of this article already dealt with claims for the usefulness of psychodynamic psychology
and these arguments will not be repeated.
190
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rational use of mental health expert testimony than the scheme
Bonnie and Slobogin propose. Finally, representative case studies
provided by Bonnie and Slobogin will be examined to demonstrate
the superiority of the Crazy Behavior proposals expanded upon
here.

A.

The Juropathology of Everyday Expertise

The method votaries/responsibility skeptics believe that mental
health professionals can contribute much to criminal justice decisionmaking. This belief rests on three assumptions: first, the criminal law must assess and take into account the defendant's actual
psychological functioning; second, to do so properly, courts must
admit somewhat imprecise data relevant to the defendant's psychology; and third, experts possess the knowledge, skills, and techniques to provide reasonably reliable and valid data relevant to legal questions of mens rea and responsibility. Although I agree that
the criminal law must take into account a defendant's psychological states, and that courts must admit somewhat imprecise data to
do so, I take issue with the degree to which Bonnie and Slobogin
assume that mental health experts can provide legally relevant
data that is sufficiently reliable and valid. Bonnie and Slobogin admit that much mental health science is still rather soft, 192 but they
believe that most expert mental health testimony is sufficiently
precise to qualify for admission into evidence. 193 Moreover, they
believe that it is possible to eliminate much of the imprecision and
many of the other faults of such testimony by adequately training
experts to gather data and testify about it properly. 194 Although
their assertions about expertise and forensic training appear
facially reasonable, a closer inspection of the data and the arguments that support these assertions renders them unpersuasive.

1. The Merits of Mental Health Expertise: Some Legal Consequences of the Distinction Between Science and Speculation
In Crazy Behavior, I set out the basic questions that all mental
health cases pose, and I suggested how the law should properly

192
193
19

•

Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 8, at 461.
Id. at 461-62.
Id. at 492-522.
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frame these questions and how experts should properly answer
them. 196 The analysis clarified the question of what data would be
useful to legal decisionmakers. I then reviewed the contributions
that mental health experts, as experts, could make in providing
that data. 196 Indeed, without a clear understanding of the law's
concerns in mental health cases, it is often irrelevant to demonstrate that professionals do or do not have particular knowledge or
skills. The only kno-vvledge and skills t hat the law should be concerned with are those that are relevant to proper legal questions.
My review of the scientific knowledge and clinical skills of
mental health professionals convinced me that these professionals
have much less to contribute to legal decisionmaking than is commonly supposed. 197 As described in Section II of this article, I concluded in Crazy Behavior that the proper role of mental health
experts is to offer behavioral observations-which they often can
gather more efficiently and fully than laypersons-and hard data
relevant both to the question of the actor's capacity for self-control
and rationality and to predictions about his or her future behavior.
Since the publication of Crazy Behavior in 1978, I have continued to review the mental health literature for new data, because
many of my views are subject to revision in light of new advances
in the behavioral sciences. I still conclude that the law should limit
the role of mental health experts, as I suggested previously. Clearly
there have been advances in mental science during this period,
both in the knowledge about the biological and the psychosocial
foundations of crazy behavior 198 - many of which advances are
extremely promising - and in the devising of methods for acquir-

Morse, supra note 2, at 542-600.
Id. at 604-22.
197
Id. at 602. The most extensive and comprehensive-albeit one-sided-recent review of
these issues that takes a similar, but more extreme position, is J. Ziskin, Coping with Psychiatric and Pyschological Testimony (3d ed. 1981).
198
See, e.g., G. Brown & T. Harris, Social Origins of Depression (1978); Berger, Biochemistry and the Schizophrenias: Old Concepts and New Hypotheses, 169 J. Nervous and
Mental Disease 90 (1981); Carroll, The Dexamethasone Suppression Test for Melancholia,
140 Brit. J. Psychiatry 292 (1982); Stress, Social Support and Schizophrenia, 7 Schizophrenia Bull. 12 (1981); Weitkamp, Stancer, Persad, Flood & Guttormsen, Depressive Disorders
and HLA: A Gene on Chromosome 6 That Can Affect Behavior, 305 New Eng. J. Med. 1301
(1981). On the other hand, some accepted conclusions, such as the link between genetic
predisposition and schizophrenia, have come under renewed attack. Lidz, Blatt & Cook, Critique of the Danish-American Studies of the Adopted-Away Offspring of Schizophrenic Parents, 138 Am. J. Psychiatry 1063 (1981).
196
196
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ing such knowledge. 199 There have also been contributions to what
may loosely be termed the antimedical model of craziness. 200 Nevertheless, most of the advances have not produced data or skills
that are legally relevant. 201 For instance, increased comprehension
of basic behavioral processes cannot help answer the question of
whether a person's craziness is extreme enough to reach the
threshold of legal relevance, nor has our comprehension reached
the point where it is possible to claim that we fully understand the
causes of behavior, or almost do.
Let us now turn to a consideration of some of the claims that
Bonnie and Slobogin make for the usefulness of professional
knowledge and skills. An assessment of the contributions that
mental health experts can offer to criminal law decisionmaking
raises two related issues. First, if the knowledge and skills are relevant to legal questions, are they scientifically reliable and valid?
Second, if the knowledge and skills are reliable and valid, are they
relevant to legal questions? Bonnie and Slobogin clearly recognize
two major problems that compromise the reliability and validity of
expert testimony: bias in the collection of data and bias in the formation of opinions. 202 In asserting that these difficulties are controllable or remediable within reasonable limits for legal purposes,
however, they rarely attempt a systematic evaluation of the scient ific validity of the techniques or knowledge they offer, and all too
often they support their assertions solely with speculations by a
mental health professional. Bonnie and Slobogin assume, for instance, that mental health professionals can perceive and interpret
body language cues more effectively than laypersons. 203 Although
t his assumption may be intuitively appealing, and some mental
health professionals may believe it to be true, there is now available extremely good evidence based on rigorously performed research that demonstrates that mental health professionals are no
Buchsbaum, Ingvar, Kessler, \'Vaters, Cappelletti, van Kammen, King, Johnson, Manning, Flynn, Mann, Bunney 8~ Sokoloff, Cerebral Glucography With Positron Tomography:
Use in Normal Subjects and in Patients with Schizophrenia, 39 Archives Gen. Psychiatry
251 (1982); Carroll, supra note 198.
200
E.g., T. Sarbin & J. Mancmo, Schizophrenia: Medical Diagnosis or Moral Verdict?
(1980).
201
A possible exception is the American Psychiatric Association's adoption of DSM-III,
supra note 131. DSM-III wiil be discussed in detail, infra note 210 and accornpHnying text.
202
Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 8, at 512-14.
oos Id. at 506.
109
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better than a norm group of high school students at assessing nonverbal cues. 201 In a similar vein, Bonnie and Slobogin q uote an. eminent forensic psychiatrist and a la;v professor to support the conclusion that an "experienced forensic clinician is able to assess the
accuracy of the information that he uses to form h.i3 eondusion." 205
The quoted experts recognize the difficulties of assessi:ng the accu~
racy of information received from the patient n:nd other sources~
but they conclude that the professional's training allows him or her
to discern the truth. These experts may be right, but they cite rw
evidence in support of their assertion, and, to ra.y knm,:ledge, such
evidence does not exist. 206
The solutions Bonnie and Slobogin offer to remedy the problems
in data collection and interpretation are unpersuaBive. For instance, they recommend that forensic evaluations should include
intensive fact gathering, 207 and that more than one professional
should evaluate a subject to avoid the data collection biases that
are inherent in solo evaluations. 208 I endorse these recommendations completely, but I am less impressed by the process they suggest for forming opinions based on evaluations. Bonnie and
Slobogin recommend ongoing discussion by the evaluating staff

R. Rosenthal, J. Hall, M. DiMatteo, P. Rogers & D. Archer, Sensitivity to Nonverbal
Communication 294-319 (1979).
200
Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 8, at 510 (citing Diamond & Louisell, The Psychiatrist
as an Expert Witness: Some Ruminations and Speculations, 63 Mich. L. Rev. 1335, 1353
(1965)).
206
Recent research calls into question the ability of mental health experts to be reasonably objective in legal proceedings. Simon & Zusman, The Effect of Context on Psychiatrists'
Perspective on Illness: A Case Study (1981) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
For a final example, Bonnie and Slobogin also appear to endorse the use of the Draw-APerson Test (DAP) in forensic assessment. Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 8, at 503 n.221.
This test asks subjects to draw pictures of a man and a woman. Proponents of the test allege
that professionals can draw accurate diagnostic inferences about the subject from the characteristics of the pictures. Despite its popularity, the DAP lacks reliability and validity,
however, and its continued use by clinicians should be an embarrassment rather than a
justification for using its results in the criminal justice system. See Harris, Book Review, in
1 The Seventh Mental Measurements Yearbook 401 (0. Buros ed. 1972); Kitay, Book Review, in id. at 404; Roback, Human Figure Drawings: Their Utility in the Clinical Psychologist's Armamentarism for Personality Assessment, 70 Psychological Bull. 1 (1968). Unfortunately, clinical psychologists are evidently unaffected by negative research evidence
concerning the tests they use. Wade & Baker, Opinions and Use of Psychological Tests: A
Survey of Clinical Psychologists, 32 Am. Psychologist 874, 879 (1977).
207
Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 8, at 508-09.
208
Id. at 505, 513.
204
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leading to a consensus formulation. 209 This is a sensible way to
construct a hypothesis, but not to validate one. Unless other investigators can independently reach the same conclusions, there is no
reason to believe that the formulation is reliable or valid. Multiple
evaluations are a fine idea, but consensus opinions do not correct
for bias. Rather, they tend to reflect the varying persuasiveness of
the various formulators. More powerful, persuasive professionals
will tend to convince the others, producing no gain in reliability
and validity.
Speculations, assumptions , and assertions are not substitutes for
hard evidence, and the method votaries simply do not show that
their "expert" techniques and knowledge are reliable and valid.
Unreliable and invalid "scientific" evidence cannot assist the
factfinder, and it may be misleading and prejudicial. Therefore
courts should not accept it.
The second difficulty with suggestions for the broad use of expertise is that even reliable and valid techniques may not generate
data that respond to the questions properly asked by the criminal
law. Techniques may yield data acceptable for some mental health
purposes but inadmissible for use in the courtroom. The burden is
on the dynamicists to demonstrate that the data in question is
admissible.
Let us take some examples. The major change occurring in the
last three years that bears on the use of mental health experts in
the courtroom is the promulgation by the American Psychiatric
Association of the long-awaited third edition of the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-111). 210 Use of this

I d. at 515-17.
DSM-III, supra note 131. Bonnie and Slobogin do not deal with DSM-III, but it is
crucially important to current psychiatric and psychologit::al practice and research in the
United States.
DSM-III differs from its maligned predecessor, American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (2d ed. 1968) (DSM-II), in at least four
ways. First, the criteria of DSM-III rely far more on research evidence than on the sheer
consensus opinions of its developers. Second, the diagnostic criteria for the various disorders
are considerably more precise, and include relatively clear inclusion and exclusion criteria.
Third, DSM-III adopts a multiaxial approach that considers factors such as physical health
and social functioning in the total diagnostic picture. Fourth, there is theoretical and empirical reason to believe that DSM-III is considerably more reliable than its predecessor. These
four factors render DSM-III possibly relevant to legal decisionmaking because reliable and
relatively precise diagnoses conceivably might be efficient and adequate proxies for the determination of whether a person is crazy. But even if DSM-III is truly as reliable as it
209

210

1982]

Experts and the Unconscious

1049

manual promises to make expert diagnoses more reliable and to
allow experts to articulate their diagnostic criteria and reasoning
more precisely. Nevertheless, although the diagnostic categories of
DSM -III are far more precise than those of the second edition of
the manual (DSM-II), they are still not _a dequate proxies for legal
craziness because they are not sufficiently precise to provide the
factfind er with the necessary, full, textured account of how the defendant behaved. 2 u Persons whose behavior places them within
the same diagnostic category may differ greatly in the degree and
quality of their behavioral abnormalities. 212 In determining
whether a defendant is crazy, there is simply no substitute for the
fullest possible account from all sources of the defendant's behavior at the time of the alleged offense. If experts provide the
factfinder with such rich behavioral data, a diagnosis will add little
of value because the criteria for DS1Vf-III diagnoses, like those of
DSM-II, are almost entirely behavioral. 213 Thus, permitting the ex-

appears to be-and there is some reason to doubt its reliability, Morse, supra note 29, at 70
n.75-it is still not an adequate proxy for craziness. See infra notes 211-13 and accompanying text.
The authors of DSM-III also claim that there is research evidence for the validity of the
various categories, but DSM-III admits that most categories "have not yet been fully validated ," DSM-III, supra note 131, at 8, and I and others believe that in fact such evidence is
distinctly lacking and that only future research will establish the validity of the diagnostic
categories of DSM-III. Morse, supra note 29, at 70 n.75 (citing sources). See also Kendell &
Brockington, The Identification of Disease Entities and the Relationship Between Schizophrenic and Affective Psychoses, 137 Brit. J. Psychiatry 324, 329 (1980) (meaning of validity
of a disease entity in psychiatry rarely defined; no natural boundary found between schizophrenia and affective psychoses). The chief author of DSM-III, Robert Spitzer, has referred
optimistically to this problem in a recent interview. A.P.A. Monitor, Oct. 1981, at 33.
Finally, DSM-III cautions that its use in nonclinical contexts, "such as determination of
legal responsibility . . . must be critically examined in each instance within the appropriate
institutional context." DSM-III, supra note 131, at 126.
211
This statement and similar statements that follow in the text can only be confirmed
by simple inspection of DSM-III criteria. Consider the general and specific criteria for schizophrenia and its subtypes. DSM-III, supra note 131, at 181-93. Knowing a person meets
these criteria hardly substitutes for a full behavioral portrait of the actor.
212
Id. at 6 ("Another misconception is that all individuals described as having the same
mental disorder are alike in all important ways. Although all the individuals described as
having the same mental disorder show at least the defining features of the disorder, they
may well differ in other important ways that may affect clinical management and outcome."). Moreover, Axis V of DSM-III, which rates the highest level of adaptive functioning
within the past year, is too imprecise to serve as a proxy for an assessment of social
functioning .
213
Behavioral abnormality is a necessary criterion for all diagnoses and it is sufficient for
most, including the majority of disorders whose presence in a defendant may raise questions
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pert to provide a diagnosis yields no additional data; and in labeling the defendant as suffering from a disorder, the expert interjects a host of unproven assumptions about disease processes
and consequent lack of control. The criminal law must avoid this
question-begging result if it is to resolve the question of responsibility properly. 2 1-!
For another example, Bonnie and Slobogin suggest that a behavioral rating m ethod called Ego Functions Assessment (EF A) can
provide a relia ble and valid method of assessing ego functioning. 2111
Indeed, examination of the EFA reveals that it includes measures

about crimin al respons ibility. Cf. Rappeport, Differences Between Forensic and General
Psychiatry, 139 Am. J. Psychiatry 331, 333 (1982) ("It is not because the man had a psychosis that he is not responsible; it is how his illness affected his behavior and his ability to
form the necessary criminal intent or to have the mens rea, or guilty mind, that is
important.") .
2
"
It may be objected that the danger of ascribing legal relevance to an expert diagnosis
is overstated. Professor John Monahan of the University of Virginia School of Law has suggested in a person al communication that a diagnosis may be, first, a convenient summary of
behavior, and, second, an efficient means of communicating that persons who behave in
certain ways (those whose behavior fits a particular diagnosis) are likely to behave in other
ways. Interview with John Monahan (June, 1981) (notes on file with the Virginia Law Review Association). These suggestions are unpersuasive, however. A diagnosis simpliciter conveys little additional, legally relevant information to a legal factfinder beyond the description of the criteria! behaviors themselves. Moreover, the diagnoses of DSM-III are too vague
to convey much information about a person's degree of craziness or the quality of the criteria! behaviors. DSM-III re cognizes this point explicitly when it notes that persons with the
same diagnosis may be different in important ways. DSM-III, supra note 131, at 6. Any
convenience gained by using the shorthand - and convenience would be the only virtue is more than offset by the problems I have identified.
The second suggestion merits more attention, but only in those cases where a diagnosis is
significantly statistically related to other legally relevant behavior (beyond the criteria! behaviors to which the diagnosis refers). At present, hard data linking diagnoses to other legally relevant behavior are rare, but when such data exist, experts can present them without
using the diagnostic shorthand. For instance, the expert can say: "People who behave in A,
B, C ways, are also X % likely to behave in Y (legally relevant) way." This is undoubtedly
"less efficient" than saying, for example: "Schizophrenics are X % likely to behave Y way."
But, again, the only loss is minor time efficiency, a price that seems worth paying in light of
the possibility of the greater efficiency loss of predisposing the factfinder to an incorrect
decision.
Professor Monahan has also suggested that, in any event, criminal juries pay little attention to diagnos is. If so, there is little practical loss in allowing or prohibiting diagnostic
conclusions or diagnostic shorthand. On a more theoretical level, however, I still wish to
avoid using question-begging diagnoses (and other forms of question-begging) as much as
possible in mental health related cases in order to increase the honesty, clarity, and integrity
of criminal justice decisionmaking. These issues are dealt with in further detail in the discussion of the case of Mr. Gat infra notes 241-74 and accompanying text.
210
Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 8, at 521.
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for "reality testing," "judgment," and "sense of reality," all of
which do seem relevant to craziness and the capacity for control.
Even assuming that the EFA is reasonably reliable and valid for
mental health purposes, 216 however, there are several reasons to
think it will not aid legal decisionmakers in resolving the relevant
questions. First, defendants will always take the test after the time
of the offense - usually long after - and its retrospective and
external validity is unknown. 217 It therefore tells the factfinde r
nothing definite about the defendant's behavior at the t ime of the
offense. Second, because all the scales rely on behavioral criteria,
there is no advantage to giving a scale score rather than simply
describing the behavior. A scale score is a conclusion: the raw data
are far more useful and easily interpretable by laypersons. A
description of the defendant's behavior itself is a better account of
the defendant's functioning than a test score. 218
In sum, those who propose to introduce into evidence the results
of mental health tests and techniques should first demonstrate the
legal relevance and usefulness of those results. Otherwise,
factfinders may be so impressed with the "scientific" findings that
they fail to form their own independent conclusions on legal issues,
conclusions that they could easily have formed had they been
presented with the raw, behavioral data. 219 Most of the evidence
that Bonnie and Slobogin offer to support the broad use of expert
testimony appears either scientifically unreliable or invalid, or not

-----------------------------------------A check of the Social Science Citation Index for every year since the EFA was firat
published until the present revealed that it is virtually never cited and never used in its full
form in research or clinical reports except by its authors. The EF A may be both useful and
employed regularly by mental health professionals, but there is simply no evidence of this in
the literature. Thus, there is little substantial evidence of its reliability and validity beyond
its initial publication, and, in its initial publication, the authors only suggested that it might
be useful for legal purpose. This suggestion was never tested, however.
217
A test may be said to be retrospectively valid if responses to it at a later date provide
accurate information about a subject's behavior at an earlier date.
218
Even if the EF A is a useful statistical technique for reporting research findings on,
say, the outcome of psychotherapy, its results are not a useful means of presenting data to a
legal factfinder.
219
And, of course, few tests will be more helpful to factfinders than the raw behavioral
data on which they are based. A recent review of the validity of psychological tests for
providing legally relevant information produced "dismal" results. Poythress, Is There a
Baby in the Bathwater? Psychological Tests and Expert Testimony 9 (1981) (unpublished
manuscript on file with the Virginia Law Review Association). See Comment, The Psychologist as Expert Witness: Science in the Courtroom, 38 Md. L. Rev. 539 (1979).
216
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demonstrably relevant to legal questions. Observation and hard
data are the only sound and legally relevant evidence that the law
can reasonably expect from the testimony of experts. The techniques and methods that Bonnie and Slobogin propose will not
cure these problems and therefore will not produce evidence that
will assist criminal law decisionmakers.
2.

(

Forensic Training: The Future of an Illusion

Forensic training, despite the best intentions of proponents like
Bonnie and Slobogin, cannot "cure" the defects in mental health
science and testimony. No amount of training can render unreliable, invalid, and irrelevant methods reliable, valid, and relevant.
Training programs to ensure that future expert witnesses understand the limits of their expertise would be terribly useful. 220 But
even if mental health science has reasonably relevant information
to offer the .criminal law, there are insuperable practical problems
with ensuring the proper training of adequate numbers of future
mental health expert witnesses.
The proposal for improved forensic training as a means to justify
the broad use of mental health expertise is the pursuit of a "fugitive utopia." The broad use of clinical mental health expertise
should require that expert witnesses be fine clinicians, 221 but a
° From personal communications with Richard Bonnie and Christopher Slobogin, I
gather that they agree that good training programs should stress the limits of expertise. The
difficulty, of course, is that we disagree wholeheartedly about what those limits are.
221
One of the immediate difficulties is creating reliable and valid criteria for assessing
who is a skillful clinician, but accepted, validated criteria do not exist at present. I do not
wish to overstate this point; there may be personal qualities, for instance, that seem desira·
ble. See S. Garfield, supra note 101, at 69-82. These qualities tend to be idealized and nonspecific, however, and which qualities are chosen seems to depend on the professional theoretical orientation of the respondent. Id. For an example, concerning specific skills, a recent
study from a prestigious psychiatric department tested the reliability of judgments by senior
supervisors of the psychotherapy performance of psychiatric residents using a simple rating
device. Although the reliability was statistically significant, it was "uniformly low." Liston,
Yager & Strauss, Assessment of Psychotherapy Skills: The Problem of Interrater Agreement, 138 Am. J. Psychiatry, 1069, 1071-72 (1981). For another example, a Canadian study
examined the reliability of ratings by senior psychiatrists of the performance by residents on
the oral, clinical portion of a practice examination for board certification. The study concluded that, "there is a significant degree of interrater disagreement about the quality
shown in a videotape of a simulated certification examination procedure." McCormick, A
Practice Oral Examination Rating Scale-Inter-Observer Reliability, 26 Can. J. Psychiatry
236, 237-38 (1981). Simply put, it will be very hard in many cases for training programs to
judge the clinical skills and knowledge of practicing mental health professionals. The train-

I
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training program of the type that Bonnie and Slobogin propose can
teach neither clinical skills nor, a fortiori, the complexities of psy·chodynamic psychology and assessment. 222 Forensic training programs will have to assume that enrolling clinicians have excellent
clinical skills and are genuinely knowledgeable about mental
health theory and data in general, and about psychodynamic principles in particular. But there is no guarantee that enrollees \.Vill
have this knowledge or skill. :M ost psychiatric residency training is
empirical and insufficiently theoretical. Even board-certified. psychiatrists are rarely sophisticated dynamicists (or sophist icated
theorists of any stripe) un less they privately engage in the intensive training provided by psychoanalytic institutes or similar ins titutions. Training in clinical psychology is usually more theoretical
and research oriented, but, again, there is rarely sophisticated
training in psychodynamic psychology. 223 At the completion of
their formal training, few mental health professionals have the
panoply of skills and knowledge that should be a prerequisite for
training in the type of forensic program that Bonnie and Slobogin
propose.
I suspect that even highly reliable and valid admissions criteria
would not guarantee the enrollment of excellent clinicians, because
ing program might develop its own evaluation instruments, including observation of a sam ple clinical assessment, but such evaluations would be very expensive and of unclear reliability and validity. For the purpose of this discussion, however, I shall assume that adeqU'lte
criteria for assessing clinical skills can be developed.
222
It should be remembered that formal psychoanalytic training rarely takes less than
five years of intensive work, including a full analysis of the student, and often it takts
longer. A recent impressionistic study of candidates for Canadian certification in psychiatry
found that the examinees had less sophistication in psychodynamics than would be expected
among psychiatric specialists. Warme, The Current Level of Psychodynamic Knowledge of
Candidates for the Canadian Certification Examination in Psychiatry, 26 Can. J . Psychiatry
296, 299 (1981) (also noting insufficient emphasis on psychodynamics in same training
centers).
A recent survey of third-year psychiatric residents found that residents rated their medical education and experience with drug therapy as the highest aspects of their psychiatric
training, whereas personal analysis or psychotherapy and training in psychoanalysis and research were rated lowest. See Coryell & Wetzel, Attitudes Toward Issues in Psychiatry
Among Third- Year Residents: A Brief Survey, 135 Am. J. Psychiatry 732, 733 (1978). See
also Coryell, The Organic-Dynamic Continuum in Psychiatry: Trends in Attitudes Among
Third- Year Residents, 139 Am. J. Psychiatry 89, 90-91 (1982) (ran kings of training experiences were the same as in Coryell & Wetzel, supra, but survey demonstrated some revival of
enthusiasm for psychoanalysis; response rate low, however).
223
Fewer and fewer clinical psychologists define themselves as psychodynamically oriented. See Garfield, supra note 131, at 178.
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better clinicians generally will not be interested in forensic work. 224
The primary business of mental health clinicians is, and ou,ght to
be , evaluating and helping crazy people who want help. Forensic
work rarely helps any patient in a mental health sense, 1Nhere the
prosecuti on retains a professional to evah.Jate a defendant, the clinician is not the agent of the allegedly disordere d subject. Indeed,
•
l 1s
. act mg
.
f'
th<::
prori'esswna
contrary t o t ne al e_enaam:;
s perce1vea
best interest. No stance, n o conduct, could be fu rt h er frmn t he primary caring role of a competent mental health p rofessional. If a
substantial percentage of better--than --average clinicians decline to
engage in forensic work because it is not the type of wor k that
maxi1nizes t he fundamental goals of their profession, forensic
t raining programs will have to t each those who do enroll the basic
clinical skills as well as t he theoretical and clinical psychodynamic
techniques and knowledge required for testimony of t he type that
Bonnie and Slobogin propose.
A final problem is that if broad use of expertise continues, there
will be a Inuch greater need for trained forensic specialists nationwide.225 Even if the programs were excellent and enrolled fine clin icians, it would be impossible to develop enough programs to
train enough forensic specialists to possess a degree of skill and
knowledge that would ameliorate the present problems. Most testify ing professionals would therefore have the same disabilities that
are so obvious today. Training programs cannot, under the Bonnie
and Slobogin view of appropriate testimony, supply adequate
amounts of excellent expert testimony.
The forensic training program remedy will be an ineffective placebo. No amount of training can ameliorate the scientific weaknesses or irrelevance for legal purposes of much mental health expertise. Even if the science makes dramatic gains, as I expect it
will, training programs will make only minuscule improvements in
the deficiencies of expert testimony: either the skills and knowledge that might be imparted will be unnecessary, or, less optimistically, there will be no means by which enough proper training can
1

2

1

' '

•

.1

' This is only a hunch. Admittedly, there are no reliable data about any of these topics.
I did consult, however , a totally nonrandom group of mental health professi on als who are
knowledgeable about forensic work and they universally agreed with the proposition in the
text.
220
This will be especially true if the law widely and broadly accepts the validity of excusing and mitigating psychodynamic exp lan ations.
"
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be provided, even assuming proper training is "the answer."

B.

Rationalizing Expert Testimony:
Beyond the Battle Principle

The Crazy Behavior proposals for the proper use of expert test imony would not require expensive and ineffective training programs and would alleviate almost all of the present problems of
unreliability, invalidity, and irrelevance. According to those pro··
posals, experts would not offer conclusions, psychiatric or legal, nor
would they offer unproven theoretical explanations. 226 Experts
would only offer clinical observations and hard data. 227 Conse quently, they would not need to know the law, or how to separate
fact from value questions. Moreover, experts would not need. the
sophisticated psychodynamic knowledge that the Bonnie ' and
Slobogin scheme demands but cannot provide. Theoretical sophistication or lack of it would not be an issue, because the factfinder
would not need to hear theoretical speculation from experts. Perhaps most important, the "battle of the experts" would be reduced
to minor skirmishes in most cases.
Three basic factors probably are primarily responsible for the
battle of the experts: the softness of mental health theory, data,
and collection methods; the nonscientific character of legal issues;
and the inevitable bias of mental health experts as they enter the
criminal justice system as advocates. Let us consider these factors
in light of the Crazy Behavior proposals.
First, experts often disagree about both observational data and
inferential conclusions such as diagnoses or theoretical explanations for behavior. Some degree of disagreement among experts on
factual matters and interpretations of these facts occurs in all
fields, but it is especially problematic in mental health: the primary assessment technique is human interaction, the criteria for
drawing conclusions are often unusually vague, there are myriad
competing explanatory theories, and the conclusions reached are
commonly unverifiable. 228 Under such conditions, it is unsurprising
that experts will disagree about the subject's behavior or explana-

Morse, supra note 2, at 618-19.
Id. at 601, 625.
228
Rarely are laboratory tests or other forms of relatively objective and verifiable data
employed.
226
227
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tions. The measuring tool changes from examiner to examiner, no
theoretical scheme is self-evidently correct, and reliable and valid
benchmarks for drawing inferences are often lacking.
Limiting expert testimony to observations of behavior and hard
data would alleviate many of the difficulties produced by the softness of mental health science. Observers are far less likely to disagree about observations than about inferential conclusions, and
disagreement about observable behavior, precisely because it is
about observable data, is easier to resolve than disagreements
about inferences. Moreover, factfinders need not be exposed to the
unseemly spectacle of experts jousting over inferences, because
factfinders are perfectly capable of drawing those inferences themselves if they understand the relevant legal questions. Within the
realm of hard data produced by acceptable scientific methods/ 29
there can of course be disagreements about what the data show,
but here, too, there are criteria for assessing studies - primarily
methodological soundness - that provide a touchstone for assessing disagreements. The Crazy Behavior scheme therefore will confine the courtroom-battle behavior of mental health experts to
those matters where factfinders themselves can assess and resolve
the disputes. 230
Second, demanding or allowing conclusions from mental health
experts on ultimate legal issues such as criminal responsibility or
the capacity to form mens rea 231 is certain to cause unseemly dis-

See supra note 78.
I suggest that all forensic assessment interviews be videotaped and that the factfinder
view the tapes if either party so requests. When mental health experts testify on the basis of
clinical examination, they will rely on parts of the examination that support their conclusions and the factfinder may not hear about portions of the examination that would lead to
contrary inferences. Cross-examination can alleviate this difficulty to some degree, but it is
not an adequate substitute for allowing the factfinder to view the raw data to decide
whether the defendant's behavior during that interview supports the expert's inference.
Even if the factfinder is not routinely allowed to view the tape on grounds of cost, ineffi.
ciency, threat of confusion, or the like, cross-examination will be far more effective if counsel can see the opposing expert's examination.
The American Psychological Association (APA) has recently recommended taping of
clinical interviews as a means of ensuring the fair administration of court-ordered, government-requested clinical interviews. Amicus Brief of APA at 22-23, 26-27, United States v.
Byers, No. 78-1415 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The reasoning of this brief applies to all clinical interviews performed to provide evidence in criminal cases.
231
See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 704. A notable exception is a California statute that prohibits
mental health expert testimony on the issue of whether a criminal defendant had the requisite mens rea in fact at the time of the alleged offense. Cal. Penal Code § 29 (West Supp.
229
230
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agreements among experts because such issues are not capable of
scientific resolution. Consider a case where the experts agree on
the behavioral data, and perhaps even on the diagnosis and inferred psychodynamic mechanisms that would explain the behavior. Nonetheless, one expert testifies that the defendant could conform to the requirements of the law or that t he defendant had the
mental capacity to form a mens rea, and the other expert testifies
to the opposite. Moreover, both deliver their opinions as a matter
of " reasonable medical (or psychiatric or psychological) certainty."
Because there is no scientific standard fo r the "abilit y to conform"
or for the capacity to fc·rm a mens rea, it is again unsurprising that
the experts will disagree. The legal standards are primarily moral
and social - only the application of moral, social, community
standards and values can determine whether a specific defendant's
behavior conforms to the legal standards. Facts alone do not provide the answer. Disagreement among experts on these issues is as
inevitable as disagreements among jurors, because there is no scientific resolution of the questions the law poses. Experts offering
legal conclusions are operating as extra, and unnecessary, jurors. If
these fertile grounds for disagreement are removed, factfinders can
discharge their duties unencumbered by the unnecessary confusion
and obfuscation resulting from expert disagreement.
Finally, the pre-existing bias of mental health experts and the
bias resulting from participation in the criminal justice system as
advocate-witnesses also promote the battle of the experts. Mental
health professionals, like all other citizens, have social and political
biases that extend to their views of criminal justice. 232 Moreover,
even a relatively neutral professional inevitably becomes an advocate when entering a case on one side or the other. In addition, the
softness of mental health science and the legal system's willingness
to accept the conclusions of experts on legal issues provide little

1982).
232
The most notable example in recent years is Dr. John Grigson of Texas, known familiarly as the "hanging psychiatrist," because he has testified for the prosecution in favor of
the death penalty in many cases. Dr. Grigson was the psychiatrist involved in Estelle v.
Smith, 101 S. Ct. 1866 (1981) (holding that the fifth and sixth amendments apply to a
psychiatric examination of a criminal defendant where the results of the examination may
be used to support the imposition of the death penalty). Dr. Bernard Diamond is a notable
example of a psychiatrist who is sympathetic to the defense. See Diamond, Criminal Responsibility of the Mentally Ill, 14 Stan. L. Rev. 59, 60-61 (1961).
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scientific constraint on the expert's testimony and great opportun ity for them to express these biases. In a particular case, experts
may agree on the behavioral data, but their individual views on
cr iminal justice and their advocacy bias will lead them to disagree
on the issues of criminal responsibility. By asking an expert's opinion on a nonscientific issue and by allowing experts to testify about
impermissibly soft data or theory, the legal system permits experts
to air their own biases before the credulous factfinder as if those
b iases were matters of reasonable scientific certainty.
F'ew people subscribe today to the myth of the "impartial"
mental h ealth expert. 233 Accepting the inevitable bias of mental
health experts, however, should not lead necessarily to the conclusion that the law cannot ameliorate the effects of this bias. The
Crazy Behavior proposals will substantially reduce the effects of
partiality by eliminating much testimony that allows the expression of such bias and by permitting testimony on those topics observable behavior and hard data - where the effect of bias on
opinions is diminished and far easier for the factfinder to detect
and address. Although Bonnie and Slobogin are commendably sen- ·
sitive in general to the problem of bias in expert witnesses, 234 they
do not confront directly the problems of criminal justice and advocacy bias and do not attend to their remedies. The Crazy Behavior
proposals will do far more to eliminate these difficulties than advances m mental health science or the forensic training of
experts. ~
23

m Morse, supra note 2, at 608 & n.172. See Gardner, The Myth of the Impartial Psychiatric Expert- Some Comments Concerning Criminal Responsibility and the Decline of the
Age of Therapy, 2 L. & Psychology Rev. 99 (1976) .
234
See Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 8, at 512-14.
230
The Crazy Behavior proposal would have other beneficial effects as well. Limiting expe rt testimony would decrease costs without depriving the legal system of valuable and sufficient expertise. The expertise most needed by the legal system is clinical assessment to
provide behavioral observations, and clinical assessment skill is the most plentifully available of all mental health clinical skills (assuming, of course, as courts do now and will continue to do, that clinical skill is a valid entity in mental health). Moreover, because hard
data cou ld come from professionals of any discipline competent to provide it - not just
psychiatry and psychology - the Crazy Behavior scheme would enlarge the pool of experts.
See Morse, su pra note 2, at 622-24.
Hearsay problems would also decrease. Expert witnesses are allowed to base their testimony on hearsay, see Fed. R. E vid. 703, but, again, use of hearsay testimony is a particularly unfortunate mistake in the mental health area where the data are behaviors and the
rneasuring tools are so inaccurate and subject to distortion. See Note, Hearsay Bases of
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There is not today substantially greater mental health expertise
relevant to criminal law questions than I claimed in Crazy Behavior. Nor is forensic training a workable solution. Given the present
state of the mental health arts, the Crazy Behavior proposal is far
more likely to make expert testimony more accurate and less expensive. ~A ost importantly, under the Crazy Behavior scheme
there will be no unfairness to either the prosecution or the defense.
To buttress these contentions, this article will now turn to an assessment of representative cases used by Bonnie and Slobogin to
enhance the validity of their analyses and proposals.

C.

The Cases

In this section, I shall examine the exemplary cases that Bonnie
and Slobogin provide from the comparative perspectives of their
proposals and mine. In the course of this analysis, I shall consider
the theoretical and scientific validity of the various expert tools
that Bonnie and Slobogin use. I hope to demonstrate that the
Crazy Behavior system is fairer and more valid.

1.

Mr. G. and the Usefulness of Diagnosis

Only a full and textured description of the defendant's behavior
provides the factfinder with the information necessary to answer
proper criminal law questions. A reliable diagnosis does not provide such a description. 236 If one is given a diagnosis, one presumably has a disorder. The criminal justice system really wants to
know, however, how the defendant behaved at the time of the alleged offense -what the actor was thinking and feeling, and how
much control he or she had over the behavior. Although the behavioral data that meet the criteria for a diagnosis may help answer
these questions, the diagnosis itself conveys little additional infor-

Psychiatric Opinion Testimony: A Critique of Federal Rule of Evidence 703, 51 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 129 (1977). There is no indication, other than bald assertion, that mental health professionals can evaluate the accuracy of their informants' observations. The distortions that
inevitably occur when an expert bases his or her conclusions on the unverified behavioral
observations of others may be acceptable in clinical practice, but they are not acceptable for
the vitally important function of determining guilt and punishment.
238
See supra notes 210-14 and accompanying text. Bonnie and Slobogin recognize that
the question of mental disease or disorder is neither crucial nor necessary to criminal justice
decisionmaking, Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 8, at 466-73, but I believe that they do not
confront fully the implications of this recognition.
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mation about cognitive, emotional, or control processes. It does not
give the factfinder a "feel" for how abnormal the defendant was or
how much he or she was suffering. Nor does it provide the judge or
jury with a three-dimensional portrait of the defendant that will
permit the judge or jury to make their difficult and important legal
and social decisions.
Bonnie and Slobogin claim that " [e ]xpert opinions about the
comparative severity of behavioral dysfunction often rely upon diagnostic con cepts." 237 With all due respect, they have it backwards.
Modern diagnosis begins with signs and symptoms (i.e. behaviors)
and attempts to determine into which category the behaviors best
fit. Some diagnoses are considered more severe than others precisely because their behavioral criteria are more severe and crazy.
Even if the expert presents the definitional, behavioral criteria
that led to a reliable DSM-III diagnosis, a full portrait of the severity of the defendant's abnormality will not be conveyed unless
the expert also reports the fullest description of all the defendant's
behavior, including the normal aspects. 238 In determining whether
the actor is sufficiently crazy to meet the test of legal abnormality,
what Bonnie and Slobogin dismissingly refer to as "a bare description of symptoms" 239 represents most of the data that there are.
Nor, in the absence of hard data linking a diagnosis to other legally
relevant information, can a diagnosis provide any further information on a person's other psychological functioning or behavior. 240 If

Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 8, at 468.
Although the multiaxial approach of DSM-III, supra note 131, also includes assessment Axis V, which is used to assess the patient's highest level of adaptive functioning
during the last year, this Axis is not necessarily related to the patient's diagnosis; instead it
relies on behavioral assessment.
239
Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 8, at 469.
2 40
As discussed supra note 214, if hard data link (or do not link) a reliable diagnosis to
other law-related behavioral consequences, say, some types of antisocial behavior, that diagnosis may appear useful. See, e.g., Monahan & Steadman, Crime and Mental Disorder: An
Epidemi ological Approach (1982) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Virginia Law
Review Association) (no relationship between crime and particular disorders); Special Report, The Nature of Aggression During Epileptic Seizures, 305 New Eng. J. Med. 711, 715
(1981) (directed aggression during seizures extremely rare and it is nearly impossible to
commit murder or manslaughter during random and unsustained psychomotor attacks).
Even th en, however, the diagnostic term is not necessary. The expert can convey the same
data in the following form: X % of persons who, like this defendant, behave in ways A, B, C
(where A, B, and C are the criteria for schizophrenia), also engage in aggravated assaultive
behavior, whereas only the lesser percentage, Q, of normal persons also engage in such
behavior.
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the court is concerned with the defendant's state of mind, a rich,
factual description of the defendant's delusions is relevant and
useful; the bare conclusion that the defendant was schizophrenic is
not.
To prove that diagnosis itself is legally relevant, Bonnie and
Slobogin relate the case of !vir. G, a twenty-five-year-old charged
with capital murder for the rape and murder of a seventeen-yearold woman and the subsequent murder of the young woman's
mother. 241 Mr. G's history, as narrated by Bonnie and Slobogin, 242
is a sad one: his mother abused him; his father died when Mr. G
was two; his stepfather, to whom he was particularly close, died
when Mr. G was ten; Mr. G had alcohol, drug, and school problems
during adolescence; he was isolated and lacked close friends; and,
during his late adolescence, Mr. G observed the promiscuous behavior and alcohol and drug abuse of his mother and sister (Mr.
G's mother denied her promiscuity and the abuse of intoxicants by
her and the sister). 243 Although the tale is told in terms of conclusions, and almost nothing of the positive aspects of Mr. G's life is
related-for example, the relationship between Mr. G and his stepfather-it is admittedly an awful life.
To determine the degree to which Mr. G was abnormal, Bonnie
and Slobogin provide information about Mr. G's present psychological functioning. During his clinic interview, Mr. G "appeared
extremely depressed and demonstrated considerable anxiety." 244
Based on this information, no mental health professional would
have an idea, except in the vaguest way, of how Mr. G appeared. A
description in raw behavioral detail of how he behaved would be
much more illuminating and helpful than these conclusions. Anxiety and depression are common affects that laypersons with the
relevant behavioral information can assess. 2411 The case study tells

Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 8, at 469.
How one telis the tale is of course heavily influenced, wittingly or unwittingly, by one's
preconceptions, biases and purposes in telling it. This is true for therapists, see Rosenhan,
On Being Sane in Insane Places, 179 Sci. 250, 253 (1973); sources cited supra note 146-47,
and we can be certain it is true for criminal justice observers. Surely the case history could
be presented to make Mr. G appear far more "normal."
243
Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 8, at 469.
2« Id .
2
See, e.g., Rippere, How Depressing: Another Cognitive Dimension of Commonsense
"
Knowledge, 19 Behav. Research & Therapy 169 (1981); Rippere, Predicting Frequency, Intensity and Duration of Other People's Self-Reported Depression, 18 Behav. Research &
241

242
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u.s that IVh. G demonstrated an "unsophisticated and almost childliken thought process, 246 but it does not report what the criteria for
this conclusion were. We do not know whether 1\;Ir. G was compared to tv-Jenty- five-year-old males of his socioeconomic status, intellig;_::;nce, and education, nor do we knmv \Vhat scientific, expert
crit'2ria INBTe used to reach these completely unhelpful conclusions.
BcmLko; ::-u1d Slobogin report that Mr. G had pervasive repressed
hostility t oward his rnother and sister, but that he also consciously
c:-Jnsldeted thern "junkies" and "sluts." 247 Was the hostility so re1-"., ·1-·lie
. t.1c +h
fHessecJ:
case stu d y reports tna~.,+ n~1. r. G~ 'na d " auhs
. , ough t
p:rocc:.:sses," 248 but we do not know what this means. Again, instead
of using a conclusory "scare" label - autistic - the report should
describe Mr. G's thought processes in detail and let the factfinder
decide how normal ~Ar. G's thinking was. If there are studies relevant to persons like Mr. G that provide statistically normative data
about cognitive processes, the factfinder should by all means have
this data as well. Bonnie and Slobogin also relate that fv1r. G was
able to communicate in a "normal" fashion and that he had supported himself for several years with no apparent problems. 249 One
would like to hear much more about Mr. G: how did he get along
with co--workers, did he date, did he have any friends, what was the
nature of his friendships, and so forth. Any factfinder who possesses all the data upon which Bonnie and Slobogin based their
conclusory opinions, plus all the additional data that I would require, would be fully able to decide whether the defendant was sufficiently crazy to meet the legal threshold for an insanity defense.
Not only do Bonnie and Slobogin provide unhelpful conclusions
1

1

:J

J
l

The rapy 259 (1980); Rippere, Commonsense Beliefs About Depression and Antidepressive
Behaviour: A Study of Social Consensus, 15 Behav. Research & Therapy 465 (1977). Cf.
Sarbin, Anxiety: Reification of a Metaphor, 10 Archives Gen. Psychiatry 630 (1964) (denying the validity of the construct).
One might object that this assertion does not account for cases of so-called "smiling" or
"masked" depression, where the person is allegedly depressed but shows none of the usual
outward signs of this affective state. If this is a valid diagnostic category, then experts can
present the behavioral detail and linking data that lead them to conclude that a person is
depressed, even though the person does not appear to be. If the category is speculative,
however, the expert should not infer for the factfinder that a person feels blue (or whatever)
contrary to his or her appearance. The category does not exist in DSM-III, supra note 131.
246
Bonn ie & Slobogin, supra note 8, at 469-70.
·m Id.
248
Id. at 470.
z•• Id.
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about Mr. G's psychological functioning, they also insist on diagnosing Mr. G in an attempt to "aid" the factfinder. The diagnosis
they offer, however, like their behavioral conclusions, is of dubious
reliability and assistance. Bonnie and Slobogin claim that Ivir. G's
"early emotional isolation and unresponsiveness to others, his pervasive but repressed hostility toward his mother and sister, an d his
autistic thought processes were indicative of a severe 'schizoid personality disorder.' " 2 ti 0 They allege that Mr. G's "behavioral rnanifestations met the accepted criteria for the diagnosis [of schizoid
personality disorder]. " 2111 This diagnosis is questionable for several
reasons. First, J\!Ir. G's childhood functioning is not a criterion for
the present diagnosis of "schizoid personality disorder. n Although
a childhood schizoid personality may predispose to the adult trait,
there are data indicating otherwise. 252 The issue is whether Tvlr. G
is still isolated and unresponsive. We know he was able to support
himself financially, and that he saw women socially. Second, as we
have seen, his hostility was hardly repressed, and there are simply
no data to support the conclusion that at present he demonstrates
abnormally autistic thought processes. More importantly, Bonnie
and Slobogin have labeled Mr. G with a now-abandoned diagnosis
from DSM-II which is extraordinarily vague, highly unreliable, and
of unknown validity. 253 Arguably, too, lV1r. G's diagnosticians have

Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
202
LaVietes, Schizoid Disorder, in 3 CTP-III, supra note 1, at 2613, 2614-15.
203
Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 8, at 470 n.35. The vagueness of the diagnosis can he
confirmed simp,ly by examining it:
This behavior pattern manifests shyness, oversensitivity, seclusiveness, avoidance of
close or competitive relationships, and often eccentricity. Autistic thinking wit hout
loss of capacity to recognize reality is common, as are daydreaming and the inability
to express hostility and ordinary aggressive feelings. These patients react to disturbing experiences and conflicts with apparent detachment.
DSM-II, supra note 210, at 42. It takes no sophistication in mental health science to recognize that these completely unquantified criteria are so broad and vague that persons who
display extraordinarily disparate kinds of behavior might easily be so classified . Of course,
the unacceptably weak reliability and unknown validity of DSM -II diagnoses-which had
been developed by professional consensus and without regard to hard scientific data--were
the major reasons that DSM-II was abandoned in favor of DSM-IIL For eBmple, the average reliability coefficient for personality disorders was found to be only .32 in a re-tmalyBis
of major reliability studies. Spitzer & Fleiss, A Re-analysis of the Reliability of Psychiatric
Diagnosis, 125 Brit. J. Psychiatry 341, 344 (1974). Robert Spitzer, the primary author of
DSM-III, recently noted that "it is gilding the lily to refer to the general six sentence DS!\<1II description of schizophrenia 1~s criteria. To do so is to obscure the most important ad 200
201
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missed the clearly correct diagnosis. As early as 1917, similar cases
were noted and classified as "cyclonic brainstorms." 2 ~ Alternatively, according to DSM-111, it may not be clear that Mr. G has
any disorder at all. ~~
Even if Mr. G is given a reliable DSM-111 diagnosis, it is of little
assistance to t he factfinder. Although Bonnie and Slobogin properly note that it is necessary for experts to present the underlying
data and reasoning upon which they base their diagnosis, they present us here with almost pure conclusions. They tell us that Mr. G
was not psychotic, ~ but that he may have been "bordering on
that condition." ~ Why? We do not know the criterion for the conclusion, or whether all schizoids border on psychosis, or how many
ultimately cross the line, or whether elements of psychosis appear
before the line is crossed. In any case, the use of a diagnosis to
present such data, even if they exist, is quite unnecessary and perhaps misleading and prejudicial. 2 ~ 8 Finally, Bonnie and Slobogin
note that Mr. G was not an "average" schizoid personality and that
his condition was severe. ~ But what are the criteria for these assertions about severity, and are they reliable and valid? 260
Bonnie and Slobogin claim that conclusions about severity, possible proximity to psychosis, and nonaverageness "could place into
4

2

2

2

6

7

2

9

vance in nosologic research that occurred in the 1970's . . . : the specified inclusion and
exclusi on criteria for making a psychiatric diagnosis." Spitzer, In Reply, 38 Archives Gen.
Psychiatry 1229 (1981) . This point surely applies even more strongly to the description of
" schizoid personality" in DSM-II. Thus, the claim that a person's behavior met the "accepted" criteria for the DSM-II category of "schizoid personality disorder" is virtually
meaningless.
264
Rern ondino, Cyclonic Brain Storms: Their Entity and Character and their Relations to
Legal Medicine, 34 Medico-Legal J. 1 (1917) (attributing the brainstorms to an oversupply
of blood in the brain and recommending bleeding as a possible remedy).
200
The major contenders would be "schizoid personality disorder," DSM-III, supra note
131, at 309-11 , and " avoidant personality disorder," id. at 323-24. The critical category for
differential diagnosis would be "schizotypal personality disorder," id. at 312-13. Another
possibility is "isolated explosive disorder," id. at 297-98. I shall leave it to my more intrepid
colleagues to conclude where in the diagnostic shell game Mr. G's pea may be found. Comparative inspection of the four categories listed above and Mr. G's case history should convince the reader , however, that guessing the correct location of the pea, if it is under any of
the shells at all, will not be easy.
206
Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 8, at 470.
zo1 Id.
zos See supra notes 214, 240.
2 09
Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 8, at 470-71.
260
As far as I know, such validated criteria do not exist.
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better perspective the type of disorder from which Mr. G suffered.
This diagnostic description helps the factfinder to assess the relative severity of Mr. G's mental condition, facilitating a more informed decision on the 'mental disease or defect' question." 281 I
disagree. These conclusions offer little in ad d ition to the
factfinder's knowledge of the defendant's raw behavior. Conclusory
labels do not help the factfinder to judge the nature or severity of
a "condition" when the labels and conclusions are diagnosed on
the basis of behavioral criteria. A factfinder in full possession of
the raw behavioral data will be capable of drawing conclusions for
legal purposes about the nature and severity of the defendant's abnormality. Moreover, why should the "type of disorder" a de fendant suffers from be an important issue? The difficulty in diagnosing Mr. G strongly confirms my thesis. Whether Mr. G's behavior
fits a diagnostic category or falls between the diagnostic cracks is
not the legal point. The relevant legal questions are whether the
defendant is so crazy, and whether the craziness is so related to the
criminal behavior, that the usual rules of criminal responsibility
perhaps should not apply. The factfinder can judge this without
conclusory help from the experts. 262
Assume, for example, that there are personalities marked by the
traits of shyness, over-sensitivity, and seclusiveness, and that these
traits can be assessed reliably. For some persons, these characteristics may be mild or simply considered their "personality." For
others, these traits may be so intense that one feels that there is
something wrong. But one does not need an expert to decide when
personality traits stop being normal, or even quirky, and begin to
appear crazy. Even within the abnormal range, as either experts or
laypersons define it, there will a continuum of abnormality or severity that laypersons can assess with sufficient data. If there are
distributions describing the frequency of schizoid behaviors, experts can present them without a diagnosis. If the threshold question is simply one of craziness or abnormality vel non, for legal
purposes laypersons and experts alike can assess the defendant on
the basis of the behavior.

Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 8, at 471.
Bonnie and Slobogin recognize that mental disorder is not the issue. See id. at 510.
But even if one is playing the game by irrational rules, the information as presented is not
helpful.
261

262
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Not content with using a diagnostic label to assist the determination of normality, Bonnie and Slobogin also essay a psychodynamic formulation to explain Mr. G's behavior. 263 They "explain"
that severe schizoids can confuse fantasy and reality. Mr. G had
known his victims for some time and considered them sluts. He
therefore identified them with his hated mother and sister and
projected his hatred and disgust for his mother and sister onto the
victims. At the time of the killing, the daughter-victim h ad just
rejected intercourse with Mr. G after previously encouraging his
sexual advances. Presumably enraged by the rejection, this severe
schizoid acted as some schizoids (and many nonschizoids, I might
add) do - by acting out his repressed hostility impulsively and
antisocially in a highly symbolic and regressive manner. In short,
to take revenge against his mother and sister, Mr. G unconsciously
perceived his victims as surrogates and killed them after they
(once again, symbolically as well as realistically) mistreated and
disappointed him. 264
Let us examine this diagnostic formulation and its relationship
to Mr. G's criminal responsibility. Bonnie and Slobogin do not
claim that Mr. G was unaware of what he was doing or was unable
to form the intent to kill. Indeed, the killing of the mother appears
to be a classic, premeditated, intentional homicide. 286 The claim
must be that Mr. G was substantially less able than the average
person - to a legally and morally relevant degree - to control his
behavior. But no scientific or normative theory linking alleged psychological causes to responsibility is provided. Attempts to do so
using psychodynamic formulations are unsuccessful. 266 Moreover,
the scientific validity and usefulness of the diagnostic information
is questionable, and the diagnosis was not necessary to construct
the dynamic explanation of the case. 267 Assuming arguendo the va-

263
It is not clear why an explanation was necessary, but I assume it was for purposes of
sentencing.
264
Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 8, at 472.
26 6
Even in a jurisdiction such as California that requires considerable forethought, see,
e.g., People v. Anderson, 70 Cal. 2d 15, 447 P.2d 942, 73 Cal. Rptr. 550 (1968), the killing of
the mother can be no less than a second degree murder.
266
See supra notes 151-86 and accompanying text.
26 7
Dynamicists construct a formulation on the basis of inferences fr om general clinicalbehavi oral assessment, and rarely, if ever, do they use classical disease-entity diagnoses to
a id their dynamic work. Cf. Goldsmith & Mandell, The Dynamic Formulation-A Critique
of a Psychiatric Ritual , 125 Am. J . Psychiatry 1738, 17 40-42 ( 1969) (criticizing usefulness
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lidity of a dynamic explanation, a separate diagnosis will not be of
further use to the factfinder.
To bolster their contention that a diagnosis is useful in determining criminal responsibility, Bonnie and Slobogin offer the
"finding" of a study that concluded that persons with schizoid
traits may be overrepresented among sudden murderers. 268 Use of
this study furnishes a good example, however, of how lack of scientific rigor in expert testimony can waste time and lead fac tfinder s
astray. The study is so flawed that little if anything can be rel iably
concluded from it, 269 especially because its findings, as the investigators admit, are not consistent with those of other investigations.270 Moreover, even if by chance the study's findings happened
to be valid - and it would be by chance - its findings do not
seem to apply to Mr. G. The study did not find that schizoids were
overrepresented among sudden murderers; instead, it concluded
only that sudden murderers had certain schizoid personality traits.
The study noted that sudden murderers also had other non-schizoid personality traits, and that personal isolation was common
among the controls as well. Furthermore, the background characteristics of the sudden murderers were unlike those of Mr. G. Finally, it is not at all clear that Mr. G's adult personality traits

and scientific validity of psychodynamic formulations and demonstrating that they are not
good predictors of correct diagnosis). Moreover, dynamic explanations were the basis for
many DSM-II categories, so there is a large risk of tautology, as Bonnie & Slobogin rightly
recognize, in moving from dynamics to diagnosis and back again. Bonnie & Slobogin, supra
note 8, at 473.
268
Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 8, at 472 n.l39 (citing Weiss, Lamberti & Blackman,
The Sudden Murderer: A Comparative Analysis, 2 Archives Gen. Psychiatry 669 (1960)).
269
The study is methodologically well-meaning, but nonetheless poor. The sample size is
tiny and there are insufficient controls. Extensive data were collected, but in an unstru ctured and unreliable fashion. Weiss, Lamberti & Blackman, supra note 268, at 669. Further,
the investigators were not, and perhaps could not be, blind to the subject's status as an
experimental or control subject. The investigators created assessment categories aft er the
data were collected, and they do not report either the categories or the criteria for them. Id .
at 670. Although the categories were quantified, placement of the data on the quantitative
scales was done by consensus of the investigators rather than independently (thus, it is
impossible to obtain and report reliability coefficients) . ld. Finally, the study reports that
there are significant differences between the experimental and control groups, but there is
no statistical treatment of the data whatsoever. Id. at 672-75. The investigators recognize
some of the flaws in their study, but blithely conclude that "spot checks" [of the data]
"indicate" that most of the flaws probably do not undermine their findings. Id. at 675. This
apologia is "nonsense," however.
270
Id. at 676.
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matched those of the study's sample of sudden murderers. This
study is unfortunately representative of the type of weak and unhelpful scientific data that experts often rely on, but it does not
advance the understanding of Mr. G, or the understanding of "sudden murderers. " It would be of no assistance to criminal justice
decisionmaking. 271
Now let us consider the proper and efficient use of expertise in
the case of Mr. G. On the questions of normalit y and responsibility, one simply wants as much information as possible about the
defendant's behavior his thoughts, feelings, and actions.
Laypersons, such as family, friends, and co-workers, can provide
this information, and skilled mental health clinicians can also efficiently gather and present the necessary behavioral data. 272 Armed
with this data, the factfinder or sentencing judge can decide the
legal/moral question of whether the defendant's abnormality and
lack of rationality or self-control are sufficient to warrant the consideration of an insanity defense or sentencing mitigation. Diagnostic and other conclusory labels for behavior - for example "autistic," "childlike," and "severe"
add nothing to the
fundamental assessment of behavior that the factfinder or sentencing judge must make. Moreover, using diagnostic labels and other
conclusions prejudices decisionmaking about responsiblity by in-

271

Another example of the use of weak and unhelpful science that Bonnie and Slobogin
provide is the discussion of the Ibn-Tamas case, in which a beaten wife killed her husband
and was charged with murder. Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 8, at 482-84. "Scientific evidence" about battered women was adduced to cast doubt on the defendant's culpability.
But the evidence used was based on "findings," which the investigator herself admits were
obtained in an unscientific and nonrigorous fashion. L. Walker, The Battered Woman xiii
(1979). Unless subjects are randomly selected and there are controls in such a study, it is by
no means certain that one's findings are representative of or unique to battered women.
Moreover, it would be useful to know what percentage of battered women kill. In any case, I
submit, and one court has agreed, that the "findings" are matters of common sense and lay
assessment. State v. Thomas, 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 423 N.E.2d 137 (1981) . If a defendant who
has been battered kills her lover because she actually, psychologically perceives the situation
as presenting her with no alternative but to kill, perhaps a defense should be allowed on
that basis. But the defense should not be based on pseudo-science that obscures more than
it answers. If self-defense is raised, for example, inaccurate data may obscure a necessary
assessment of what the reasonable woman would have done under the circumstances. If
society wishes to abandon an objective test for self-defense in such situations, it should do
so openly. For an attempt to balance the issue, see generally Note, Partially Determined
Imperfect Self-Defense: The Battered Wife Kills and T ells Why, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 615
(1982 ).
27 2
Morse, supra note 2, at 611-12.
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jecting all the unproven speculations about lack of control or disease processes that are inherent in psychiatric language. The question is whether crazy behavior is the cause of, or sufficiently
related to, other behavior, and this question can be answered by
any person with sufficient behavioral data about the defendant.
For legal purposes, a label conveys nothing more than the behavior
itself conveys, and it may convey far less by misleading the
factfinder. 273
Rather than demonstrating the need for expert diagnosis, conclusory labels, and psychodynamic formulations, the case of Mr. G
establishes that laypersons, armed with sufficient information,
could assess Mr. G's responsibility for the dual homicide he committed. First, Mr. G was clearly not crazy and was perfectly aware
of what he was doing. No one knows whether Mr. G could have
avoided killing the victims. All that is really known about the
crimes is that Mr. G allowed the irrational anger that was so violently aroused by the first victim's provocative but rejecting behavior to get the best of him. Further explanations are sheer speculation. 274 The most one can do in assessing responsibility is to form a

273

Sometimes, however, hard data relevant to an actor's behavioral choice exist. In such
cases, the factfinder should certainly have such data to help understand the actor's choice.
Suppose, for instance, that the study of "sudden murderers" criticized above, see supra note
269, was methodologically sound and applicable to Mr. G. If the study had been properly
done, it might have shown that there are significantly more schizoids among sudden murderers than among the population in general or than among other classes of criminals. The
study might be useful because it would tend to show that being schizoid is somewhat predisposing to sudden murder. Of course, to have a full picture of how predisposing being schizoid is, one would also want to know how many schizoids are sudden murderers. The answer,
probably, is only the tiniest fraction . Wolff & Chick, Schizoid Personality in Childhood: A
Controlled Follow-Up Study, 10 Psychological Med. 85, 93-94 (1980). Thus, even if almost
all sudden murderers were schizoids, being schizoid would be only slightly predisposing to
sudden murder. Nevertheless, there is something about being schizoid-presumably a condition beyond the actor's control-that increases the probability slightly that one will suddenly murder, and a jury should know this. With this information - which can be provided
without using the label "schizoid," and all the behavioral observations that can be mustered,
the factfinder or sentencing judge can decide if Mr. G's desire to murder was too hard to be
resisted .
274
Mr. G had no "good" motive for killing either the daughter or the mother, but it takes
little psychological sophistication to understand that, as a result of his childhood experiences, he may have developed a high degree of irrational anger and resentment toward
women, especially women who reminded him in some way of his sister or mother. Furthermore, this explanation - if an explanation is needed at all in the case of a person who
appears not to meet even the threshold level of abnormality - is easily within the domain
of laypersons who are armed simply with the behavioral data of Mr. G's life and the events
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commonsense judgment on the basis of Nlr. G's past behavior. Did
he have a history of attacking women, even nonmurderously, in response to rejecting behavior? Perhaps I\1r. G can generate a history
of control problems in response to certain stimuli that might lead
to the legal/moral conclusion that he is less responsible than most
murderers because it is too hard for him to control himself in response to rejecting, "slutty" women. If so, the judge or jury may
have some basis for reaching the nonscientific conclusion that perhaps lVlr. G is not fully responsible and should be punished less.
But, if the dual murder was an isolated incident, as it appears to
have been in this case, then the problem of responsibility assessment is even harder. It is of course possible that previously controllable impulses finally overwhelmed Mr. G at the time of the
murders, but it is more probable that he simply did not exert the
self-control of which he was capable. This, too, the judge can decide in light of Mr. G's history and his description of his behavior
at the time of the killings.
As any sensible layperson would have concluded, Mr. G was
found insufficiently insane to raise the insanity defense. Despite
his horrible childhood and adult resentments, and the sympathy
one may therefore have for him, Mr. G clearly operated according
to the usual behavioral assumptions and rules. He was not crazy or
out of touch with reality, and he was capable, within reasonable
limits, of unexceptional, normal behavior. By trying to give Mr. G
a diagnosis in addition to describing his behavior, one only runs
the risk of obfuscating the crucial normality and control issues by
confounding them with disease-talk. Decisionmaking according to
the Crazy Behavior proposals would use more scientifically honest
information and would be more fair than decisionmaking according
to the Bonnie and Slobogin scheme.

in questi on. A sophisticated critic might object, however, that this "lay" explanation is nothing more than description. Such a criticism would be apt but unavailing for the proponent
of dynamic "explanations." After all, dynamic formulations are also mere descriptions buttressed by the alleged presence of unobservable quasi-mechanical forces or unvalidated unconscious motivations. See generally Rubinstein, Explanation and Me;-e Description: A
Metasci entific Examination of Certain Aspects of the Psychoanalytic Theory of Motivation,
in Motives and Thought: Psychoanalytic Essays in Honor of David Rapaport 20 (R. Holt ed.
1967) .
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lvfs. B and lvlens Rea

2.

The substantive criteria for almost all crimes include a conscious
mental element, the mens rea of the offense, such as intent, purpose, knowledge, or advertence to risk (recklessness). Basic considerations of fairness, as well as the federal constitution, require t hat
the law permit criminal defendants to present any evidence, including truly ('expert" mental health testimonyJ that bears on
whether the defendant had the requisite mental state. Ben nie and
Slobogin correctly note that the prosecution is able to rely on commonsense inferences about behavior to convince a factfinder tf.ta.t
this mental state was present at t he time of the offense. 27 e After
all, a claim of no mens rea is often counterintuitive in light of t he
defendant's observable behavior. In effect, then, the burden of
proving the absence of a mens rea shifts to the defendant. Consequently, the law should give a defendant every reasonable opportunity to cast doubt on whether the necessary mens rea was present.
Once again, the flaw in the Bonnie and Slobogin analysis lies in its
failure to note t he scientific limits of the expert testimony used to
disprove the presence of mens rea.
Even severe mental disorders rarely interfere with a defendant's
ability to form a mens rea, as Bonnie and Slobogin properly recognize.276 In the few cases where a disorder would so interfere, the
disorder generally will be sufficiently extreme to justify an insanity
defense. 277 In brief, a mental disorder will only prevent the forma-

Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 8, at 446 n.52, 477.
Id. at 448.
277
A rare example is People v. Wetmore, 22 Cal. 3d 318, 583 P.2d 1308, 149 Cal. Rptr. 265
(1978). Wetmore was charged with burglary but claimed that he delusionally believed he
was in his own apartment with his own possessions and therefore had no intent to steal. If
Wetmore is believed, he lacked the mens rea for burglary or even for simple breaking and
entering, and he would clearly he not guilty under any insanity defense test. Generally,
however, even the most insane defendants will have the requisite mens rea, but they will
typically be motivated by crazy reasons . Thus a person who plans and executes a killing
because he believes the devil has told him to do so meets the technical requirements for first
degree murder, but is also legally insane .
Until recently in California, however, many murder defendants who were not legally insane could show that they lacked "malice aforethought," see, e.g., People v. Conley, 64 Cal.
2d 310, 411 P.2d 911, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1966), or premeditation, see, e.g., People v. Wolff,
61 Cal. 2d 795, 394 P.2d 959, 40 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1964). These seeming exceptions to the
statement in the text were the result of highly creative and dubious interpretations of the
elements of murder by the California Supreme Court. In effect, that court "legislated" a
mini-insanity defense as part of the elements of premeditation and murder. Consequently, a
m

276
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t ion of a mens rea if it renders the defendant incapable of knowing
what he or she is doing, and such defendants are legally insane
according to any insanity test. One may rightfully wonder why
the~:e is any dispute about the role of mental health experts in
me ns rea determinations if it appears that in almost no instance
will mental disorder negate mens rea. But if one abandons one's
reliance on disease or disorder concepts, and instead simply considers behavioral observations unencumbered by theoretical baggage, the problem - if not the resolution - becomes clear.
Determining t he existence of mental states from behavioral observations can sometimes be exceedingly difficult. Most persons
can remember times when they probably appeared to others to be
acting intentionally, or with knowledge of the circumstances, but
th ey were, to state it commonsensically, in <'another world." For
sorne reason they did not notice the circumstances, or made a silly
or even unbelievable error in perception. For instance, people commonly will drive their cars quite competently without noticing for
some length of time where they are going. They are on "automatic
pilot," so to speak: at some level they are able to take account of
the circumstances, but they are not consciously aware of where
they are or how they are driving. To others, however, they may
appear quite attentive to their driving. To take another example, a
person may walk out of a bar or restaurant, whether or not drunk,
and forget to pay the bill. It is perfectly conceivable, especially to
the many people who have done this, that the patron simply forgot
t o pay rather than intentionally failed to pay. Despite the common
inference others might draw from observing such behavior, the
mens rea of intent or even of recklessness may be lacking. This
type of situation may arise in the criminal law context, so there is
reason to consider how such behavior occurs and how it may properly be proven.
There is a wide variety of explanations for slips, lapses of attention, and other behaviors that may be inconsistent with a mens
rea, but the two leading contenders are psychodynamic psychology
and cognitive/information processing models. The former claims,
following Freud's classic exposition in The Psychopathology of

defendant whose behavior met the traditional elements of murder might be found guilty
only of manslaughter. See Morse, supra note 189, at 279-82. These cases have now been
" legislatively overruled" in California. See Cal. P enal Code §§ 188-189 (West Supp. 1982).

J
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Everyday Life, 278 that such behaviors covertly express unaccept-

able wishes and the defenses against them. In contrast, cognitive/
information processing models liken the mind to an imperfect information gathering and processing system: it takes in and sorts
correctly a great deal of data, but it also misses, misprocesses or
incorrectly "outputs" a substantial amount of data. 279 It is bootless
to argue which model is correct, because at present there is no de finitive resolution: dynamicists can construct very compelling stories in individual cases, but the more controlled empirical evidence
favors the cognitivists. There is no disagreement, however, about
the existence of the phenomenon. The issue is how to resolve legal
cases that involve such behavior.
Bonnie and Slobogin provide the case of Ms. B to examine the
issue of the proper assessment of a counterintuitive claim that a
particular defendant lacks mens rea, and they attempt to demonstrate that a psychodynamic explanation is a fine tool to aid the
factfinder's decision. Ms. B was charged with knowingly possessing
nine stolen welfare checks. 280 The conditions under which she possessed them would have raised the suspicions of almost any conscious, sentient person, and thus a prosecutor might successfully
rely on the intuitively obvious inference that Ms. B knew the
checks were stolen. Ms. B claimed, however, that she did not know
the checks were stolen because she received them from a close
friend of her boyfriend, who told her they were rightfully his. 281 If
Ms. B truly believed her boyfriend's friend, she is innocent even if
she is unusually credulous.
Bonnie and Slobogin try to explain and support Ms. B's credulity with a psychodynamic tale. Ms. B is a highly passive and dependent person who will go to great lengths to please and avoid
conflicts with people to whom she is emotionally attached. In the
situation at hand, she strongly desired to please her boyfriend and
thus wanted to please his good friend. This desire to please, however, conflicted with the obvious suspiciousness of the welfare
checks. To resolve this conflict, she unconsciously used certain defense mechanisms characteristic of passive, dependent persons -

278
279
280
281

6 Standard Edition (1901).
See references cited supra note 122.
Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 8, at 477.
I d. at 478.
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namely, denial and repression - to keep from her conscious
awareness the illegal character of what she was doing. 282 Bonnie
and Slobogin recognize that Ms. B does not suffer from a serious
mental disorder, but they argue that such a disorder should not be
required. They argue that because mental health experts have special scientific knowledge of general personality functioning, the law
should permit them to offer formulations like the one offered in
the case of t.1s. B. They claim that such evidence is scientifically
respectable and bears directly and probatively on the credibility of
Ms. B's claim of no mens rea. 283
It is possible that Ms. B is telling the truth and therefore lacked
the requisite mens rea, but there are far more convincing and less
scientifically dubious ways of supporting her claim. Bonnie and
Slobogin rely on an empirical assumption when they claim that
Ms. B may have been "denying" and "repressing" the suspicious
character of the checks: such defenses are assumed to be "characteristic" of people with her personality traits. We do not know the
data source for this assumption, nor do we know whether there are
studies relevant to Ms. B's case that reliably link particular defenses to particular personality types. Perhaps the assumption is
based largely on clinical wisdom. But if studies do exist, the
factfinder should know the probability that a particular character
type exhibits particular defenses, and under what conditions and
to what degree (although such studies show only the probability of
certain behavior within a class of persons that arguably includes
Ms. B). In the absence of such studies, the law should not permit
experts to offer conclusions based on unproven speculation or
"clinical wisdom," especially where, as here, the factfinder can
draw its own inferences from the observational data. 284
If one is permitted to speculate, as Bonnie and Slobogin will
surely allow, a more parsimonious and damning explanation may
be available for Ms. B's personality and behavior in the case at
hand: Ms. B detests conflict with her boyfriend, and to avoid it in
this situation she simply decided to overcome her reluctance to act
illegally. Although acting illegally may have provoked anxiety,
there is no evidence that the anxiety was so intense that she had to

282
283
284

Id. at 478-79.
I d. at 479-80.
See infra notes 287-90 and accompanying text.
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deal with it entirely unconsciously. She may have simply employed
a number of other defenses, such as various forms of rationalization,28:5 to justify her wrongful acts. For instance, she may have
told herself that the friend needed the money and that the government would replace the lost checks anyway, so no one would be
hurt. Indeed, she may have employed no defenses: rather, t he desire to please her boyfriend may have simply overwhelmed any
anxiety she felt about wrongful possession, and she may have
knowingly decided to proceed with the illegal behavior. 288 Suppose
the prosecution offered this parsimonious theory and then buttressed it with the testimony of a mental health expert. There
would be no sensible way for the factfinder to resolve this conflict
of theories without additional information. Clearly it would be
more desirable to provide additional data to the factfinder without
theoretical explanations, and allow him or her to reach his or her
own conclusions about the defendant's mens rea.
The additional data necessary for the factfinder is simply behavioral observation. Although the debate about the comparative validity of situational and personality-trait explanations of human
behavior continues, 287 it seems probable that characteristic personality styles do exist. 288 Neither the mental health expert nor lay
witness needs any "scientific" explanation to assert plausibly that
observations indicate that Ms. B is characteristically a "denier and

See J. La Planche & J. Pontalis, supra note 46, at 375.
A similar and more common example is the person who buys a wristwatch from a
street vendor, knowing full well that it is probably stolen.
287
See, e.g., Epstein, The Stability of Behavior: I. On Predicting Most of the People
Much of the Time, 37 J. Personality & Soc. Psychology 1097 (1979); Epstein, The Stability
of Behavior II. Implications for Psychological Research, 35 Am. Psychologist 790 (1980);
Eysenck & Eysenck, Mischel and the Concept of Personality, 71 Brit. J. Psychology 191
(1980); Mischel, On the Interface of Cognition and Personality: Beyond the Person-Situation Debate, 34 Am. Psychologist 740 (1979).
288
The Grant Study of Harvard men carried out over thirty years, for instance, has
demonstrated that characteristic styles can be identified reliably and are significantly linked
to other variables such as physical health and occupational and social functioning. The findings of this fascinating and important study are summarized in G. Vaillant, Adaptation to
Life (1977). Although this study used male subjects only, there is no reason to expect that
women lack characteristic personality styles, albeit, perhaps styles different from those exhibited by the Grant Study males. See Vaillant, Natural History of Male Psychological
Health V. The Relation of Choice of Ego Mechanisms of Defense to Adult Adjustment, 33
Archives Gen. Psychiatry 535 (1976); Vaillant, Theoretical Hierarchy of Adaptive Ego
Mechanisms: A 30-Year Follow-Up of 30 Men Selected for Psychological Health, 24
Archives Gen. Psychiatry 107 (1971).
280
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represser" under conditions of conflict with those persons she loves
or is dependent upon. 289 The expert should be able to demonstrate
the validity of the assertion with countless instances from Ms. B's
life and from a probing interview that "tests" her defenses. 290
From the examination, the expert ought to be able to describe to
the factfinder any "out of it" behavior observed when Iv1s. B confronted conflict about dependency. Finally, Ms. B's family members, close friends, and boyfriend ought to be able to testify about
all the occasions, presumably of conflict, when Ms. B seemed to
misperceive or failed to perceive the events around her. W ithout
such a background of similar behavior, Ms. B's claim is almost
completely implausible; with such a background, the claim is entirely plausible (although not necessarily true), and the factfinder
would be entitled to believe it.
Without behavioral substantiation, the Bonnie and Slobogin theory is not "informed speculation." Rather, it is a scientific fable
that unfairly prejudices the prosecution's case because it provides
the defendant with an "out" to which she is not entitled on scientific grounds. The law must set some limit to the degree of imprecision and scientific softness that it will allow in the evidence either side offers to support its claims. Moreover, if Ms. B has a
history of similar behavior, the theory is superfluous. The theoretical rationale does not change a whit the probability estimate based on Ms. B's prior history of misperception in conflictual circumstances - that she did not knowingly possess stolen checks.
The factfinder's final assessment ought to be based entirely on Ms.
B's behavioral history and on any existing hard data relevant to
persons like her.
My system may appear more costly in this case because it asks
for the collection and presentation of a great deal of behavioral
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This simply means that the person appears systematically to fail to perceive salient
aspects of the environment and his or her own behavior. According to dynamic theory, these
aspects of outer and personal reality create so much anxiety that the person unconsciously
prevents himself or herself from perceiving them.
290
"Testing the defenses" is an interviewing technique whereby the interviewer brings up
or points out to the subject just those stimuli or topics that seem to create anxiety and to
motivate the use of defenses. The purpose is to see how strong or rigid the defenses are, how
they operate, and the degree of anxiety or dysfunction the subject evidences if the interviewer's interventions penetrate the defenses. See, e.g., Kernberg, Goldstein, Carr, Hunt,
Bauer & Blumenthal, Diagnosing Borderline Personality-A Pilot Study Using Multiple Diagnostic Methods, 169 J . Nervous & Mental Disease 225, 226-27 (1981).
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data. On the other hand, it is probably no more costly than a system that engages experts to work out fully and then justify a coherent formulation. Offering a theoretical explanation without rich
behavioral substantiation is admittedly quicker and cheaper, but it
fails to provide evidence that would sensibly aid a factfinder. Presentation of behavioral evidence plus theory is more expensive and
less helpful.
3.

Mr. Z: Dynamic Explanations and Criminal Responsibility

Bonnie and Slobogin present the case of Mr. Z to illustrate how
mental health experts can help determine criminal responsibility.
From a clinical and legal standpoint, the case of Mr. Z is the most
interesting that they present because his criminal behavior is the
least comprehensible. 291 Nlr. Z was a twenty-three year old artist
who had attempted six rapes in six years. 292 According to Mr. Z,
before each attempt he felt a "powerful" though vague "impulse"
which he described as follows: "there was a feeling of real power
and hate and anger ... I was really excited sexually. You know, I
just felt ... there is a word, I can't think of it." 293 Mr. Z selected
his victims at random, and, after entering their houses through unlocked doors, he felt scared but "could not make himself leave."
During his assaults, he was "horrified" at what he was doing. He
never actually raped his victims because, he claimed, he was too
"scared and angry with myself." On two occasions, he apologized to
his victim after the assault. 294
Mr. Z was an articulate, intelligent person who gave no outward
signs of craziness, 296 but he admitted that for as long as he could

291

Professor Bonnie, the Director of the Institute of Law, Psychiatry and Public Policy,
graciously allowed me to read the full "Psychiatric Evaluation" of Mr. Z (approximately 12
single spaced pages) and to view selected portions of the videotapes of the evaluation interviews. In the notes that accompany my discussion of Mr. Z, I shall cite material from these
sources simply as Institute Evaluation.
292
Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 8, at 488.
293
Id. at 489 & n.l93.
29
• Id. at 489. During one of these two instances, Mr. Z bloodied the victim's nose when
she wouldn't stop kicking and during the other he accidentally cut the victim's finger. Mr. Z
would generally try to quiet his victims by threatening to kill them and by wielding a knife
(usually a "butter knife" according to Mr. Z). Institute Evaluation, supra note 291.
29
" Indeed, Mr. Z's behavior during the Institute's psychiatric evaluation, as seen in the
videotapes, was undeniably rational and normal. Moreover, he consistently showed and expressed appropriate affect, including evidently genuine remorse for his deeds.
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remember, he had had suicidal thoughts, hated himself, and felt
that he had little to offer to others. 296 He had friends, however,
and kept a journal, and from these sources the Virginia Clinic concluded that he isolated himself socially, neglected his work, and
had suffered long periods of depression. 297 On the basis of further
history, t he Clinic concluded that Mr. Z "suffered from chronic depression throughout his adolescent years and had developed abnormally low self-esteem." 298 This was due, the Clinic believed, to very
harsh treatment from his perfectionist, demanding father, who
would choke Mr. Z for trivial disciplinary infractions. Mr. Z v:;as
terrified by such incidents, and told of nightmares of his father's
face "exploding" due to some unexplained transgression on Mr. Z's
part. 299 Finally, the Clinic discovered that sexual relations between
Mr. Z's parents were exceedingly strained. Mr. Z's mother apparently abhorred sex, would consent to intercourse with his father
only rarely and unwillingly, and, when she did so, called the father
derogatory names. As a small boy, Mr. Z saw many of these incidents and was horrified by them. 300
Mr. Z clearly was not legally insane: the prosecution could easily
have proven the elements of attempted rape, and Mr. Z pled guilty
to several of the charges. The question in this case is whether,
under a sentencing scheme that allows for a reduction in sentence
based on mitigating factors, the law should consider Mr. Z less responsible and less culpable.
Bonnie and Slobogin claim, incorrectly, that under my system
only the selective, conclusory, and summary material presented
would be "available to the factfinder in reaching a conclusion
about Mr. Z's "normality' and the psychological explanation for his
offense." 301 But Bonnie and Slobogin have not given the factfinder
the crucial, behavioral data my system demands. They have given
us no information about Mr. Z's present functioning except vague

The Institute Evaluation revealed that these feelings began when Mr. Z was in college,
rather than earlier.
297
Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 8, at 489.
298
Id. at 490.
299
Id. at 489.
300
Id. at 489-90. The Institute Evaluation reports that he remembered these incidents
vividly and that they sounded "as if his father were raping his mother," but the report does
not mention that he was horrified by the events. Institute Evaluation, supra note 291.
'"' Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 8, at 490.
296
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conclusions about depression and social isolation. Yet 1\!Ir. Z had
friends and kept a diary. I would want to know much more about
his interpersonal and occupational functioning. HO\v did he function in schooi? What were the positive aspects of his relationships
with his parents? 302 Also, we are not provided with a complete sexual history, although such information is crucial to assessing t his
case. 303 In sum, we are given no substantial developmental history
and no full present functioning analysis.
Now let us turn to an examination of Mr. Z's criminal responsibility. I agree with Bonnie and Slobogin that a factfinder could not
assess l\1r. Z's normality solely on the basis of the behavioral data
that they present. But if the full behavioral data required by my
scheme were available, the factfinder would possess ample information to determine how "normal" Mr. Z was for the purpose of
judging his responsibility. Still, Bonnie and Slobogin claim that experts are necessary to help the factfinder understand whether f\Ar.
Z could have controlled himself. Without the experts, they allege, a
layperson could develop only one intuitive explanatory theory that Mr. Z "was seeking sexual gratification . . . even though the
circumstances of the offenses may be inconsistent with this explanation."304 A better explanatory theory is necessary because, without additional hypotheses which could be provided only by an expert, "the factfinder is likely to see no basis for questioning Mr. Z's
capacity to 'control' his behavior as a normal person would." 30 ts

For example, his parents were terribly concerned about Mr. Z and his plight and offered their cooperation to the Institute. Institute Evaluation, supra note 291. Mr. Z's parents may have been difficult and not overtly affectionate parents, but they were not uncaring or unconcerned.
303
The Institute Evaluation provides more helpful, although not sufficiently complete,
information. Mr. Z reported that he had been scared of having an intimate relationship with
a woman because he feared that women would not like him. He masturbated compulsively
until he formed his first stable relationship with a girlfriend. These behaviors are not unusual, however. Mr. Z reported that he fantasized about rape while masturbating - not an
uncommon fantasy - because he believed this was the only way he could have a woman,
and he admitted that he masturbated so frequently in order to curb frequent powerful impulses to forcefully have intercourse with a woman. These feelings seemed to coincide with
periods of extreme pressure from problems in his life. Finally, at the time of the evaluation,
he had formed a stable relationship with a woman he planned to marry before his arrest. No
information is provided about their sexual relationship although such information would be
very useful.
30
• Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 8, at 491 n.l96.
300
Id. Contrary to the assertion of Bonnie and Slobogin, laypersons could develop a reasonably plausible theory. Let me suggest the following explanation which is entirely consis302
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No theory is necessary, however, because consideration of Mr.
Z's own description of his mental state at the time of the crimes
provides the factfinder with the information necessary to evaluate
Mr. Z's difficulties in controlling his impulses and his criminal responsibility.306 When Mr. Z was "overcome" with the "strong
urges" to rape, he claims that he became "panicky." He had to
have a woman or "go crazy." Sometimes he would stifle the urge
by shutting himself up in his room, thinking about his girlfriend or
masturbating. At other times, he allegedly could not control himself: he would "fight it back and forth" before eventually succumbing. On each occasion, he had been drinking or using drugs
either before or while his urges came upon him. If Mr. Z was unable to conquer his panic, he would usually begin trying doors at
neighboring apartment complexes or homes, attempting to find a
woman alone. The victims were chosen entirely at random. Remember too Mr. Z's statement about his feelings just before committing his crime: "there was a feeling of real power and hate and
anger . . . I was really excited sexually. You know, I just felt . . .
there is a word, I can't think of it." 307
If Mr. Z credibly presented this story on the witness stand or to
a sentencing judge, with or without expert or lay explanation of his
crimes, the jury might reasonably believe that Mr. Z had unusually
difficult problems with self-control and might conclude that mitigation is the just response. Whether or not they would be correct,
the decision would not be a matter for experts. No expert explanation could provide "scientific" evidence of control problems that
would add anything to Mr. Z's own account. Expert opinions might
provide the sentencing judge with an "authoritative" rationalization for mitigating punishment, but it would be no more than that.
Bonnie and Slobogin do not believe that laypersons are capable

tent with the data Bonnie and Slobogin present and well within the powers of laypersons.
The reason Mr. Z attempted but never completed rape was that he harbors great hatred
towards women and perhaps he fears them as well. Moreover, he is very mixed up about
women and sexuality and about hurting people. Furthermore, these feelings are the result of
his unfortunate childhood. The very fact that he could engage in such perplexing behavior is
good evidence of the degree to which he is mixed up about women, sex and hatred.
306
The following material is taken from the Institute Evaluation, supra note 291.
307
Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 8, at 489 n.l93. One wonders, unavailingly, what
thoughts of Mr. Z were elliptically omitted. This statement is presented in the same way in
the Institute Evaluation, supra note 291. Perhaps the ellipses were meant simply to indicate
pauses.
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of forming an opinion about Mr. Z's control problems a.11d his responsibility without causal explanations for his behavior provided
by experts. "We have no doubt that the motivations for his [Mr.
Z's] behavior would remain obscure to the untrained layman, even
if the factual information were presented." 308 It is unfortunately
the case, however, that the motivations for Mr. Z's behavior are
obscure to experts and laypersons alike. At this stage in the scientific understanding of human behavior, no one can fathom much of
the human heart except in a commonsense and post hoc fashion.
Probably, life in general and the assessment and control of human
conduct would be more manageable if we understood behaviors to
the extent Bonnie and Slobogin assume, but we do not. In a case
like Mr. Z's, an evaluation of the rich available data, using commensense and compassion, is all that one can reasonably expect.
Bonnie and Slobogin offer the dynamic formulation of Mr. Z as
"an organizational and interpretational tool that neither the
factfinder nor counsel could have supplied." 309 But laypersons can
construct coherent interpretations or explanations that organize
and make sense of the data just as well as the expert. Lay interpretation may not sound as mysterious, scientific, or complex, but, as
I demonstrated in Section III of this article, there is little reason to
credit dynamic accounts of causation. 310 The dynamic explanation
offered by Bonnie and Slobogin does not organize and provide a
more scientifically confirmed causal account of Mr. Z's life than
common sense could - it only seems to do so in scientific fashion.
What is more, even if we accept psychodynamic explanations,
they will not be "probative and helpful on the issue of the defendant's ability to control his conduct," 311 as Bonnie and Slobogin
believe, because there is no theory to link intrapsychic causal accounts of behavior to control problems. 312 Presumably all behavior

Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 8, at 491.
Id. at 488.
Given Mr. Z's psychose xual development, the result of Z's drive toward self-degradation was his preoccupation with sexual aggression. Seeing his parents virtually do
battle each time they had intercourse led Z, on an unconscious level, to equate sex
with violence and degradation. The attempted rapes can be seen as an impulsive acting out of an unconscious desire to prove himself a "bad person."
Id. at 490.
310
See supra notes 84-135 and accompanying text.
311
Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 8, at 491.
312
See supra notes 151-86 and accompanying text.
308
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is intrapsychically caused. To claim that Mr. Z is intrapsychically
abnormal simply begs the question. 313 Pseudoscientific explanations only tend to prejudice the determination of whether a defendant was able to control himself. By conceptualizing the question
as one of disorder or disease, these explanations incorporate stereotypical notions of control, thereby begging the crucial legal question. Dynamic formulations, without more, are not explanations of
behavior, they are simply post hoc interpretations of that behavior.
They cannot tell us about the degree of impulse control problems
that Mr. Z experienced; they can only help rationalize a belief that
he is telling the truth and deserves mitigation.
Skilled clinicians may help the factfinder by providing useful observations about a defendant's thoughts, feelings, and actions, but
their science does not afford "deep" explanation and understanding. Mr. Z's unadorned life story and description are the best foundation for his plea for mercy. If the factfinder hears the rich data
that I believe is crucial, without the spurious contributions of experts, it will be able fully and fairly to determine whether a defendant is criminally responsible.

4.

Summary

As the case analyses demonstrate, when mental health issues are
implicated in criminal justice decisionmaking, the Crazy Behavior
proposals provide the most sound and complete data to ensure
sensible and fair decisions. Defendants should have every opportunity to present reasonable and relevant evidence on the questions
of mens rea and responsibilty, but legal decisionmakers do not
need spurious science and speculative fables in order to be fair to
defendants. The Crazy Behavior proposals, too, will admit imprecise information into evidence, but they will help keep the imprecision within reasonable limits. 314 By contrast, I believe that on

Ind eed, I had a patient whose history and dynamics matched those of Mr. Z quite
closely, yet the overt behavior was very different. Although my patient was mixed up about
women, anger, and sex, his "antisocial" fantasies and impulses were never acted out. Instead, he married, made a tenuous but lasting adjustment in the marriage, and pursued a
reasonably successful career and social life. My patient, too, was mixed up and would very
much have liked to ravish women, but he didn't. What is the difference between Mr. Z and
my patient? Frankly, I have no idea and neither do others unless they wish to engage in
conclusory, tautological reasoning .
3
Information about the influence of alcohol or drugs on behavior is an example. See
"
313
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grounds of scientific invalidity and legal irrelevancy? the Bonnie
and Slobogin approach is uncomfortably akin to "anything goes."
Even though the Crazy Behavior proposal is opposed to modern
trends in evidence law, careful analysis of mental health issues in
criminal justice decisionmaking leads to the conclusion that, in
that context, the modern trend is an unwise policy and ought to be
reversed. Although this will cause no loss in fairness, it will effect
great gains in honesty and efficiency. To vary Freud's phrase, if
the law adopts the Crazy Behavior proposals, where fantasies were,
there fact shall be. JH>
V.

CoNcLUSION: RESPONSIBILITY SKEPTICISM AND METHOD
VOTARISM, TERMINABLE AND INTERMINABLE

Although the climate of opinion in criminal justice has become
decidedly more conservative in the last decade, the emphasis on
subjective assessment in determinations of liability has shown little sign of abating. I believe the emphasis on the defendant's subjective states is entirely right. Mental states and the capacity for
control are important in ascribing liability: the criminal law should
be clear about the limits of responsibility and about what mental
states are required for various crimes, and it should ensure highly
accurate factfinding about these issues at trial and dispositional
proceedings. Even under presumptive sentencing schemes, there is
often some room for discretion, and it should be exercised intelligently and fairly.
Unfortunately, two harmful beliefs that are common among influential participants and observers of the criminal justice system
accompany the criminal law's emphasis on subjective functioning:
first, the belief that large numbers of persons are not responsible
supra note 149, however, for an explanation of why this information is not nearly as problematic as dynamic explanations.
3
'" This, of course, is a variation of Freud's famous dictum that after therapy succeeds,
"Where id was, there ego shall be." S. Freud, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, in 22 Standard Edition 57, 80 (1964).
An eminent psychiatrist has recently written:
[W] e should make every effort to be highly critical of data in the field of psychiatry
and to convey this critical attitude to our residents. This means that we must be
knowledgeable about the published evidence and must not accept illiteracy. . . . Why
not opt for a hard and data-bound viewpoint?
Winokur, What to Do?, or What Do We Owe Our Residents, 15 Biological Psychiatry 599,
611 (1980).
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for their conduct, and second, the belief that there are experts who
somehow can simplify the extraordinarily complex and difficult
question of criminal responsibility. Based more on compassion
than on empirical data or hard analysis, the first proposition erodes the moral fabric of society and the deterrent and educative
effects of the criminal law. The second proposition, which is based
on credulity and an understandable need for authoritative explanations in the face of troubling perplexities, leads to misguided
decisionmaking processes that surrender the responsibility for deciding hard questions to experts and compromise the integrity of
the criminal justice system. We must accept the reality that often
there are no scientific explanations for the behavior of individual
defendants, and that common sense and compassion are our best
tools for ascribing responsibility and meting out punishment.
There are no panaceas for the ongoing problem of crime in our
nation or for the ineffectiveness of our criminal justice process.
Nevertheless, I believe a renewed emphasis on both personal responsibility for one's actions and the limitations of irrelevant expertise will have a salutary effect on crime and criminal justice.

